Turkey’s apparent (and not naively expected) return to aggression shatters the dangerous illusions of many who at every “opportunity” call for direct “dialogue”, sending dangerous messages of tormented desperation without a rudimentary sense of (unfortunately harsh) reality. The “Great Turkey genie out of the bottle” and the conceived “package solution” do not fit the current inter-party dissonance, misunderstanding and, ultimately, hindsight of the difficult things ahead. We need a new strategy with the elaboration of alternative scenarios and, in any case, the realization that dialogues without conditions, rules, positions and allies with an ever-increasing enemy lead to the most unfavorable results.

Unconditionally. During 50 years of confrontation with the constantly threatening Turkey, our country has always set certain conditions before entering into a dialogue. Even when not strictly adhered to, they created a shield of dignity. The terms currently established are formulated with problematic ambiguity and vary from operator to operator and speech to speech, creating anything but the image of a coherent strategy.

No rules. References to international law or even to the law of the sea and “calm waters” do not provide a clear framework for dialogue. As for the choice of procedure, over time we tried, but to no avail, all possible alternative ways of consulting with a neighbor: the judicial route of applying to The Hague, international mediation and political dialogue. The Hague is the favorite choice of politicians, who prefer to ignore its increasingly dangerous consequences and freely shift national responsibility to foreign judges. In very difficult ones (the 1996 Imiya Crisis and the 2020 Oruç Reis), we resorted to third-party mediation in order to collect “equal distances” of allies and partners, between the attacker and the defender. But even in the political dialogue, we tried everything over time (although usually from scratch). Conversations of any level (from experts to leaders), as well as any agenda: from economic cooperation and memorandums of understanding to research. The latter, from which many are in a hurry to retreat, provided Ankara with the opportunity to project any of its pretentious madness and submit it along with letters to the UN, thereby forcing us to internationally counterargue its revisionist claims. International difficulties for our diplomacy will now be created by the spectacular turn of Ankara, which now invites us to appeal “all our differences” in The Hague – another consequence of the lack of a comprehensive plan.

No places. Despite my many years of experience in international negotiations, I have not found a single example of a country entering into a dialogue on the delimitation of borders without publicly showing on a map how it defines the geographical boundaries of the maritime zones it claims. I also didn’t understand our exclusive and bold emphasis on the limited benefits of 12 noon. in relation to a much larger part of the EEZ, i.e. by an area of ​​the sea up to four times larger than our land. Indecisively, we hid (unofficially) for a long time behind the relevant Seville Charter, drawn up on behalf of the EU. However, after the 2020 crisis, we formally denounced it in a letter to the UN as just private, raising – among other developments – worrying concerns about the possible abandonment of any claims to maritime rights east of Rhodes.

Before the “Great Turkey genie out of the bottle” and the conceived “package solution”, the current inter-party dissonance does not fit.

There are no allies. Our country, unfortunately, has not taken advantage of EU membership. with harmonious design. Suffice it to recall that for 40 years we have used a real veto only (under A. Papandreou) against Chad and the Korean giant (!), but never against Turkey. Even within NATO, which has recently been fighting revisionism, we have lacked a smart international campaign to highlight the common ground between Putin and Erdogan. In addition, despite the old and new allies advertised by us, Ankara’s aggression is constantly growing. Finally, the wording (already from official lips) of our preference for direct dialogue, “without third intermediaries”, “like two good neighbors”, as Erdogan has been demanding for the last two years, also raises questions.

The dialogue into which we will be forced to re-enter under military threat and third mediators is not far off. The US is rushing for energy deals and not only for cooperation in the Southern Mediterranean and cannot wait for the slow and dead-end procedures of The Hague. While it is generally preferred to put pressure on Greece and Cyprus (since with or without Erdogan the priority is given to the “return of the prodigal son”), perhaps the next Turkish leadership’s inevitable financial straitjacket and the possibility of internal instability (as a result of intense contestation of the election results), make Ankara more susceptible to retreat. Therefore, in view of the above, instead of passively and obsessively sticking to any dialogue proposal as a panacea, there is an immediate need for reasonable positions and initiatives for our strengthening, supported by partners and allies and usable by the mediators. When, despite our advertised deterrent power, Turkish assertiveness-aggression is increasing rather than decreasing, it is obvious that at the same time, it needs to be immediately reinforced by more substantial (if possible coordinated) preparation, far from dragging out efforts to target communication, but urgently .

In view of the combined pressure of international mediation and dialogue, with the aim of a “package solution” in the Aegean and the Southern Mediterranean, we must ensure that any agreement or even partial normalization with Turkey really strengthens, and does not weaken the position and security of Hellenism in relation to the current situation. .

Mr. Yannis Valinakis – Professor, President of the European Center of Excellence/EKPA, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.