A network of business interests and conflicts and a string of controversial government decisions they seem to be behind unreasonable delays in the signaling of the country’s railway network.

A project that started as a technically simple repair of an existing system and should have ended in 2016, as a result, “crawled” for nine yearsat the same time, ERGOSE not only did not rebel against the consortium that undertook this, but also decided in 2021, under an additional contract, to pay again for the same item, instructing it to replace part of the equipment it installed.

From the beginning of the 1980s, electrical signaling began to be installed in the Greek railway network. According to the Ministry of Infrastructure, the signaling systems were installed under 15 different OSE and ERGOSE contracts with a total budget of about 250 million euros (most from 1995 to 2001). The systems are owned by two companies: Bombardier and Alstom. Until a certain period, contracts were concluded directly with a specific manufacturer (Bombardier) under the pretext of “uniqueness of the manufacturer”, while Alstom gradually entered the Greek market.

Since 2008 (serious) problems began: on the one hand, sabotage (theft of cables, vandalism of mechanical cabinets, etc.), and on the other hand, (and) the obsolescence of the railway, as Greece entered into an economic crisis. However, it is a fact that until 2010, on most of the railway network (Kiato – Aharnon Transportation Center – Thessaloniki – Idomeni/Promachonas – with the exception of the reconstructed section of Tiforeas – Domokos – and the Oinois – Chalkis branch), the system was installed and managed signaling from remote control.

The collapse of the system happened very quickly. OSE and ERGOSE started studying system recovery methods in 2011-2012 and launched a tender in 2013, which was awarded in 2014. The project “Reconstruction and modernization of the signaling system – remote control and replacement of 70 track shifts in localized parts of the Athens – Thessaloniki – Promachona axis” was transferred to the joint venture “TOMI ABETE (subsidiary of Ellactor) – Alstom” (contract 717/14).

As stated in the contract (which is at the disposal of “K”), ADtratz systems were installed on the SKA – Platy section (with the exception of the Tiforeas – Domokos section, which was outside the contract, since it was reconstructed according to another project that also included signaling) , later Bombardier, and on the Plati – Thessaloniki – Strimonas section – the Promachonas system of Sasib, now Alstom. The contractor was called upon to “design, modify, build, install and put into operation all the equipment necessary for the full and normal operation of the signaling and telemechanics,” the contract says (clause 1.4).

“The equipment that the contractor will need to manufacture will be the same or equivalent to the existing one to ensure the necessary compatibility with reused as well as already installed equipment and will be certified for use on the main railway network” (condition 1.5 of the contract). In fact, the contract stipulated that the contractor would not be able to subsequently “show” other problems, demanding additional payment. “It is specifically stated that any equipment or work that becomes necessary for the full and normal operation of the CCS and remote control and the need for them is not expressly described in this issue or arises during the project (after determining the type and / or condition of the existing or existing equipment) will be provided by the contractor at no additional charge, while the corresponding price is considered reduced to the total cost of the project, ”it says (clause 1.7 of the contract). In addition, the contractor must train ERGOSE personnel in the operation and maintenance of the equipment, be solely responsible for its correct operation for 3 years (condition 1.8 of the contract), and the selected suppliers must be able to supply spare parts for 15 years (clause 15.1 of the contract). Finally, he had to ensure that his work “does not affect the level of safety of the existing system” and to coordinate his work with the requirements of train traffic.

Precisely because the contractor was required not to build and install a new system from the very beginning, but to “revive” the existing one (with the necessary repairs and additions), the time allotted for the project was short: only two years. and even with intermediate delivery times for stand-alone parts.

The project was supposed to be completed in 2016. Only in 2021, after prolongations and delays, ERGOSE decided to put it back into operation, replacing the installed equipment.

Exchange

After signing the contract with ERGOSE, the two companies of the consortium signed an “internal” agreement in which they divided the project into two parts. According to the “K” people involved in the projects at the time, TOMI took over the southern part (SKA – Platy), which contained Bombardier’s equipment, and Alstom took over the northern part (the rest), where its equipment was previously located. Given that TOMI was not a company specializing in such systems, it used what in the “language” of government projects is called “expert loans”, that is, the studies will be signed by Alstom-Ferroviaria.

The project started with problems. According to the head of ERGOSE, studies prepared by TOMI were rejected by ERGOSE due to errors. In addition, Alstom-Ferroviaria, although a “partner” of TOMI, refused to certify the systems of the southern section. In fact, before the end of 2014, ERGOSE, with the assistance of a consortium, proposed to remove and replace all existing equipment in the Oinoi-Tiforea and Domokos-Plati sections. The request was rejected at the project supervision level (01/12/2015).

