Every selective the system is, in a sense, doomed to failure. And this is because its mission seems impossible by definition: it must simultaneously serve two purposes, competing with each other. On the one hand, it must ensure representativeness so that the parliament reflects the will of the people as expressed through the electoral process. On the other hand, it must ensure sustainable manageability and accountability, i.e. clear acceptance of responsibility for the work of the executive branch (accountability). Thus, the closer we are to a system of simple proportionality (for example, the Netherlands, where the whole country is a single constituency), the more the first goal is achieved: in order to not get into parliament, you need to have less than 0.67% of the popular vote. valid vote. The more we move to a majoritarian system (like the UK, where the country is divided into unicameral constituencies), the more parliamentary longevity is ensured, as well as the ability of citizens to “throw out the scumbags,” as the popular English expression says (throw out the rascals).

Is there a way to somehow merge these two worlds? The usual answer is no. Each state must choose whether it places more emphasis on representation or clear government accountability. Precisely because there is no magic formula, it is the job of election editors to find the best way to bring these two worlds together. And the next question almost inevitably arises: among all the options that have been tried from time to time, in all the electoral systems implemented, is there one that we could say works better? Who manages to combine the good of two systems without suffering from their bad? What combines representativeness without creating dead-end party fragmentation? Who manages to capture the pluralism of societal perspectives without making it difficult to hold the executive branch to account?

The answer to these questions is that there is: the Greek electoral system, or rather the one that was used in the May elections. In an important article, two great electoral comparators, Simon Hicks and John Carey, compared all widely used electoral systems in terms of their political outcomes. Their study concluded that, of all systems, simple proportional with a relatively small average number of district seats and “open voting” (election of an MP through a cross rather than a list) is the system that most combines the advantages of the two worlds. Strengthens pluralism without creating centrifugal tendencies in the political system.· Protects representativeness without encouraging extremes, supports cooperative governments that are more representative because they include an intermediate voter without increasing the risk of anarchy.

And here lies the problem. We have an electoral system that was initially not supported by those who voted for it. Which from the very beginning became, instead of a counterbalance to polarization, a stone in the boot of the galloping newly formed two-party system. He got into a bag of simple proportionality, as if the proportionality of electoral systems is not a continuum, but a dipole – black or white. And therefore we are preparing to say goodbye to him as a bad bracket, inappropriate for the Greek political system. As if the bonus system, for example, which in May 2012 gave 40 additional seats to the first party, although it did not get more than 20% of the vote, was appropriate for the circumstances. Have we ever wondered what compromise we, as an electorate, are making with the bonus? To what extent do we sacrifice the quality of deputies on the altar of manageability? Just think what it means to elect a bonus candidate in a four-way constituency instead of someone who would be eligible to be elected on the basis of preference crosses. Someone should probably do this very work, compare the resumes of bonus deputies with those who would have been elected without a bonus, in order to better understand what exactly is at stake in each electoral system.