The way we see History is directly related to each moment and the questions it poses to the past. Therefore, it is no coincidence that the view of 21 years, this fundamental moment of the existence of modern Greece, tends to change its characteristics and transform itself in accordance with the historical moment. We have moved from a heroic view focused solely on the achievements of the fighters and myth-makers to a disillusioned view that wanted the Revolution of 21 to be the start of a chain of evils such as civil strife, painful loans – harbingers of future bankruptcies and xenocracy. The most recent revision of the past was that, ultimately, the Greek case was a “success story” on all levels: a successful experiment in building a nation-state that, despite zigzags and occasional setbacks, has not lost its bearings in the direction of modernization and, in ultimately Europeanization. This new approach re-appropriated elite elites as agents of responsibility and Westernization.

The crude ethnopatriotic view and its propaganda are, of course, no good. However, the teleological perception that wants modern Greece-Psorocostine, the result not only of the Ottoman remnants, but also of the peculiar exandrapodism of the great powers, is based on a linear perspective, according to which the evil demons of the turning point, the initial moment of the creation of the state, continue to haunt us to this day. But also viewing recent Greek history as the sum total of achievements that catapulted a once-insignificant and backward Ottoman province to gradually claim an equal footing in European development, which ironically could coincide with “from Miletus to Euro” dangerously softens historical nuances.

However, if we have learned anything from the bicentennial, it is that the time has come, in addition to the closed schemes and interpretations of the “Greek” type, to include the year 21 in its international, revolutionary context. The world history of the Greek revolution would, in principle, recognize 21 years as one of the first cases (if not the first) of a successful national liberation struggle in post-colonial Europe. In addition, according to some historians, the time has come to reconsider the southern European or Mediterranean contexts of the struggle, such as the consequences of the influence of the Italian Carbonars, the end of the Heptane state, as well as the Spanish constitution of Cadiz in revolutionary Greece. Let us also add to the story that far across the Atlantic, Haiti, a product of the Jacobin revolution of black slaves, was the first to recognize the newly created Greek state, while Latin American states sprang up like mushrooms through national liberation wars.

’21 succeeded, above all, as a manifestation of an original and generally successful political communication campaign.

Does anyone remember that one of the heroes of the Latin American revolutions, the Venezuelan Francisco de Miranda, avidly read ancient Greek authors from the original (as well as the “beautiful as a Greek” Simon Bolivar) and even had a house in Athens? On the other hand, acknowledging the global dimension of the Greek revolution and connections to movements outside of Europe is crucial, but that certainly does not mean that it should impose a sly logic about chronic and colonial dependence on the country. Against.

’21 as a success story, perhaps, is applicable not so much at the level of modernization of the formation of the nation-state, but primarily as a manifestation of an original and in all respects successful political communication campaign. An international campaign for the Greek cause that made the most of the European fantasy of Ancient Greece while living out the stereotype of enslaved Christians under a barbaric Eastern yoke. Taking advantage of emerging concepts such as that of international public opinion, a liberal International sensitized by the representations of the Chios massacre and the heroic departure of Messolonga (although for the moment it was “frozen” by the descriptions of the massacre of civilians in Tripoli by the excluded), but also empathy with the plight of the “others”. And it is true that in the end it took foreign intervention at Navarino to establish itself; again at the global level, we may perhaps be talking about an early case of external intervention cloaked in humanitarian considerations.

Historical reality is complex enough to be seen through the prism of schemes that unambiguously focus either on the exploits of great men, or on theories of subjugation, or on the eternal regression between national disasters and the triumphs of modernization. The history of revolutions has shown that their legacy is so complex that it cannot be measured in terms of their perceived success or failure, while looking beyond the short-term and immediate results is always a long-term view of the long-term. consequences. That is why we must continue our consideration of the 21st trace; perhaps this may be facilitated by an attempt at a transnational vision that goes beyond the current Greek forms.

Mr. Kostis Kornetis teaches modern history at the Autonomous University of Madrid.