Is there a Western preference as Türkiye approaches a major turning point on May 14? Would the United States and Europe prefer President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to remain in power, or would they finally want change in Ankara? The conspiratorial Turkish public is often obsessed with outside forces seeking to determine its fate. Of course, the Turks will choose in their presidential and parliamentary elections. However, as Erdogan masterfully exploits these anti-Western domestic sentiments to his advantage, there is great reluctance, especially in Washington, to take a stand other than the importance of holding “free and fair” elections. But behind the surface, oddly enough, lies an unrecognized and highly selfish preference for the West. And, unfortunately, she is wrong, she is not worthy of Western democracies, which should support Turkish democracy much more, instead of seeing Erdogan as “the devil they even know.”

The authoritarian course of Erdogan’s Turkey, combined with a foreign policy that blocks Sweden’s NATO membership and welcomes Putin’s Russia as a major economic and military partner, should usually make life easier for the West. However, when you dig a little deeper, everything becomes darker. For example, the conventional wisdom is emerging in Washington that a post-Erdoğan Ankara will not be radically different in foreign policy and that any minor changes will be more about style than substance. Under this assumption, two fundamental problems on the Turkish-American agenda – in particular Ankara’s frustration with US support for the Syrian Kurds and Washington’s frustration with Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system – are unlikely to disappear with an opposition victory. Similarly, if Erdogan loses, no one expects a radical divergence from Turkish positions on Cyprus, the Eastern Mediterranean or the Aegean. Turkish nationalism and the desire for strategic autonomy and independence are likely to remain the driving forces behind Turkey’s foreign policy.

What about the expectations of the Turkish opposition and the Middle East? Ironically, there have been significant changes under Erdogan’s leadership over the past two years. Given the dire state of the Turkish economy, Erdogan’s desperate need for liquidity has already led to major changes in Ankara’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Erdogan’s glamorous offensive in the Gulf states required a rethink of Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood, which in turn helped improve relations with Israel and Egypt. This rapid adjustment in Turkish foreign policy has likely strengthened Erdogan’s image in the West as a pragmatic opportunist rather than an Islamist ideologue. Not surprisingly, the former US ambassador to Ankara, who has a long relationship with Erdogan, has not hesitated to express his preference for him as “the devil we know.”

Today, in the hope of repatriating some of Turkey’s four million Syrian refugees, Erdogan is even pushing for normalization of relations with Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, the regime he struggled to overthrow just a few years ago. The issue of Syrian refugees is what brings us to the European position on Erdogan. Usually, France, Germany and Italy, as well as other European countries such as Greece and Cyprus, which are the recipients of Erdogan’s confrontational rhetoric, should support the change of power in Ankara. However, there are some fears in France and Germany that the new Turkish government led by Kemal Kilicdaroglu will want to revise the refugee pact signed between Ankara and Brussels in 2016. Recall that at the height of the migration crisis, the European Union made peace with Erdogan, offering Turkey 6 billion euros to stop the wave of Syrian immigrants.

It is no coincidence that Greek-American relations are at an all-time high today, due in part to Turkey’s unreliability as a NATO partner.

Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the main opposition, the secular and social democratic Republican People’s Party (CHP), categorically rejected the signing of the mentioned refugee agreement between Ankara and Brussels. Today, Kılıçdaroğlu is running against Erdoğan as a single candidate from an eclectic coalition of six political parties, including a deeply nationalist one. The electoral platform of this “National Alliance” promises to improve relations with the EU, but also seeks to renegotiate the refugee agreement with what Kılıçdaroğlu calls “Turkey First”. Is Europe ready to accept a post-Erdoğan Turkey that seeks improved relations towards full integration, as well as a new refugee agreement that better protects Turkey’s national interests? The answer is no.” Neither France nor Germany are in the mood to talk about Turkey’s long-forgotten EU membership. And, of course, there is no desire to accept more refugees in Europe. So it might be easier to negotiate in the context of a deal with a fiery nationalist like Erdogan, who has broken many bridges with Brussels, is like “the hell they even know.” And it’s much easier to fight back against an angry authoritarian leader who doesn’t have an ounce of democracy than a democratic Turkey trying to revive its European bias.

Finally, during a recent visit to Athens, I was especially surprised to find that the Greek foreign policy establishment seemed to be completely satisfied with the prospect of Erdogan winning the next elections from a purely pragmatic and cynical national point of view. This Greek position can be explained by the fact that the authoritarian and unstable Erdogan, who constantly threatens in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean, arouses the sympathy of the West for Athens. It is no coincidence that Greek-American relations are at an all-time high today, due in part to Turkey’s unreliability as a NATO partner. After 20 years of working with him, for Greece, Erdogan is truly “the devil they even know” in a country that “doesn’t see angels often”.

This perception of Erdogan is short-sighted and dangerous. There are two main reasons why we cannot see Erdogan as the villain familiar to the West. The first and very simple one is that democracy should be given a chance. Autocratic leaders like Putin and Erdogan almost always tend to overdo their foreign policy by making the wrong decisions. Is Greece really willing to risk war with an increasingly authoritarian and tyrannical neighbor? Does Washington really prefer a repressive and militant Turkey to a Turkey seeking a democratic solution to its Kurdish problem? And does Europe really believe that an authoritarian Turkey, to which it can safely say no, is the best alternative to a democratizing Ankara, which will inevitably become more pro-European and anti-Russian? The second reason Kılıçdaroğlu deserves a chance is that we are not faced with a binary choice between an angel and a devil. As was said in the case of the Brazilian elections between Lula and Bolsonaro, Kilicdaroglu is not the gate of heaven. This is the gate to hell. As Joe Biden did not get tired of repeating during the election campaign, “do not compare me with the Almighty. Compare me to the alternative.”

Mr. Omer Taspinar is Professor of Homeland Security at the National Defense University in Washington. He also teaches at Johns Hopkins University.