The international community is watching today’s elections in Türkiye lifeless. After all, there are many stakes: personal (one of Erdogan and Kılıçdaroglu will most likely not have a next chance), financial (the next leader is called upon to quickly make unpopular decisions on economic restructuring, which may even include the IMF), geopolitically (whether the country will retain the same semi-autonomous way, deviating from the West, or returning to the Western camp and under what conditions), democracy and the rule of law (the neighboring country has been in a long and fruitless phase of democratization since 1950), but also identity (Turkish society is divided vertically and horizontally, and the battle of secularism against political Islam is fierce, and its outcome is uncertain).

Of course, while the two worlds collide, the two grand coalitions are so inclusive that the forms end up being decidedly disparate. What is glue? For the current ruling coalition, the glue is power and its preservation at any cost. In the past, Bahceli has been a vocal critic of Erdogan, but has traditionally chosen to play the role of a government wildcard, offering his votes in parliament and exchanging them for government positions and influence. His connection to the deep state and his extreme views have made him a liability, but for now, Erdogan cannot get rid of him. In fact, on the contrary, the two formations with minimal influence that were added to the AKP and the MHP are even more marginal, and Erbakan’s son’s position towards women is anachronistic, and the actions of the Islamist Kurds are blamed for the massacres of their compatriots in the dangerous decade of 1990 -X.

So in this alliance of several extreme elements, the undisputed leader is Erdogan, whose party shows remarkable resilience in the midst of the economic crisis, in which his policies also played a decisive role, raising this figure above 35%. However, his partners are dragging him down with their low percentages, as a result of which the opposition of six parties, provided that we also add a pro-Kurdish party that runs for elections under a different name, has a chance of winning the parliamentary elections. elections too. It is noted that the Kilicdaroglu party in public opinion polls, despite its growth of almost 7%, remains at around 30%. In any case, in Turkey, traditionally, after the parliamentary elections, there are personnel changes and relocations of deputies, although this time the schemes seem concrete. Indeed, for the opposition, the link is the overthrow of Erdogan. Characteristically, she spans the spectrum from the extreme right and nationalist to the liberal left, while Aksener is poorly remembered by Kurds when she was interior minister in the Çiller government. In other words, this is a heterogeneous coalition, justifiably concerned about whether Kılıçdaroğlu will demonstrate the necessary tough leadership, but whether it will be able to synthesize the diametrically opposed views of its partners, especially if we include the Kurds among them. In the middle of all, Ince’s departure, while the vote for Turks abroad has already been completed, upsets the balance, giving Kılıçdaroğlu the appearance of victory, with the latter accusing Russia of conspiracy and the government, indirectly seeing Gülen’s finger framed by the Americans. Until Friday, rumors about the removal of Sinan Ogan, another presidential candidate whose votes would go to Erdogan, were not confirmed.

In a fluid and uncertain environment, where we don’t even know if a result will be accepted, a neighboring country enters a phase of introversion for who knows how long. Correcting the economic imbalance and rebuilding the earthquake-affected areas becomes an absolute priority, no matter who wins. Polarization will also remain, even if we don’t have a marginal and questionable result, because a large and dynamic public hates the authoritarian Erdogan, while the other is completely identified with his system. The fact that self-government elections will follow in nine months reinforces the scenario described above, because no one will lay down their arms, expecting a change in attitudes and an early turn to elections. At the same time, persistence will be the goal. For Kılıçdaroğlu, to curb any centrifugal tendencies on the part of those who are not satisfied with the division of power. For Erdogan to reach agreement or even understanding with, say, the Kurds and those who are in front of him, because another five years in terms of persecution and intimidation will not be sustainable. In foreign policy, a possible turn of the page will lead to differences in aesthetics and style, to the restoration of institutions, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and to a reorientation of relations with the West on a new basis. Turkey is ostensibly becoming more conciliatory, partly withdrawing from the near front and attempting a glamorous offensive led by democratization and the restoration of the rule of law, among other things, to garner support for the overthrow of the Erdogan regime. But it is a mistake to think that a “revolution” at home will bring about the same state in external relations. All this assuming everything goes smoothly…

Mr. Konstantinos Filis is Director of the Institute of International Affairs, Professor at the American College of Greece, and International Relations Analyst at Ant1.