Turkey’s regional rivalry with Greece is one of the issues that Congress is considering as it evaluates Ankara’s request to upgrade and acquire new F-16 fighter jets.

A related five-page report by the Congressional Research Service titled “Turkey: Possible F-16 Sale” has a paragraph on Greek-Turkish relations and even mentions that “the joint explanatory statement accompanying the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Appropriations Bill (NDAA) warns allies NATO from “unauthorized territorial overflights of the airspace of another NATO ally”.

According to the report, some of the key issues that will come under the microscope of Congress and determine its assessment of the Turkish F-16 issue are:

• Sweden’s entry into NATO
• Close economic and energy relations with Russia
• Regional rivalry with Greece
• Violations of human rights inside the country and retreat from democracy observed during the rule of President Erdogan

The report notes that the US administration informally notified Congress of Turkey’s request in an attempt to gauge the reaction of US lawmakers.

“In February 2023, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken publicly confirmed that the Biden administration supports a possible sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey and is in talks with Congress on the matter. According to January 2023 reports citing unnamed U.S. officials, the Biden administration informally notified Congress of the potential sale.

The January unofficial notice refers to 40 new Block 70/72 Viper F-16 fighters and Block 70/72 upgrade packages for 79 existing fighters, as well as 900 air-to-air missiles and 800 bombs, totaling $20 billion. The deal could modernize and extend the lifespan of much of the Turkish fleet as Turkey seeks to acquire or develop a more advanced fighter jet. However, the delivery of new F-16s may be delayed due to production reasons.

However, some members of Congress from both parties expressed reservations. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez said in January, “until (Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan) stops his threats (against neighboring NATO allies), improves his domestic human rights record (…) and takes action as a reliable ally. must act, I will not approve this sale.”

Several other senators, including Committee on Foreign Relations Minority Leader Jim Reese and 29 senators who wrote a letter to President Biden in February, said they could only consider supporting the F-16 sale to Turkey if its parliament agrees to Sweden’s entry. and Finland in NATO.

It is worth noting here that the US government, taking into account the objections expressed, has not yet sent a formal request to Congress for approval of the sale and modernization of the F-16. As the report acknowledges, “Congressional committee leaders’ concerns about the potential sale of the F-16—whether related to Sweden and Finland joining NATO—may linger beyond Turkey’s scheduled May 2023 elections.”

However, it is speculated that at some point the White House may be called upon to break the Gordian knot regarding the F-16, either by offering solutions to issues raised by congressmen and senators, or bypassing their concerns and issuing formal notice of the sale of the fighters.

“For most potential major arms sales that require congressional review, the State Department first sends informal notice to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, allowing for a confidential process during which the committees can raise and discuss concerns with executive power. .

This process usually takes 20 to 40 days, followed by formal notice of a possible sale. However, if the committee chair or minority leader suspends the proposed transaction, then formal notice is usually not given, even if the suspension is not legally binding.

According to the Arms Export Control Law, the government can proceed with the sale – if there was no relevant prohibition legislation – 15 days (for NATO allies such as Turkey) after official notification.

“Legislation and congressional oversight has helped shape defense cooperation between the US and Turkey for decades. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey from 1975 to 1978 following the 1974 Cyprus conflict. Since then, Turkey has focused more on developing its defense industry, and to this end, one of the goals of Turkish arms purchases from the United States. and other foreign suppliers were to acquire technologies that would help future domestic defense production.

Over the past 15 years, a number of alleged US arms shipments to Turkey have either stalled or have reportedly been delayed.

After Turkey acquired the S-400 air defense system from Russia, the Trump administration removed Turkey from the joint F-35 strike fighter program (citing concerns about Russia’s possible use of the S-400 to gather intelligence on the F-35). ) and imposed Congress-approved sanctions against Turkey. Section 1245 of the Fiscal Year 2020 Defense Appropriations Act (NDAA) prohibits funding for the transfer of the F-35 to Turkey unless Turkey ceases to have the S-400.”

“Shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, a letter from the State Department to some members of Congress reportedly stated that there were “compelling and long-term interests related to the unity and (defense) capabilities of NATO, as well as the interests of the national US security. , but also with economic and commercial (interests) that are supported by relevant defense trade ties between the US and Turkey.”

While Turkey has operated more independently of the West under Erdogan, it has the second largest military force in NATO, hosts allied military equipment and personnel, and cooperates in other ways with the US and NATO, including using F-16s in occasional policing missions.

US officials have expressed gratitude to Turkey for actions that appear to be favorable for Ukraine. Turkey condemned the Russian invasion, closed the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to warships, helped create a Black Sea corridor for Ukrainian grain exports, served as a transit hub for natural gas to Europe, and supplied Ukraine with military equipment.

However, Türkiye has also strengthened various forms of economic and energy cooperation with Russia. In early 2023, US officials warned their counterparts in Turkey (and some non-NATO countries) of possible sanctions against businesses that continue to trade, potentially supplying the Russian defense industry. According to information, since March 2023, Turkey began to impose restrictions on the passage of goods subject to Western sanctions from its territory to Russia.

“Against the backdrop of strong congressional support for Sweden and Finland joining NATO, some members argue that Turkish delays on this issue threaten the unity of the alliance. The Turkish Parliament ratified the Finnish accession protocol in March 2023, but it is not clear if and when the ratification of Sweden’s accession can continue (Hungary also did not ratify Sweden’s accession until the end of March). Turkish officials seem unhappy with the steps Sweden has taken against what Turkey considers terrorists.

The Swedish government has proposed new anti-terror legislation, which it hopes will be passed by Parliament in time and come into force in early June. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said he intends to complete the entry of Sweden and Finland into the alliance by the July 2023 summit.

“Turkey’s regional differences with Greece are also a factor (considered) by the Congress. US arms supplies could affect the balance of power between Turkey and Greece. Cooperation between the US and Greece has increased, and the administration reportedly informally notified Congress of a potential sale of up to 40 F-35s to Greece at the same time as the informal notification of Turkish F-16s.

In addition, a joint explanatory statement to the Fiscal Year 2024 Defense Appropriations Act (NDAA) warns NATO allies against “unauthorized territorial overflights of the airspace of another NATO ally.”

The report assesses that different electoral scenarios could lead to different positions in Congress, provided that the new political correlations that arise in a neighboring country will allow changing the policy on the main issues of concern to US lawmakers.

“Domestic violations in Turkey are another matter. Many US lawmakers argue that “a gross violation of human rights and a retreat from democracy” occurred under the leadership of President Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party. The highly competitive Turkish presidential and parliamentary elections are scheduled for May 14, 2023 (with subsequent presidential elections in two weeks if necessary). In March 2023, a “six-party coalition” nominated Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, Turkey’s main opposition leader since 2010, as a presidential candidate. Some preliminary polls show that Kılıçdaroğlu could win the presidential race from the fallout from the devastating February 6 earthquakes and a troubled economy, despite questions remaining about how strong a candidate he is and about the unity of the “six-party coalition.” Different electoral scenarios could affect Congressional assessments depending on how changes in Turkish leadership or the end of the electoral cycle affect Turkey’s F-16 policy, including Sweden’s NATO membership.”

“The actions of Congress regarding the potential sale of the F-16 could affect whether Turkey continues to use major US defense systems and other aspects of US political and military ties with Turkey. Turkey is reportedly considering the Eurofighter Typhoon as a possible alternative to the F-16, but it is not clear if Germany would approve such a sale. In addition, the Turkish Air Force may find it difficult to adapt to a system other than the F-16, potentially complicating alternatives. In addition, European arms shipments to Turkey may be subject to the (same) Congressional approval process if those (European) weapons include US-made components that require (Congressional) approval.”

Source: RES-IPE