Tuesday evening, February 28th. It was his fifth consecutive night shift on duty. stationmaster in Larissa. Resumption of work on the basis of the appropriate organizational chart at 22.00. Earlier in the day, at 15.54, a failure occurred on a section of the railway network.

Passenger train No. 56, on the Athens – Thessaloniki route, had just stopped at Paleofarsalos when an electrical cable broke and fell on the train. The disembarkation signal was withdrawn until it was determined that there was no danger to the passengers. Train 56 departed shortly after 1900 from Paleofarsalos, covering the distance to Larissa with a diesel engine.

In this part, to Larissa, passing trains would have to move in the opposite direction, downstream. From Larisa onwards, there was no reason to go in one direction, according to the available evidence. Trains would have to run on a conventional double track. However, passenger train 62 departed shortly after 23:00 for Neos Poros downstream.

A few minutes later he met an approaching commercial train. OUR head-on collisionwithout the operation of special electronic security systems and the prevention of human errors at that time it was impossible to prevent.

“Only from 22.25”

In his apology, which saw the light, the head of the police department of Larisa outlined his version of what happened on the fateful night. He said that he arrived at the Larissa station at 21.20 and that at that moment the train 56 was on the ascending direction, which in half an hour left for Thessaloniki by order of his colleague in the regular mode. An hour later, at 10:25 p.m., he said he was the only head of the station in Larisa, as two of his colleagues, who usually had a shift until 11 p.m., allegedly left earlier.

A commercial train with containers of goods departed at 19:50 from Thessaloniki towards Athens. A few minutes earlier, at 19.22, she went on her own route. Passenger train IC 62 from Athens.

Due to a problem with the network, he stopped for about 48 minutes in Paleofarsalos and then headed to Larissa. After some passengers disembarked and others boarded, there were 352 people on the train, of whom 10 were crew members.

Experienced driverwho passed that point earlier in the day, explains “K” that due to the inoperability of the key fob, the movement is carried out by telegrams, radiotelephone consultations and written instructions. If ETCS, the European Rail Traffic Control System, were put in place, there would be an extra margin of safety to avoid human error. Without it, transportation is carried out on other conditions.

“It’s like driving down the road at a red light” his colleagues pointed to “K”. about the conditions in which they work. OUR train driver talking to “K” he states that under the relevant OSE traffic regulations, his IC 62 colleague should have received an official document (which is called a “Form 1001” and acts as a binding directive) by the stationmaster. It was with this document that he indicated where he should move, along which line. This, judging by what is known so far, did not happen.

In his apology, the head of the station allegedly claimed that, due to the workload, he did not take appropriate action to announce the route that the passenger train would then follow.

Normally, he should have informed the train driver that he was traveling on a double line to the traffic light at the entrance to Nei Poron, i.e. that after Larisa he continues on his way normally, and not along one line. In their dialogue, which was made public, the following conversation can be heard:

Driver: Larissa is listening?
Station manager: Listens. At number 47 you pass through the red traffic light at the exit to the traffic light at the entrance to Neios Poros.
Driver: Santa, am I leaving?
Station manager: You’re leaving, you’re leaving.

He himself, based on his testimony, did not seem to understand what had happened and that the passenger train continued on its way to Thessaloniki, moving downhill. “I can’t understand how it happened. I don’t remember what happened,” he said. “What I can assume is that the key clicked for a moment and then turned off and I returned to the siding, but the indicators on the panel have not changed.

Shock Dialogues

He was informed about the train collision by the fire department. “I called both trains, and neither of them answered me, and I told the head of the New Resources station to call too, but there was no answer, and then I realized what happened,” he said. From audio documents published on the website protothema.gr, it follows that a few minutes after the collision, he did not understand what had happened. At 23.41, a traffic controller from Athens contacts him and the following dialogue follows:

Traffic Regulator: Where did you bring him in the 62nd?

From the dialogue of the traffic controller from Athens and the head of the station Larisa, it turns out that until 23.41, almost 20 minutes after the accident, he did not notice the slightest phenomenon.

Larisa Head of the station: Upstream is fine.

Traffic Regulator: Because they say it became commercial with… so… it became a conflict.

Larisa Head of the station: Man!

At 23.47 the traffic controller contacts the station master for the second time and again asks the station master from which line he pushed Intercity. He replies that he had it on the lift line and mentions that he had a problem with his keys that day. At 00.06, the head of the New Resources station contacts him in shock. From the dialogue it follows that the stationmaster did not understand what happened.

– Come on, Helen.

– Santa, what happened?

– There’s been an accident.

– How did he crash?

“I don’t know, Eleni, I don’t know, whatever I tell you, I’ll lie to you. That’s how it happened and got downhill, I don’t know…

He claimed that the driver of a commercial train should have reacted upon seeing that he was sent downstream and asked him about it or stopped the train.

Acting stationmaster who spoke to “K”. on condition of anonymity, he suggests that his colleague in Larissa probably forgot the key in the wrong place, and so the train moved in the opposite direction.

He claims that at least five minutes after the train left Larisa, the stationmaster should have determined that the train was going downhill. “He has to stop this, turn back. Then he would have been punished, but the accident could have been avoided,” he argues.

He also adds that if modern security systems were installed throughout the network, the collision could have been prevented, and calls the incident “unthinkable.”