What exactly happened? Opinions differ. TOMI executives at the time argued that placing Alstom equipment online was a business “game” (interestingly, Alstom merged with Bombardier in 2020 with approval from the European Commission). Alstom executives at the time argued that TOMI purchased low-quality machines that “no one would put their signature on”, and the quality of its research was poor due to a lack of relevant expertise. K sent questions to both companies that were not answered.

As a result, the project progressed slowly. On August 31, 2016, the ERGOSE Board of Directors decided to grant the first extension of the project. The extension decision and the subsequent six do not provide sufficient grounds. But they have a (legally fatal) mistake: ERGOSE admits that it is also to blame for the delay of the project, which makes it jointly and severally liable.

The project, with an initial budget of 41 million euros, was co-financed by the NSRF. As it happened, at some point (in 2017, after two extensions), the EU intervened. asking why the project is not being completed. This was followed in 2018 by an investigation by the Fiscal Audit Committee (EDEL), which found serious problems at the SKA-Plata section and demanded the recovery of 2.42 million euros from the project owner, ERGOSE (see K, 3.3. 2023) . ). The Ministry of Infrastructure claims that the checks (coinciding, in fact, with the well-known case of the “cartel” of builders) actually “frozen” the project from 2017 to 2019. And while it was all going on In 2017, the Ministry of Infrastructure presented the European agencies with a “national interoperability implementation plan” in Greece, misleading them about the project schedule. Specifically, it states that the signaling system “started in 2014 and will be completed in early 2019”, claiming that it will be put into operation in 2020 (except for the Tiforeas-Domokos section), which was, of course, impossible.

Now that the risk of withdrawing from the project (and returning the funding) was clear, ERGOSE began (several years late) to threaten the consortium with sanctions. According to sources in the Ministry of Infrastructure, the progress of the project in 2014-2017 reached 32.69%, and in 2017-2021 it was zero.

“Half of the devices worked. None have been certified.

Revolutions are coming in 2021. Under the new “internal” agreement, TOMI transfers its part of the project to Alstom (remaining, however, in the consortium). In May, ERGOSE signs an additional contract worth 13.3 million euros for a period of 14 months (it has already received its first extension until March 2023). At the end of 2021, Alstom delivered an alarm system for the Thessaloniki – Promakhona section and a remote control system for the Plati – Promakhona section (about 190 km). Meanwhile, in May 2022, the remote control of the Tiforei-Domokos section, built under a different contract by a different contractor, was handed over.
But what gives an additional contract?

ERGOSE demanded, among other things, to “remove” and replace the existing equipment at the Oinoy-Titora section, which was installed with European funds. “It turned out that only half of the devices installed by TOMI are working. In addition, none of them was certified by either Alstom or ERGOSE, ”an employee of the Ministry of Infrastructure told K on condition of anonymity. Thus, the state paid the same consortium 13.3 million euros to restore the same part that it had just paid for. Events related to the project led in April 2022 to the resignation of the (then) chairman of the ETCS (we are talking about automatic train braking system) ERGOSE Christos Katsiulis. Pointing out that the ETCS system cannot function without remotely controlled signaling, Mr. Katsioulis speaks of the “unnecessary dismantling of the current (European funded) existing interdependence systems at the railway stations of Tanagra, Eleonas, Tivas, Aliartos, Alalkomena, Livadei and Pressure and their replacement by another system of interdependence”, “improper execution of the contract for signal reduction in the Domokos-Larisa section”, “non-compliance with the object of the contract in the Oinoi-Tiforea section by canceling the line segmentation stipulated by the contract and replacing conventional track circuits with axle counters”, arguing that that track meters do not detect a break in the railway tracks on which trains travel at a speed of 200 km / h. Finally, he reports that the country has made commitments to the EU. to the completion of ETCS in May 2022, which, of course, should not have happened.

According to the Ministry of Infrastructure, the implementation of the Athens-Thessaloniki-Promakhona line remote-controlled signaling project is currently 69.23%, and the completion of the additional contract is 16.9%. In the coming days, both contracts will be extended until September 2023. “The system will be ready in July, provided that we have parts that we import from abroad, because at the moment we have big delays,” Panagiotis Terezakis, management consultant. OSE (“Inconsistency,” SKAI Television) said Thursday. “The answer to the question “why wasn’t the project completed sooner?” it is hidden in some of the tender procedures and in some of the contract validation checks, in some of the schedules that are left behind because of the materials. Accomplishing such a task is difficult. Some new systems were added that were not covered by the original contract. This leads to some increase in cost. You see, technology is evolving at a tremendous rate.”