The invasion itself is considered a victory, and it will be equally difficult for the Russian president to lose or win the war, writes the Financial Times.

The order for Russian troops to withdraw from Kherson, a large Ukrainian city – the only regional center they have managed to capture since February – is one of Moscow’s latest major defeats in Ukraine. Only two months ago, the Russian army was forced to withdraw from all previously occupied districts of the Kharkiv region.

General Serhiy Surovikin, who was appointed commander of Ukrainian forces after the withdrawal from Kharkiv, warned that there could be “difficult decisions.” The loss of Kherson is the worst that could happen, as the region was among the four Ukrainian regions annexed by the Kremlin in late September.

Since the beginning of the invasion, there has been speculation that the military’s failure could lead to Putin’s downfall.

Ultimately, it was after a series of failed military adventures that the Greek and Argentinian juntas collapsed, and the disastrous colonial wars led to the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and the dismantling of the Salazar-Caetano regime.

Other examples suggest that we should be careful: the defeat in Kuwait in 1991 did not remove Saddam Hussein, and the nationalist regime of Slobodan Milosevic survived the defeat of Serbian forces in Croatia and Bosnia. However, even if major setbacks in Ukraine do not lead to Putin’s downfall, they may change the “face” of the regime.

Russia’s goals in this war against Ukraine are not clear. Among them are “denazification” and “decommunization”, the safety of Donbas residents, demilitarization and preventing Ukraine from joining NATO, the return of former Russian territories, the protection of the Russian language, and even “saving” Ukrainian cities from gay parades.

The lack of clear goals makes the definition of victory uncertain. But this ambiguity also makes the criteria for defeat unclear—not to mention the worst ones that put Putin at risk. In fact, the Russian president has already experienced several defeats: the first blitzkrieg-style invasion failed, and Russian troops were forced to withdraw from Kyiv and other cities.

Russia lost the “Moscow”, the pride of its Black Sea fleet, and left Snake Island, its first successful conquest since the beginning of the war. After a hasty departure from the outskirts of Kharkiv, they attacked another important symbol – the bridge to the Crimea. Other leaders may have already been removed from power by such military failures, but not Putin.

The truth is that Putin’s supporters do not perceive the invasion of Ukraine as an act of aggression. For them, it is revenge against the stronger West. Researchers of Russian society observe an amazing paradox. History ranks Russia among the largest Western colonial empires. But after the defeat in the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis of the 1990s, more and more Russians feel like a colony ruled by Western powers. Now they believe that they are getting rid of the yoke that has so greatly humiliated their country by “imposing” capitalism on it.

In the eyes of disgruntled Russians, any form of resistance to the West is a victory, almost regardless of its outcome. Even if they retreat, they will console themselves with the thought that they have prevented a greater enslavement of Russia. Therefore, there is no direct connection between the failures of the military and the weakening of Putin’s power. It is equally difficult for a president to lose or win a war. Internally, even the invasion itself is a kind of victory. At the same time, the passive majority can be convinced that whatever the result is, it is the best. And the crickets will be silenced with repressions, just like now.

There are signs that after leaving Kherson, a number of more pragmatic elements in the Kremlin will seek a compromise. Whether or not the retreat is a trap for Ukrainian forces, as many fear, Moscow will find it impossible to control the city and maintain its forces, or be cut off from supply lines across the great Dnieper River. The word “negotiations”, once almost taboo, is now increasingly heard among Russian officials.

By winter, Moscow can seek official recognition of its control over the remaining occupied territories and an end to the Ukrainian offensive in exchange for the annexation of Kherson to Ukraine and an end to the bombing of critical infrastructure. But such a proposal involves two problems: one is complete mistrust on the part of Kyiv. Another problem would be that it would jeopardize Putin’s position as an adversary of the West. The risk would be that it would push the Russian president into a seemingly endless war for war’s sake and to repress the country even more harshly than he might think necessary.

The material was made with the support of the Rador agency