In the corresponding article of January 29 (“Erdogan’s game with Finland and Sweden”), we pointed out the intention of the Turkish president to separate the affairs of Finland and Sweden and proceed to approve the candidacy of the former, leaving the latter in a frozen state. . Indeed, the Turkish parliament overwhelmingly ratified Finland’s entry into NATO days after Hungary did the same. A development that might not have started had a catastrophic earthquake not intervened. However, it is characteristic that both Ankara and Budapest still resist the accession of Sweden and coordinate their actions so that their two parliaments coincide with the ratification of their Finnish counterpart. It is no secret that Erdogan and Orban maintain a very good and functional level of relations with Putin, and this certainly played a role in the protracted decision, while the other 28 countries immediately rushed to complete their internal processes.

Turkey is benefiting from the indulgence of the Americans and NATO in its choice to join the two Scandinavian countries in two stages, and not simultaneously, as originally planned. This gives Erdogan reason to claim that his country is strong enough to defend its positions, even in relation to Washington and NATO as a whole. This development of events shows that the Americans failed to convince all their partners to follow their line and even to opt for the North Atlantic Alliance in the shadow of the war in Ukraine. Ankara, splitting the two, gains the upper hand in the negotiations with Stockholm, although it is possible that the White House wanted the Finland case closed to act as a buffer zone for Sweden (minus the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad) and then with the F-16 gun for pressure on the Turks.

However, the resistance of Hungary and Turkey — even in the good scenario that they did not act as Moscow’s quasi-Trojan horses — delayed and halted the integration process of the two states, feeling the hot breath of revisionist Russia, which testifies to Washington’s bias. strategic confusion. Ankara understood this correctly and demanded even absurd exchanges from the two Scandinavian countries. At the same time, it is confirmed that the values ​​and principles that the American president often refers to in order to separate the Western camp from authoritarian regimes are only euphemistic. Here we are talking about the triumph of commercial diplomacy, promoted by states such as Turkey, which managed to break the united Finnish-Swedish front, while this scenario was initially categorically ruled out by both countries, as well as by the United States and Stoltenberg.

Ankara’s indiscipline in the Alliance could have long-term consequences.

The conclusion is that the American factor, in the light of new international relations and demonstrating an inability to coordinate diplomatically with several of its allies, does not hesitate to add up or adjust to show results, however fragmentary, against Russia and China. However, when the collapse of the Western front occurs over a seemingly easy issue, questions and concerns arise as to how the West will act as a united front against the International Emerging Revisionists with the growing displacement of Beijing.

On the other hand, Ankara’s partial indiscipline is not without its losses. Its stance on the issue exacerbates the general unreliability and clumsy behavior it exhibits in NATO, giving another argument to its critics or even those who want to push a framework of rules (cautious, not principles) for relations from now on to and from the West and the US. in particular. Turkey does not seem to lose anything, on the contrary, it seems that it is imposed, but its inconsistency deprives it of the diplomatic capital that it will certainly need in the future to meet the growing challenges at home, mainly in the economic sphere, but also in foreign policy. By changing her mood and reception to the degree of her attachment to the Western institutional system, she runs the risk of not getting the help she needs, or that her conditions will be difficult, or that she will not have the desired avada in negotiations. It is already in a treaty whereby its acceptance of Sweden’s membership is tied to congressional approval of the F-16 procurement. The American president cannot try to overturn the decisions of the Congress while Ankara is blockading Stockholm. His arguments are undermined by the way Erdogan’s Turkey is politicized, which in turn is facing delays in F-16 procurement and upgrades, leaving it a step behind Greece, given that it has also been squeezed out of the F-16. -35 program. After all, all parties have bought time by extending their appointment to July 11 at the NATO summit, when the goal is to include Sweden as well.

Mr. Konstantinos Filis is Director of the Institute of International Affairs, Professor at the American College of Greece, and International Affairs Analyst for ANT1.