Last week, in my visit to Washington, I had the opportunity to ascertain the relative—we assume—limited U.S. interest in Greek-Turkish. The big American priority is to contain China and defeat Russia in Ukraine. It also revealed the lack of a strategy to rectify the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean as a whole and the unwillingness to get involved in the settlement of disputes that divide the states of the region. Perhaps it will be episodic, and we will see Washington return after the Greek and Turkish elections with a specific agenda and intent to bring order to a region that has recently risen in importance due to the war in Ukraine and the resulting need to provide alternative sources. deliveries to Russia.

As for Turkey, the prevailing view in the State Department and in some academic circles is that the situation is not out of control and that, despite disagreements, the Turkish wagon will not deviate from the Western course. However, the American factor does not seem to appreciate that any victory for the opposition will necessarily be a balm for US-Turkish relations, and it still counts heavily on Erdogan. The feeling that he wants to get rid of him, considering him a burden, may echo the innermost thoughts of some actors, but for obvious reasons it is not expressed in private, but I’m not sure that Erdogan’s defeat is necessarily a burning desire. Perhaps because Americans are worried about uneven transition or instability due to economic problems and the consolidation of the Erdogan regime in all institutional and para-institutional structures of the state, which will make life difficult for his successor. Maybe the US thinks they have a strong bargaining chip against the Turkish president, either with the pending Halkbank lawsuit, which if it goes badly could lead to huge fines, further hampering the Turkish economy, or being forced to turn to Washington. for financial assistance in connection with the devastating earthquake.

Interestingly, however, on the other side of the Atlantic, they prefer to downplay Turkey’s propensity to the East, the strategic understanding it has with Russia, and the understanding it has with Iran, which it is trying to expand with Assad in Syria. . . . They prefer to focus on the positive, such as Ankara’s provision of information from fronts in which it is actively involved, such as Libya, the Caucasus, and Africa, as the first in the overall picture defined by the war. in Ukraine, and they are in no hurry to adapt to their demands, especially on the issue of Sweden and Finland joining NATO. Even if this is done for tactical reasons, we argue that what they initially rejected, namely the separation of Finland’s candidacy from Sweden, now remains open as a possibility.

To avoid unpleasant surprises, we must immediately formulate and submit our own detailed plan for our wider area.

The situation is quite different in Congress, where the cross-party opinion is that the face of Turkey has changed dramatically, that this phenomenon is not temporary and that, therefore, it is necessary to introduce a system of rules that will reduce the room for maneuver in a country that has one foot inside NATO (which increasingly awkward), but her eyes are on international change, with an apparent willingness to reconsider not only the regional but also the global status quo. Regarding the latter, Ankara’s message is that the operation of the international system must become more fair and commensurate with the new relationship, classifying it among the new powers that claim a larger piece of the pie in the international redistribution of power. And it is a completely logical scenario that until it settles down for its position in the world and a new situation in the emerging global situation is not consolidated, it will demand space and tolerance from the West with minimal obligations towards it, something that does not particularly concern Washington bureaucracy, but greatly hinders the legislature.

As for addressing at least some of the unresolved issues that are holding the Eastern Mediterranean hostage and preventing the development of a comprehensive plan centered on energy issues, the Americans are leaving Germany the opportunity to take initiatives, recognizing effective intervention in the past, as well as in the difficult months of 2020 years with seismic exploration “Oruch Reis”. In addition, not considering Turkey flawless, they call on other states to look for ways to reintegrate it into regional events. They do not deny that the scope of specific conditions should be agreed upon among all states, but they seem to be flexible as to the conditions to be put forward, giving priority to agreement. Therefore, to avoid unpleasant surprises, we must immediately formulate and present our own detailed plan for our wider neighborhood, on which we will then consult with our partners inside and outside the region. This is how we will preempt and jointly set the agenda against (and) a dizzying superpower that looks more for answers than offers solutions.

​​​​​Mr. Konstantinos Filis is Director of the Institute of International Affairs, Professor at the American College of Greece and International Affairs Analyst for ANT1.