1) The recent election results were mainly influenced by SYRIZA. The attitude of citizens to the official opposition party determined the percentage of all parties. I have long pointed out that SYRIZA has left behind what it was without achieving what it wants to be. This bloat makes the party look blurry and colorful. But citizens make their choices based on a normality that SYRIZA hasn’t conquered, or perhaps doesn’t want to characterize.

During the PASOK-ND standoff, citizens perceived rotation in government as natural, perceiving party divisions as elements of safe pluralist parliamentarism. Today, the return of SYRIZA to the government is seen as an unorthodox event. The economic crisis that turned SYRIZA into a protagonist and elevated her to power does not exist, at least with the consequences of the civil war, but SYRIZA rules in the conflict that prevailed then and does not correspond to the conditions of the current period.

Of particular note: a) The confusion in the public speech of the leaders of SYRIZA is based on its internal tendency to speak at the same time as honoring its roots as a relative of the KKE, and is a radical and supporter of the break, like MERA 25 and ANTARSYA, and belongs to the social democratic family as the successor to PASOK , and expresses right-conservative forces that remain dormant. All this together and at the same time makes SYRIZA an electoral pool, and not a solid political party in power.

A long tenure in government and the experience gained by him can hide these divergent views, which, when they appear, are obscured by the tyrannical politics of the government. We have the precedent of PASOK and the New Democracy in the power of state power to assimilate internal differences in the name of pluralism, but this long-term manifestation of government homogeneity remains a requirement for SYRIZA.

b) Simple proportionality will oblige its supporter to prepare their unions in time to demonstrate that controllability and simple proportionality are not incompatible concepts. SYRIZA did not, and therefore during the crisis the ideas expressed about possible allies were based only on SYRIZA’s view of its relations with other parties, as I explained above, and not on actual conditions. It is now clear that the flag of simple proportionality has been raised before the left, which for many years advocated its establishment.

Finally, SYRIZA is called upon to manage a kind of political participation. It is recognized that it owes much of its upward trajectory to its president. However, today SYRIZA has no other candidate for leadership and therefore the leadership of A. Tsipras is a one-way street, but he is now counting defeats, which, if this continues, will increasingly adversely affect the course of SYRIZA.

2) To answer the question of whether the same percentages will be repeated in the elections on June 25 or some corrective shift will be made to mitigate the pan-strengthening of ND and the Prime Minister, it is worth considering the following:

a) 20% of voters made their choice literally during the voting, and 51% chose ND. As a result of the depoliticization of the younger generation and its shallow connection with political events, this percentage of undecided before the vote is likely to remain high. This, however, may in an unforeseen and unexpected way determine the outcome of the next election.

b) Simple proportionality no longer applies, and the theory of votes lost when they go to small parties returns. Will parties on the verge of entering parliament be affected by losing votes to alleged sister parties, or will the well-founded expectation of their presence in parliament prevail?

c) A truly triumphant victory for the ND can be read twice, resulting in diametrically opposed electoral sentiment. On the one hand, with the addition to the percentage of voters weighing their vote according to consumer criteria, given that the dominance of N.D. not taken into account. on the other hand, with the reaction of part of the electorate to the formation of a balancing political counterbalance to N.D.

3) For PASOK, the elections were a challenge to a historic turn, especially due to the polarization promoted by ND-SYRIZA, which the leadership and leaders successfully dealt with. The result may not be the “strong double-digit percentage” stated as a goal, but the momentum of the moment allows it to aim for even better results in the next election, both in absolute terms and compared to the SYRIZA percentage. Particularly if the significant backlog is related to the constituencies of Attica, where citizens receive political messages more directly.

However, in order not to prove that this opportunity existed only to be missed, it must react in two main areas:

a) He emphasizes a realistic programmatic proposal based on his reformist-socialist identity, which also represents a response to the majority’s demand for progressive governance of the country. Based on this proposal, he seeks to consolidate the public debate. In other words, be at the center of the daily agenda. The discussion about collaborationism that PASOK voluntarily provoked in the last elections was a political paradox. As expected, this overshadowed his keynote speech and is unfair to the intentions of the initiators of this political line.

Moreover, PASOK equally condemned both parties as absolutely insolvent and harmful to the country, but at the same time declared an equal willingness to cooperate with them as inappropriate. “Cooperation” in this form does not suit PASOK. After all, it was obvious that as long as SYRIZA had allies that justified simple proportionality, PASOK would find partners from the very first Sunday for the social democratic type of government.

b) proclaims forcefully that the DNA of the faction remains the main character. PASOK is the government party as an organ of popular power, not as a necessary second to an undifferentiated government. The failure of SYRIZA to be a credible alternative to the ND forces PASOK to claim this role by citizen vote and be tested in practice.

4) In the month leading up to the elections, the attitude of leaders and parties is quite predictable. K. Mitsotakis will speak on behalf of all the Greeks that the ND will “accept”, emphasizing the social agenda for the castration of the opposition. A. Tsipras will call for a democratic pan-army in order to avoid the restoration of the right in the style of the establishment.

It is noteworthy that local elections will be held in a few months. If they are an addendum to the May 21 elections with similar results, then a turn on a historical scale will indeed be made in the post-revolutionary chronicle. This, from the ND side, is being structured from now on. N. Androulakis, in addition to the expected criticism from two political opponents, bears a double burden.

On the one hand, in order to morally and politically strengthen progressive citizens, who also make up the socio-electoral majority, demarcating a creative progressive union based on criteria not of class, but mainly of values. On the one hand, to show the path of Greece, which does not deceive itself. To express Greece, which is aware that it falls sharply behind the countries with which it seeks to be compared in all respects, but at the same time it is confident in its competitiveness and is determined to achieve its self-transcendence with the goal of convergence and parity with them in practice.

With this, PASOK has proved that it keeps the interests of the country in mind, regardless of the political costs. PASOK’s efforts today are again not guerrillas, but a national stake.

* Mr. Dimitris Reppas is a founding member of PASOK, former Minister and Member of Parliament.