At your starting point pre-election periodall surveys show similar trends and correlations.

What we do know is that N.D. maintains a clear lead in the polls. He seems to be recovering and is limiting the losses he has suffered due to the Tempe tragedy. The government’s image has faded somewhat, but not cracked. At the same time, any recorded deterioration affects not so much its advance as its percentage and range of difference from SYRIZA.

SYRIZA has been gaining momentum in recent months, but the pace is clearly slower than one might expect. And the growth of its interest occurs mainly due to an increase in its collection and, to a lesser extent, due to the influx of new voters. The difficulty of direct influx of votes from ND, as happened in the 2015 elections, and vice versa in 2019, is a key electoral problem, and until it is resolved, the chances of overthrow are reduced, since other pools are limited.

We also know the strengths and weaknesses of the protagonists, which will naturally be the focus of their campaigns.

For N.D. and Mr. Mitsotakis, the strengths are the economy and especially the issues of investment, job creation, etc., issues of foreign policy, immigration and digitalization of the state. On the contrary, N.D. it suffers from an inflationary crisis, lags behind in terms of transparency and the institutional functioning of the state, and its appeal to younger ages is especially problematic.

SYRIZA and Mr. Tsipras appear to be stronger in the area of ​​mental identifications with weaker income strata and younger ages. They have populist elements but score low in relation to their managerial abilities.

In both general popularity and “fitness for prime minister” Mr. Mitsotakis surpasses Mr. Tsipras.

What remains to be seen is whether the trend, which polls have shown has continued for 6 years, can be reversed within three weeks. Moreover, she was not overthrown in extremely difficult times for the authorities. Without underestimating the importance of election campaigns, this looks difficult, especially as long as the opposition adheres to arguments and style that have not yet proven to be particularly effective.

We also know that other, smaller parties have strengthened somewhat. However, we do not know if this trend is constant or if it is seasonal, fueled mainly by simple proportionality that facilitates voting in smaller formations.

PASOK is still moving above the percentages of the last election, but has recorded a downward trend in recent months, which seems to be stabilizing today. The Movement’s stance to participate in a government without Mitsotakis or Tsipras as prime minister is likely to make it easier for parties in the run-up to elections, but does not really postpone or cancel dilemmas that may need to be addressed.

The KKE seems somewhat lofty, but does not claim any other, more regulatory role.

Is it possible to reverse the trend in three weeks, which, according to polls, has been consolidated for 6 years?

The Greek solution also looks a bit entrenched, always keeping a strong base in Northern Greece, but the intra-party turmoil of the past few days could hurt it.

MePA25 also seems to be on the rise, although it has been at the center of the election debate for a while, which certainly favors it. N.D. he points to the possibility of him taking on a post-election regulatory role as a dangerous attempt to bring back the tumultuous days of 2015 and embarrass SYRIZA.

Of the remaining smaller parties, none seem to be developing a particular momentum of getting into parliament, while the Kasidiaris party is always waiting to participate or not.

What we don’t know about the smaller parties is their resilience to a very likely re-election scenario, especially if the difference between the two major parties is small.

And the percentage of undecided voters is somewhat higher than in previous pre-election polls of the same period, but in terms of its characteristics it seems to be extremely heterogeneous, which means that it will be very difficult to move en masse in one direction.

We also know the mathematics of elections. Assuming that the percentage of parties that will remain outside parliament is 10%, then the percentage to be added to the parties called upon to form the government must exceed 45.3%. Such a scenario does not seem particularly feasible, not only numerically, but also mainly politically, which makes a repeat election highly likely.

Finally, it remains to be seen how the two protagonists will tackle some important strategic issues.

On the other hand, N.D. how he will balance between the goal of self-reliance in the second election, but without discrediting the first, thus facilitating the protest vote. “Tits” Varoufakis may not last until the end.

And how will SYRIZA convincingly balance between disparate potential allies so that the goal of a “progressive government” at least seems realistic – provided that it is the first party – but also with what narrative it will go to the second elections, especially if its difference from N.D. it is important.

Mr. Eftichis Vardoulakis is a strategy and communications consultant.