“Secrets of the ballot box” under the heavy shadow cast on the political scene by the Tempe tragedy are trying to uncover party headquarters as the country enters a two-month pre-election period after the cancellation of election planning on April 9, with a simple proportional end date of May 14 or 21.

Almost all respondents, both in power and opposition, agree that there is no certainty after the multi-fatal tragedy, at least at the present stage: anger reigns in society after the shock of the incident in Tempe, while the “photo of the moment”, captured public opinion polls, which will see the light, are considered extremely unsafe. However, there are six critical questions, the answer to which will form the basis from which the final election result will emerge. What is this:

It is clear that the news about the large safety gap in rail transport will gradually begin to subside. However, in the wake of the accident, opposition parties are expected to attempt to question the managerial adequacy of the Mitsotakis administration with a broader attack on the state narrative. So the question is how effective Megaros Maximos’ argument will be that, despite the obvious failures in the Tempe case, there have been significant interventions in the direction of modernizing the state over the past four years. And secondly, whether the pre-election standoff will spread to areas where ND has a comparative advantage over SYRIZA, such as in the economy, national affairs and security.

Although the relevant forecast is premature and unreliable, the feeling prevails in party headquarters that with the “learning” of the parameters of the accident and the progress of the work of the Court and the Commission of Experts, the picture of long-term political responsibility for the tragic delay in the implementation of the remote control system and, more broadly, in the field of railway safety transport. In light of the above, it is said that SYRIZA, which was in charge of governing the country during the period 2015-2019, is unlikely to record electoral successes, while some add that the same could apply, even if to a lesser extent, for PASOK. At the same time, ND had a big advantage in the polls. compared to other parties, it leaves room to manage new data. The question is whether they will prove to be bottlenecks for N.D., coupled of course with management efficiency he will do.

SYRIZA, as a party that has recently been in power, is expected to face difficulties in receiving spoils from the government.

With the current wave of indignation and “identification” with the victims and their families, no one can rule out such a development. Especially after the strong awareness of the youth and mass gatherings last Wednesday all over Greece. However, Megaros Maximos notes that it is difficult to “repeat 2012”. Then, they add, a significant part of the citizens saw that their economic situation was completely turned upside down, and now any reaction, although quite justified, is mainly emotional. It is noted that Greece recently experienced the experience of “anger” and suffered the deadlocks that anger leads to. Also, while there may be electoral gains from parties at the ends of the political spectrum, it should be noted that with the recent legislation, the Kasidiaris and Golden Dawn formations will likely be ineligible for the upcoming elections. Finally, the question is whether the expected “hard rock” on the part of SYRIZA in the last stretch of the road to the elections could lead to a more general discrediting of the parties. However, Koumunduru emphasizes that early opinion polls show a pattern of stable interest rates for SYRIZA and PASOK, which if confirmed limits the reservoirs for so-called anti-systemic voting.

The first public opinion polls, in addition to the increase in the number of undecided from the ND, record the strengthening of the CHRG, Hellenic Solution and MeRA25. Although the pre-election period will be long and the data not “straight”, many speculate that the three smaller parties and possibly PASOK will increase their percentages as the first elections in May are held under a simple proportional system. However, the performance of the party of G. Varoufakis, which in the previous period was assessed by the majority as extra-parliamentary, is considered decisive. The prospect of MeRA25 passing the 3% threshold has broader implications as it implies an increase in self-reliance leverage for ND.

The favorable scenario for the government would be that the former polls act as “killers” for any voter discontent, while the latter activate political stability reflexes, giving N.D. the additional percentage that will be required to achieve the goal of forming a self-sufficient government. On the other hand, there is a risk that if the first round of voting is dominated by soft voting or protest voting, there will be an electoral outcome (e.g. a “clean” percentage below 32%) that will invalidate the expectation of self-confidence. N.D. in the second election. In fact, some point to a paradoxical scenario in which N.D. it may be far from self-sufficient, but it may not be possible to form a government of cooperation with PASOK from the first elections, since the two parties together will not gain the required 45% -47% of the electorate.

Megaros Maximos emphasizes that some cracks in the prime minister’s popularity are to be expected and are likely to be “covered up” until Election Day, as he steadily gains the upper hand over Alexis Tsipras. In any case, they add, it is impossible not to face the “Mitsotakis or Tsipras” dilemma in the last stretch of the election. In the above context, in fact, government officials point out that the prime minister rightly accepted the responsibility placed on him and apologized for the tragedy in Tempe, but now it is necessary to gradually counterattack at all levels and convey that he is the one who there is an initiative of movements on the political chessboard. Finally, an important parameter is that, according to PASOK representatives, the Tempo tragedy reinforces Nikos Androulakis’ argument about the impossibility of forming a government of cooperation with Mr. Mitsotakis as prime minister.