Why was it paid only by PASOK and not by ND? or SYRIZA with its memorandums? Who paid dearly for “money exists”? Who favored and who fell victim to violence and populism? Could things have turned out differently? These are some of the questions journalist Pantelis Kapsis tries to answer in his book Fall. 2011 is the zero year of the centre-left.” This is an exciting chronicle of a political and national discount that comes out February 9th from Metaichmio. In it, a veteran but not invincible journalist describes from the inside the intrigue and background of everything that happened in PASOK and in the country, as he experienced it as the director of Neos. The narrative begins in 2007, where he sees the beginning of the end, and culminates in the tumultuous 2011. The presentation of the book will take place on Monday, February 13, in the public cafe “Syntagma”, at 20:30. Giannis Voulgaris, Anna Diamantopoulou, Stavros Theodorakis and K director Alexis Papachelas will perform. It is moderated by journalist Fofi Yotaki. Tentative excerpts are previously published below.

HM.

pre-publication

I usually left the office for the newspaper after eleven. However, that evening I left much earlier. It was Champions League day for Panathinaikos and a group of parents of my son’s friends along with our children went after the stadium to eat at the famous pasta restaurant in Psychikos. The group included two journalists from Mega and Vimatos staff and close associate Vangelis Venizelos, all good friends. (…) The 2007 elections were still weeks away, and Karamanlis’s re-election was considered inevitable. I was expecting a lively political debate, but what followed astounded me. They worked out in detail for me, what later turned out to be a perfectly accurate, well-organized coup, so that Venizelos would become the leader of PASOK. In the same way, everything will be done on election night so that George does not have time to react. They discounted the success because, they claimed, Venizelos secured the support of the channel, the publishers, Christos Lambrakis and Giorgos Bombolas, and Kostas Simitis was also involved in the venture.

I must admit that I felt very bad. It was as if a conspiracy was being hatched that directly concerned me, as the director of the Youth, since he devalued the position of my newspaper behind my back. (…) While I was living in the newspaper as the editor-in-chief of the political department with Leos Karapanayiotis as director and then as director, I never faced such a situation. The “Constitution” was thought to raise and lower governments, but the reality, in my own experience, was very different. We were aware of the political power and weight of a front page headline, critical article or report. However, we did not consider it our task to dictate the course of events. (…) My first reaction was to start thinking about how to keep The News out of this story. On Monday morning, just after the election, and after Venizelos appeared in Zappeio asking for George’s resignation, I asked to see Lambrakis. (…) He left for his office very early, before the rest of the Stair officials arrived, so I made sure to get up when I knew he would be alone. I began to make a political proposal and argue why Ta Nea, as a “newspaper of all factions”, should stay out of the debate and not side with any candidate. “Very well, Mr. Capsis,” he interrupted me in a rather cold tone. “The news can keep that attitude, Bima is another matter.” And so it happened, the News adhered to a policy of equal distance, although in the end I don’t know how much we avoided criticism. With overexposure Styopa took the ball and us. (…)

Could things have turned out differently? Why was it paid only by PASOK and not by ND? or SYRIZA with its memorandums?

Simitis, Venizelos, Lambrakis, Bombolas, their coexistence on the same side of the intra-party confrontation clearly needs to be explained. (…) However, everyone had their own separate reasons. For Giorgos Bombolas, the defeat of Karamanlis was somewhat existential in nature. He has not forgotten the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to extort him from the media. (…) This could not be said about Christos Lambrakis. He had no such motive. Despite initial threats, Karamanlis’s government did not dare to openly confront him, especially with regard to his life’s work, the Concert Hall. Relationships can be described by the phrase “far and dear.” (…) As for Simitis, since the pre-election period of 2004, he was annoyed that Giorgos distanced himself and did not defend the work of his government. Finally, Venizelos always had the drive to be a leader, he truly felt he deserved it, he never showed much appreciation for George’s abilities. (…) This quasi-union of the four in itself presented a serious problem for the candidacy of Venizelos. (…) Other tactical mistakes were added to this problem. The announcement of Venizelos’s candidacy on the night of the defeat was a thoughtless act. Worse, the next day, The Step was published under the headline “Resign, Mr. President.” This was an act of arrogance, but also an unprecedented interference in the internal affairs of the party, which, of course, had the opposite effect. It turned out to be decisive.

Up to this point, there was the possibility of George’s resignation. He was the subject of discussion in a narrow circle of his people. However, after the Bimatos attack, his resignation would be tantamount to humiliation. After all, Shag allowed him to build his campaign around this attack. He will fight those who want to win the party. His candidacy acquired a significance that really touched the feelings of the broad masses. The change in tone in George’s campaign, as well as in his personal image, became apparent almost immediately. (…) A few days after the appearance on the front page of Vimatos, I had the opportunity to verify the extent of his involvement in the process. I received a panicked call from Anna Diamantopoulou, who was also thinking of running. She told me that one of the leaders of Bimatas had more or less threatened her that if she did, DOL would destroy her. I listened to her indignantly and assured her that DOL did not act like that, that there was no such “instruction”, and, of course, Novosti would never attack her on such a matter. I don’t know if the phone call was authorized by Lambrakis or if it was the leader’s initiative. Personally, I think the second one doesn’t fit my idea of ​​Lambrakis.

During the election campaign, I also met with Vangelis Venizelos after a phone call from him. We met at the Hilton coffee shop on the first floor, and he asked me to support his candidacy. I don’t forget my friends, that was the meaning of his words. I explained that Novosti would remain neutral in this confrontation. I said the same to Kostas Simitis, who took me on the phone. His own approach was different. One horse is lame, he told me, maybe in the wrong words, the other is crooked, it doesn’t matter which one leads us to the crane. I didn’t have the slightest contact with Papandreou. I generally disliked calling politicians, except in cases of emergency. (…) On the morning of September 20, 2007, Vangelis Venizelos arrived at the PASOK office to attend a meeting of the Executive Office. Journalists, television people, party members, as well as curious people gathered on the street, when suddenly a man jumped out of the crowd and poured a glass of coffee on the candidate. He was a deranged man known to the police, as he had previously thrown paints at President Kostis Stephanopoulos, as well as eggs at the memorial service for Andreas Papandreou. At the time, of course, this was not known, and Venizelos made a scathing statement about those who wanted to return political culture “to the Middle Ages.” However, he added that “as the future leader of the entire faction, I forgive” those who become “tool-driven in poverty”. The statement was played on the channels and perceived as arrogant, especially in light of what later became known about the identity of the perpetrator. It was an accidental event, which, however, ironically thickened almost the very essence of the problem of Venizelos’ election campaign. That is, it seems that he believed that he had already won the lead. This was facilitated by the fact that he hastened to put forward his candidacy for Zappeion on the very night of the elections. While the PASOK supporters mourned, he seemed to be waiting and wishing for defeat in order to satisfy his ambitions. (…)

The specificity of the pre-election struggle for PASOK was also revealed in the polls. The first, which saw the light a few days after the defeat in the national elections, gave Venizelos an overwhelming advantage. However, over time, the picture changed in favor of Papandreou. (…) In the MRB poll in October, he was ahead with 42.6% against George’s 31.5%. However, when the question was directed to those who would go to vote, George was ahead with 50.5% to Venizelos’ 43.7%. Similar results were found in other surveys. In the end, Giorgos won by an even larger margin, receiving 55.5% of the vote against Venizelos’ 38.5%.