The positioning of the European Union (EU) in relation to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia regarding the dimension of the accession dialogue depends on the results of the states. The component of European security and the geopolitical motivation of the population of the three countries was important for the EU at the stage of providing a perspective in the summer of 2022. After the completion of the stage of including the Eastern European neighbors in the “enlargement package” of the EU, Russian aggression is no longer a sufficient argument for accelerating rapprochement with the EU. At the same time, European officials insist on the exact application of the meritocratic principle in relation to the states that seek to join the EU.

An assessment of the degree of transposition of the European acquis in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia allows Brussels to moderate the ambitious steps of the three states (IPN, February 2023). Only Georgia is satisfied with the EU’s assessment and uses it to overcome the difficulties of a potential candidate, claiming that it is comparable to Ukraine and more advanced than Moldova. The authorities of Ukraine and Moldova are quite wary of insufficient progress in catching up with the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey. The latter have a level of approximation to the European acquis more than 20 points higher than in Ukraine (69 points), and more than 30 points more than the results of Moldova – 55 points (European Truth, February 2023). On the other hand, the balance of legislative rapprochement with the EU of the Eastern European neighbors is in any case positive, considering that Turkey received the candidacy in 1999 and Serbia in 2012.

Even after revelations about still limited progress on European legislation, some Ukrainian leaders still count on meeting the EU’s requirements to open negotiations in 2024, so that fast-track accession is possible as early as 2025. Optimism also prevails in Moldova, which has adjusted its targets for fulfilling the EU conditions set immediately after receiving the candidacy in June 2022. Kishinev wants to be ready from a technical point of view for possible inclusion “in a package” with Ukraine. Thus, the Chisinau government postponed the actions originally planned to be implemented from June 2023 to the end of March (Expert-Grup, 2022). On the one hand, the Georgian leadership is taking concerted action to rapidly fulfill EU requirements in order to keep up. However, the image costs of refusing to pardon former President Mikheil Saakashvili, who is serving time in Georgia for a series of past abuses (Agenda, February 2023), affect confidence in Georgia. To the same extent, the reluctance of the Georgian side to provide guarantees regarding the exclusion of any influence of Bidzina Ivanishvili on politics and justice fuels suspicions about the sincerity of the Georgian government’s intentions to promote the European integration process (European Parliament, February 2023). Similar initiatives to declare mass media and public organizations “external agents” of influence do not help Georgia either.

5 principles to make reforms more effective

In order to accelerate reforms in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, the EU needs a set of very clear rules to be followed when promoting, monitoring and evaluating the quality of reforms and the effectiveness of their impact. These include the following principles: 1) overcoming geopolitical prejudices; 2) conditionality of reforms; 3) depoliticization of the rule of law; 4) capitalization of the transformative potential of elections; 5) Europeanization of elites.

Principle 1: Overcoming geopolitical stereotypes

First of all, the EU and other external partners for the development of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia should distance themselves from the geopolitical dichotomy with which they interpret the political realities in these countries. For example, not every political actor who claims to be pro-European has an agenda that seamlessly follows this approach. Such a situation may be typical for Georgia. At the same time, if pro-European governments criticize local political forces, the latter should not be seen as supporters or mediators of Russian interests. Similar unjustified approaches to the opposition are widespread in Moldova, including with the support of government officials.

Brussels has enough tools to conduct a nuanced analysis and carefully contextualize the internal political rivalries in the three countries. Otherwise, there is a risk that signals from opposition forces about shortcomings in the implementation of certain reforms will be ignored by European evaluators. Combating geopolitical biases is particularly important in the context of Russian aggression, when healthy oppositional skepticism can be discredited by authorities through negative association, often through inertia, with pro-Russian forces.

Principle 2: Conditionality of reforms

Even if the reforms related to the EU accession dialogue are a priority for the governments in Kyiv, Chisinau and Tbilisi, they cannot remain only at the goodwill of political actors in these countries. As demonstrated by the recent high-profile corruption case involving the use of foreign aid to Ukraine, there are political actors and groups that seek to profit from prioritizing the goal of protecting against the Russian threat. To prevent such cases, the EU is obliged to intervene through its conditionality mechanism, which according to European rules must be attached to any external (non-humanitarian) aid provided by the EU.

In the context of war and the multiple crises facing the three countries, conditionality must include a measure of flexibility. However, the reforms that the three governments have committed to implementing in key sectors (rule of law, justice, etc.) require careful monitoring and punishment. As a first step, based on the completely different situation in Moldova compared to Ukraine, the EU should ensure comprehensive monitoring of the conditions applied to this country. In the period of 2021-2022, Moldova received about 1.1 billion euros from the EU in the form of grants and loans. In 2023, the EU promises to provide another 145 million in the form of macro-financial assistance. However, there is no clear EU report that would indicate how many reforms that make up the EU conditions for Moldova have been implemented, with what result. received and how the situation in the reformed sphere is developing. Such EU reports will help the opposition, civil society and the media to hold the government accountable, making the European integration process even more meritocratic.

Principle 3: Depoliticization of the rule of law

In order to eliminate the use of justice as a political tool, the EU’s approach should include depoliticizing reforms aimed at the judicial system. Attempts by politicians to purge the system of corrupt judges and prosecutors must follow strict rules to avoid setting dangerous precedents. To avoid systemic resistance to reforms in this sensitive sector, European actors should prevent representatives of the national governments of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia from intimidating judges.

Public statements by presidents, ministers or parliamentarians of a country warning judges that their decisions will be taken into account in the evaluation process are an indirect form of political interference in the reform. Thus, judges can make decisions that politically suit the authorities, but then lose in the European Court of Human Rights because they violate international conventions. There were similar episodes in Moldova. In the case of Ukraine, the Venice Commission criticized the way the Constitutional Court was reformed, as there was a risk that the institution could be politically subordinated to the country’s president (Kyiv Independent, December 2022). The risk that the courts will remain politicized remains high in Georgia. Failure to reform the self-governing body in Georgia’s judicial sector leaves unresolved the problem of “judicial clans” that may become loyal based on political criteria (Civil.ge, November 2022) Read the full article and leave comments on the contributors. ro