In the May 21 elections, populist narratives did not find much electoral resonance, and alternative and anti-establishment parties had limited impact on voters. The low score scored in the last parliamentary elections by the self-proclaimed radical party forces is not an accidental expression, but a reflection of the specific mood of the electorate, the absolute majority of which voted according to positive criteria, and only a small percentage (8%) voted according to negative and punitive criteria. Eleven years ago, in the May 2012 elections, the no vote was accepted by almost half of the electorate (44.4%), according to the exit poll of that election, which fueled and subsequently strengthened the radical party space and political forces of the anti-establishment.

The area of ​​the left radicals was indisputably stronger. Not only SYRIZA was the largest radical left party in Europe at the height of the economic crisis. There was also a particularly strong field of social activity, in the context of which new movements and networks emerged (the “Indignant”, the movement of “free spaces”, the civil movement in Keratei, Skouries, etc.) and which fed the left. radical parties. The radical left has undoubtedly proved stronger than the populist radical right, as noted primarily by the creation of anti-immigration parties in the 2000s and the support of anti-immigration networks and movements. These processes culminated in the mobilization of the Golden Dawn, which moved in a violent extremist direction. Although the camps were hostile and in conflict with each other, the radicals at the two ends of the ideological-political axis fed off each other in some way, mainly in the sense that their extreme rhetoric and even actions worked cumulatively to express the existing demand of “the enemy” , which was primarily the political system, the ruling parties and generally established political forces.

The significant retreat of the radical left at the current stage limits the spectrum of confrontation, which weakens the radical rhetoric and actions in the political space. However, anti-establishment populist far-right forces have seen their electoral percentages rise. This fact is reflected both in a slight increase (+0.75%) in the electoral percentage of Hellenic Solution, and mainly in the launch of a party slightly below the electoral ladder of 3% with the name “Niki”, an anti-communist, Russophile, anti-immigrant and anti-Semitic formation that activates para-religious motives. There is much in common between the positions of the Greek Solution and Victory, but where there is a complete identification is the militant emphasis on the Prespa Agreement, which both sides characterize as “treasonable”, with the former also openly condemning the New Democracy in defense. he proposes in this “shameful” convention.

Greece’s “Decision” and “Victory” positions have much in common, but a complete identification occurs in the focus of the war on the Prespa Agreement, which both sides characterize as “treacherous”.

The persistence and slight rise in the strength of right-wing populism is largely due to the persistence of this topic and the key position that the signing of the Prespa Agreement still occupies in the rhetoric of the parties of the populist-radical right-wing space. In fact, looking at the geographical distribution of their electoral powers, there is a significant gap in terms of their lower than average percentage distribution of their power in most districts, however clearly amplified in the regions, primarily in Central Macedonia, partly also East and West Macedonia , which in 2019 became a theater of confrontation and a place of protest against the signing of this Agreement.

More broadly, the space of the far right, although retaining and slightly increasing its strength compared to the 2019 parliamentary elections, appeared in the May 21 showdown as a more localized political expression. Both the Greek Solution and, more importantly, the newly emerging Nikes have established electoral strongholds in certain regions, but remain less visible political parties in much of the territory. If “Niki” does not get into parliament in the elections on June 25, most likely, she will not survive and will go down in election history as another bright party. In the case of the Greek decision, things are different, since its parliamentary position provides it with resources and creates conditions for presence at the regional level. The possibility of regional impact in terms of visibility, combined with her stance in favor of state intervention on behalf of indigenous people (welfare state chauvinism), has the potential to expand her electoral audience. The circle of right-wing populism in Greece, although politically limited, nonetheless shows that it is still open and that the final word has not yet been said.

Ms. Vasiliki Georgiadu is Professor of Political Science, Director of the National Center for Social Research (EKKE).