“The previously announced meeting under the chairmanship of Mr. Chairman of the Government Assembly, which I have the honor to preside over, was assembled from Colleagues whose names have been announced and whose opinions coincide with the way to more effectively serve the above goals. In this work, the government needs the confidence of the Assembly, which it hopes you will give.” With these words, Petros Protopapadakis presented the government formed under him to the National Assembly on May 9, 1922, asking for a vote of confidence in the body, which he received.

Protopapadakis, then sixty-two years old, was born on Naxos and studied engineering in Paris. Returning to Greece, he worked as an engineer in the municipality of Athens and as a professor at the Evelpid and Naval Cadets schools, and also participated from a leadership position in the opening of the Corinth Canal and the railway line Kavala – Dedeagats (Alexandroupolis). He also worked as a freelancer, and in the period 1889-90. was a professor at the School of Industrial Arts (Polytechnic).

His involvement in politics dates back to 1902 when he was elected MP for the Cyclades from the party of T. Dilijannis. In 1906-1908, he participated in the “Japanese group”, the original members of which were himself, D. Gounaris and St. Louis. Dragumi. Subsequently, he closely connected his course with D. Gunaris, served as Minister of Finance in his government (1915) and was a co-founder of the People’s Party.

After the victory of the anti-Venezuelans (01/11/1920), he will head the Ministry of Finance in the government of Kalogeropoulos (January 1921). “The burden of the financial services and food of the state,” he will say at the Trial of Six, “which I took upon myself from January 28, 1921, was so heavy that it did not allow me to follow the services of any of my colleagues.” He will save this position in the next two governments of Gunari until he himself forms a government.

Because of his position, he recognized early on the financial burden that the Asia Minor campaign was placing on public finances. This and his relationship with Gunaris influenced his attitude.

“The burden of the financial services and food of the state,” he will say at the Trial of Six, “which he took on from January 28, 1921, was so heavy.”

At the end of March 1921, after the failure of the operations of this stage, he actively participated in the negotiations between Gunaris and Metaxas, the purpose of which was to convince the latter to take over the main strategy. According to Metaxas, Protopapadakis argued that England would oblige Greece to withdraw from Thrace as well, and that in the event of withdrawal from Asia Minor, “we will be swept away by the wrath of the world” – “I do not mean government, I mean status.” According to Metaxas, he always associated the nature of military operations with public finances: “How long will we be on the defensive?” We haven’t had any money for a long time. We have to finish in two or three months.” Regarding the March operations of 1921, he stated at the trial of the “six” that “the order was given from London, on the assurance, as I was told, of the deputy chief of staff of Asia Minor, who lived in London, that the army with a walk would reach the end that was destined for him to reach, that is, to Dorilyon” [Εσκί Σεχίρ].

A year later, Eski Shekhir, Afyon Karahisar and Kutahia were captured, but the attack on Ankara was unsuccessful, and the Greek troops remained pinned down west of Sangario. At the same time, diplomatic processes unfavorable for the Greek side were developing (the proposal of the Paris Conference on the evacuation of Asia Minor, etc.) and financial problems were at their peak (after the failure to obtain international loans).

The result of all this was a split in the political front, which led to victory in the elections of 1920. At the moment, this was decided by the formation of a new government headed by D. Gunaris (2.03.1922). A new crisis a few months later led to her resignation, an investigation into a possible government under N. Stratos, and finally to the formation of the government of Protopapadakis, with the participation of the followers of both Gunaris and Stratos, which, due to the conditions that had developed, had to cope with a difficult and overburdened situation .

Finally, on August 25, 1922, a few days after the split of the Greek front, the government resigned: Kathimerini (08/26/1922) wrote: only until the discomfort of public opinion reaches such a boiling point that there is only a trigger for the noisy manifestation of this discomfort. Until the evening before yesterday, the Government did not consider that the situation had reached such a point and that the events threatened to disturb the order. However, the latest developments last night were condemned by the government as making the situation worse. Among the most important events was the announced capture of the generals Trikoupis and Digenis and four colonels.

Approximately two months later, Protopapadakis will appear before the Extraordinary Military Court (Trial of Six), where he will be sentenced to death. He would be executed along with Gunari, Hadzanesti, Theotokis, Stratos and Baltatsis on November 15, 1922, a few hours after the verdict.

Financial exception

One of the questions that Protopapadakis ran into in The Trial of the Six was whether the return of the king would result in the country’s economic exclusion from international credit. “The economic blockade,” he argued, “does not consist in the fact that the powers did not give us the amounts due to us out of 850 million (from loans concluded under Venizelos in 1918 and 1919). The financial exclusion is the obligation assumed by the Greek state (when concluding these loans) not to be able to provide any guarantee for a new loan until the loan of 850 million is repaid. France gave nothing, Britain a little more than half and the US about a third) are left and not given to you, but that’s not the point. It’s financial isolation. It was the refusal of the Powers, allegedly because of the arrival of Tsar Constantine in Greece, to give the remaining money. […] the occasion was the arrival of King Constantine.

Forced loan to finance the war

“From March 1, 1921, to May 8, 1922, when I left the service,” Protopapadakis told the Trial of Six, “$1,610,000,000 was borrowed into the Public Fund.” Of these, only 245 million came from the fission of paper money and the associated “forced loan” (the rest, up to the budgeted 1,500 million, will be collected in the following months). “Of the state’s regular resources, only 633,327,895 came into the fund and 27,180,843 came from the Smyrna fund.”

The total income, that is, amounted to 2,270 million drachmas. “We are already seeing,” he continued, “how these 2,270 people were disposed of. They were in favor of the army. 1.161 million loans. 272 million from regular state resources (excluding regular warrants of those paid from various state funds). In total, 1433 million were arranged for the army. 63% rate!
The calculations of academician Andreas Andredis in 1927 led to the corresponding percentages: military spending absorbed 51% of all government spending in 1920-1921, and 59% in 1921-1922. It was no coincidence that it was a “mystery” to the American chargé d’affaires in Athens how the Greek economy had endured the burden of the war for so long.

Protopapadakis, being the Minister of Finance, tried to answer this “mystery” with an original solution. Presenting it, in fact, to Parliament on March 21, 1922, he said: “I am obliged, before proceeding with the further development of the bill under consideration, to agree that none of us should have in our hands a solid I am afraid of being stoned, because that I believe that you do not have stones in your bags, but with the help of hard objects that can be found in your hands, an attack on my head.

Then, stating that “the requested domestic loan of 1,500,000 dirhams is something unprecedented” and that “if they thought that this loan could be obtained in the usual way, […] you’ll all think I’m a joke,” he proposed the following solution: Greek banknotes would be split in half and one half would remain in circulation at half value, while the other would be exchanged for twenty-year government bonds with an annual interest rate of 6.5%. Accepting this decision, the state forced the Greeks, who had cash, to lend half of their money to the Greek state in exchange for some bonds of dubious value.

This is how he explained his proposal to Parliament: “Gentlemen, I am the owner of a hundred drachmas, here they are. The icon of Georgios Stavros is inscribed on the right, the Royal Crown on the left. As soon as the bill is passed in Parliament and becomes law, I will cut the one hundred drachmas into two parts – the minister cuts the banknote into two parts in his hand – and the coin with the image of Georgios Stavros will continue to circulate as 50 drachmas. drachma, and the other half, when the crown is written, will be a bond for 50 drachmas, and the matter will be over. Two months later, he would announce that “this unexpected lottery is just enough to effect the demobilization of the Greek army, and for this purpose it will be used” (Llewelyn-Smith, p. 466).