Home Politics Article by P. Stathopoulos in “K”: The Mirror and the Conditions of the Game

Article by P. Stathopoulos in “K”: The Mirror and the Conditions of the Game

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Article by P. Stathopoulos in “K”: The Mirror and the Conditions of the Game

According to the constitutional terms, the productive time of the current parliamentary term is coming to an end, and the countdown to elections is underway. But all of this is now linked to one of the most tragic events we know of in this country, re-illuminating our chronic pathologies. All normality is being subverted, and the elections will be held in a particularly tense context, forcing us all to look in the mirror.

The interface goes beyond trivial debate and sets the dramatic tone for an opportunity to rethink the entire workings of our political system. After all, this is not the first time elections have been held in unexpectedly extraordinary circumstances. This has happened every time for different reasons in all the last six elections since 2009, as in the past (especially in the period 1989-93 due to the application of the proportional system at that time), not ignoring of course the many cases where elections were held suddenly – prematurely – only with a three-fold exhaustion of a four-year term: in 1981, at the first elections in 1989 and in 2004, but with a common feature that the current government did not count on winning the elections and therefore had no reason to rush them .

The conclusion, of course, does not concern us. Although we have not reached the extreme political passions and fatal situations of the pre-post-colonial past, it is unfortunate that in the post-colonial period (rightfully regarded as the best in our political history), among other things, there is not a single case of the exhaustion of a four-year period without the ruling party not expecting defeat . The only opposite conclusion today is when the ruling party is running for re-election at the end of a four-year term, surprising no one, but in the face of a highly proportional electoral system that further confuses the situation. Therefore, the parameter of the electoral law also enters into the discussion.

The analogue was applied for the first time in the interwar period (1926, 1932, 1936), in constant alternation with the majority (1928, 1933, 1935), in the decade that finally reached the dictatorship of Metaxas.

The proportional system was first used in Greece during the turbulent period of the interwar period (1926, 1932, 1936), but in constant alternation with the majority system (1928, 1933, 1935), in a decade of uninterrupted elections and panspermia. provisional governments that eventually reached the dictatorship of Metaxas. It was repeated in the first post-war elections of 1946, 1950, with the consent of the political forces responsible for managing the civil war, and has since been abandoned. It reappeared four decades later (in 1989) as a variant that claims to be the most unfair violation of the “conditions of the game” (without, of course, restricting the political dynamics of that time and the self-confidence of the leading parties, but after three elections instead of one) and suddenly again before us three decades later.

The experience of Greece confirms that the analogue “does not work”, creating rather than solving problems in the pursuit of effective management. After all, looking back at the electoral systems used throughout the world, it is clear that the proportional system is clearly less common than the majoritarian and majoritarian ones, and the relevant scientific literature clearly states that no electoral system can be considered superior to another. The best electoral system for each country is the one best suited to its own circumstances, depending on its party system and the tradition embodied in its general political culture.

In a multi-party system, it is logical to apply proportionality and have cooperative governments. However, in a small-party system, and especially in a highly polarized one such as ours, proportionality does nothing but extort cooperation between several – competing – parties that are, in fact, unwilling to cooperate. Of course, a system based on the majority is preferable, which would also give the possibility of independence or even more accessible cooperation, depending, of course, on a popular vote.

Mr. Panos Stathopoulos is the Director of the Scientific Council of the Institute for Democracy “Konstantinos Karamanlis”.

Author: PANOS STATOPOULOS

Source: Kathimerini

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