The elections in May 2023, according to Statis Kalivas, could be the beginning of the exact opposite of the elections in May 2012. Then the collapse of PASOK fueled SYRIZA. Now the decline of the left may “resurrect” the centre-left. The fateful question is how realistic it is for PASOK to overtake SYRIZA in the re-election. To answer this question, a number of facts must be taken into account.

SYRIZA lost 1/3 of its electoral power compared to 2019, registering an increase of only 60%. He lost 3 to PASOK, 3 to N.D. and 3 cumulative ones to the left of it (KKE, MeRA25, Pleussi Eleftherias). It lost electoral strongholds (Crete, Achaia) and collapsed in the popular areas of the Western Sector, Piraeus II and Western Attica. He also lost his dominance in his favored constituencies, such as youth and civil servants. It was defeated from state to state even in the three regions where its leader was a candidate (Piraeus, Serres, Dodecanese). Overall, voters who today declare their party affiliation to SYRIZA and therefore constitute the “hard” core of its supporters seem to have dwindled to 11% from 18.5% in 2019.

In this context, Tsipras seems to be basing his post-election recovery strategy on two axes. On the one hand, an anti-conspiracy, possibly fueled by the prospect of Mitsotakis’ “hegemony” after the unexpected collapse of SYRIZA. On the other hand, the “lost” vote argument, which he is expected to use to oust smaller parties, is mostly to his left due to increased proportionality. In addition, the anti-right reflexes of a part of the electorate have not disappeared. SYRIZA continues to dominate both left and centre-left voters. In this regard, the populist vein (in the words of Panos Kazakou), which exists in all democracies and in Greece predominantly on the left, will always seek expression.

However, PASOK appears to be Tsipras’ main competitor. He strengthened his forces by registering a double-digit percentage (11.5%) and expanded his appeal in the provinces. He also rebuilt bridges with youth, students, employees, civil servants and housewives reaching double digits there. Moreover, it has already overtaken SYRIZA both among centrist voters and in total in six prefectures (Rethymnon, Lassithi, Laconia, Chios, Kilkis, Drama).

The window of opportunity is indirect doubt about Tsipras’s leadership within the party and the fact that Androulakis is seen as politically invincible and potentially expressing more expectations.

However, despite the obvious gain, PASOK was still far from the goal of a “strong” double digit. In the regions of Athens and Attica, for example, despite the improvement, it again registered a one-digit percentage, remaining (with the exception of East Attica) in 4th place after the KKE. It is significant that he lagged behind even in the southern sector of Athens, where Androulakis himself was a candidate.

Therefore, sending it to re-vote is inherently difficult. To make a significant recovery, he will need to maintain his strength and at the same time attract the centre-left part of the SYRIZA electorate. Which, among other things, suggests a convincing differentiation from Tsipras, combined with the promotion of PASOK as a reliable opposition to N.D.

But there are some options that open up a window of opportunity. First, an indirect interrogation of the Tsipras leadership within the party. Secondly, the low expectations of the centre-left voters for a possible electoral “adjustment” of SYRIZA. Third, the fact that Androulakis is considered, compared to Tsipras, politically incorruptible because he did not govern and therefore potentially has more expectations. Fourth, the possibility of enriching the oppositional strategy of PASOK with elements of a positive programmatic discourse. Since the decisive victory of N.D. showed that with the economy recovering and prospects improving, citizens want a positive message for a better future. Since Tsipras’ strategy is based largely on anti-right “fear” of Mitsotaki’s “hegemony”, it remains to be seen whether this hope will be monopolized by the ND. or PASOK will try to express part of it.

Mr. Panos Koliastassis is a Doctor of Political Science from Queen Mary University of London and a lecturer at the University of Peloponnese. His book “Permanent Election Campaign in Conditions of Permanent Crisis: Prime Ministers A. Samaras, A. Tsipras, K. Mitsotakis” is published by “Epikentro” publishing house.