The reorganization of the DNR militia by the Ministry of Defense of Russia is causing discontent among Russian military bloggers after the head of the DPR militia, Eduard Basurin, was dismissed. At the same time, Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin’s new bid to attract an ally failed and his power appears to be slipping further after Ramzan Kadyrov rejected his outstretched hand, according to the Institute’s latest analysis. to study the war with the United States. Moreover, the Kremlin will lose the trust of volunteers at the front because it does not pay them.

The Ministry of Defense of Russia announced the dismissal of the military spokesman of the “DNR” Eduard Basurin as part of the official reorganization of the “DNR” militia under the Russian Ministry, which caused another wave of criticism of the “Russian defense” institution by Russian bloggers.

A well-known Russian media blogger informed his more than a million followers that on February 17, the Russian military fired the press secretary of the DPR military command, Eduard Basurin.

This media blogger reported that the Russian Defense Ministry is trying to replace all DPR and LPR militia commanders with professional Russian officers as part of an official reorganization of the DPR and LPR militia under the direction of the Russian ministry.

Many Russian media bloggers reacted to this news with displeasure, disappointment and indignation, saying that the commanders of the DPR and LPR have practical experience of fighting against Ukraine and are better than “real” Russian commanders, although the commanders of the DPR and LPR do not have a military education, but they know peacetime. military positions, have relevant bureaucratic experience or meet the physical training requirements of the Russian military.

Some bloggers claimed that the purge of DPR and LPR officers would lower the morale of Russian fighters and undermine support for the Russian military establishment.

The financier of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, said that he would soon meet with the command of the DNR to discuss the alleged dismissal of Basurin, and said that this news must be some kind of false propaganda, since the dismissal of the commanders of the DPR and LNR would be unacceptable . Prigozhin is likely to use the episode in his ongoing information counteroffensive against the Russian Ministry of Defense if Basurin’s release is confirmed.

2: Russia is losing confidence in volunteers

Another problem facing the Kremlin is that it is not fulfilling its financial promises to the Russian volunteer force in Ukraine, and this failure is likely to have detrimental consequences for Russia’s ability to build a long-term volunteer force as it seeks to professionalize and expand the army .

Prominent Russian bloggers have claimed that the Russian military is not paying promised financial compensation to Russian soldiers in many units, and noted that the problem is particularly relevant to units of the Combat Reserve of the Russian Army (BARS).

Russia’s Ministry of Defense (Ministry of Defense) sought to establish the BARS as an active reserve, enlisting volunteer reservists for three years of contract service beginning in the fall of 2021 and offering modest financial compensation of between 4,000 and 9,000 rubles (approximately US$54 and US$122) per month with other benefits, but this initiative failed almost immediately.

Millbloggers also noted that the Russian bureaucracy is making it impossible for volunteers who joined the Russian military effort in the spring and summer of 2022 to receive documents confirming participation in hostilities, documents necessary to receive the promised payments.

One of the media bloggers noted that Russian officials must resolve these issues in the near future, otherwise there will be an “explosion” of discontent.

Another mil-blogger noted that the Russian General Staff should be punished for the mistreatment of BARS personnel, since the active reserve was an initiative of the Russian General Staff.

Millbloggers also noted that mobilized Russian servicemen who fought on the Svatove-Kreminna line at the end of September 2022 do not receive compensation for their injuries, and added that officials at conscription centers are understaffed and unable to solve these problems.

Prigozhin looks for allies, but fails

The leader of the Chechen Republic, Ramzan Kadyrov, rejected attempts by Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin to join a smear campaign against Russia’s Defense Ministry, suggesting the campaign may not restore Prigozhin’s waning influence.

Despite Prigozhin’s efforts, the Chechen leader likely still considers “his official ties to the Kremlin and his position in the Russian Ministry of Defense more beneficial than any political relationship with Prigozhin,” according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). .

The ISW report comes as Prigozhin’s rivalry with Russia’s Defense Ministry escalated over the past month.

According to ISW, Prigozhin is “stepping up his information campaign” in an effort to establish his mercenary group as an independent elite force seeking power in Russia. On February 18, he stated that the “Wagner” PMC is not related to the Russian military and does not report to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

The ISW said that the attitude of Kadyrov and Prigozhin to the Russian Ministry of Defense “diverges”, with the Chechen leader strengthening his relations with the Kremlin.

Prigozhin is “probably trying to attract ultra-nationalist figures to the Kremlin and co-opt Russian military bloggers to support his rise to power in Russia,” but he is likely to find that those with ties to the Kremlin will move away from him by — and keep intercession.”

An assessment by the US Institute for the Study of War in January said Russian President Vladimir Putin and his close Kremlin advisers had lost confidence in Wagner’s mercenary group, led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, after they failed to capture the key city of Bakhmut.

Wagner PMC boss Yevgeny Prigozhin also admitted that his mercenary group is facing difficulties in Ukraine and will soon “shrink” in size amid growing evidence that its political influence in the Kremlin is waning.

Wagner has reportedly stopped recruiting from prisons, and the Russian Ministry of Defense is said to have started doing so.

The influence of the head of the “Wagner” PMC Yevgeny Prigozhin would decrease, this would also be the reason why he would purchase weapons from North Korea, reports independent researcher Chris Owen with reference to the Russian Cheka-OGPU Telegram channel.

The cited source also tells the Telegram channel that Wagner and the head of the mercenary group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, are at a disadvantage, and the Russian Ministry of Defense asserts its superiority by controlling the supplies destined for the group, which would also explain that Wagner will try to get supplies from the North Korea