The “election moment” is a symbol of democratic functioning. Ideally, the pre-election moment includes the reporting discourse and the programmatic discourse of the rulers and the opposition. Both types are necessary components of public discourse and the formation of electoral preferences in a democracy. In practice, how the “pre-election moment” works in each country is, of course, not a given and not a fixed feature. This is the result of the current political culture, ideological orientations and interpretations of the state of society, the economy and democracy itself. The atmosphere of democratic competition can range from a tepid juxtaposition of facts and opinions to extreme polarization of ideological warfare and irreconcilable confrontation. Whatever it is, competitors must anticipate the challenges of the future and communicate their plans.

Political competition creates opportunities and risks. On the one hand, it enables political forces to draw up reports and programs. On the other hand, it generates impulses to beautify friends and demonize adversaries, which obscure, distort, rather than illuminate data for important political decisions. These moments regulate the intensity of polarization. Thus, how a democracy works depends on two factors: how society works, on citizens, and on political competitors. Short-term utilitarianism, when the voter is asked to choose solely, for example, who will give him big benefits or better pensions tomorrow, is always dangerous not only for the economy, but for everyone. Turning the pre-election moment into an auction of immediate benefits may be comforting, but it leaves big questions unanswered: how are benefits funded and through what combination of taxes, loans, or other spending cuts: why long-term questions about risks and opportunities in the longer horizon? How and why is democracy limited to a short-term concept of the “common good” instead of being organized to look to the future?

The crises that we have set for fifteen years or so have always put a lot of pressure on the comforting side of programmatic discourse. Everyone competes in declaring what they will do to protect – usually temporarily – from the effects of the crisis and in criticizing the intentions of everyone else. To some extent, this was to be expected. Expected, but corrosive and inadequate. The relief needed, if not provided in the future, can easily eclipse the horizons of expectations. That is, lead to a virtual silence on existing problems that have long-term consequences (e.g., population aging, invisible over-debt, aging infrastructure, degradation of human resources) or new macroscopic risks that require ongoing mitigation and control strategies (e.g., climate change, epidemic risks).

Long-term planning is rarely brought up for public discussion in the pre-election period. Is it dangerous for voters to think about the future? A discourse that broadcasts long-term goals and forms long-term expectations is a stabilizing and organizing element of the actions of a democratic society. In today’s historical moment, there is a new and fundamental reason that makes it necessary to overcome the practice of short-term political utilitarianism, if not cynicism: the belief that the megathreats lurking for all of humanity will hit us too – this is already becoming more and more obvious – and will inflict collective harm to citizens, especially the most vulnerable, and to the country. If we realize this and if we coordinate our actions with the rest of the world in time, we will achieve much more and better than reflex reactions after the fact.

The good times of post-colonialism are over. We have a fifteen-year economic, social, medical crisis behind us and a poor job of overcoming them, which we now consider normal! Within our weaknesses, we now face risks that know no boundaries, are mega-geographic, contemporary, and coupled with timeless consequences: climate change, the energy crisis, the health crisis, derivative and overlapping geopolitical tensions, the redistribution of mainstream globalization.

Not just new policies and priorities are being imposed, but radical changes both in the content of “development” and in the role of the state. The new elements of development will include collective protection needs and will include two poles stemming from the urgent need to protect the planet’s societies: programs that address the causes of macro-threats, and policies to protect against the impacts they will inflict on natural, habitable, productive and previously of everything, the human benefits of our world. Some of these goals require the creation of global public goods, tangible and intangible, such as an expanded and binding carbon deal and a coordinated energy transition. Other goals require the creation of national and regional public goods: common infrastructure, common crisis management mechanisms, common operational actions for innovation, insurance products, energy efficiency and stability.

This means a change in the role of states. Each state must, on the one hand, act in such a way as to legitimize in its own society the allocation of resources for a coordinated response to megathreats. On the other hand, it must develop, based on its specific circumstances, content, economic synergies and opportunities with its neighbors. Participation in international initiatives and the pursuit of regional gain in the fight against megathreats will constitute an important (but currently emerging) area of ​​foreign policy.

To hear from each contender in the race for positions on their long-term priorities, concerns, and programmatic policies on critical issues.

Problems concern not only the state. They also require the mobilization of the private sector, especially in the area of ​​technological innovation, to reorient investment and align it with public investment. They also require citizens to mobilize and realize that they are concerned with the care and provision that will protect them from megathreats. Indifference and blind fanaticism nullify any rational consideration.

Let’s go back to the pre-election period. The minimum that can be expected in the face of uncertainties and ongoing changes is:

• Strive to ensure that every political force makes citizens understand that we are in the grip of evolving crises that require timeless choices, perseverance to maintain the general standard of living, improve its distribution and synergy with other societies to a degree like no other. known so far. Climate and health policy should become permanent elements of an internationalized national policy that will replace the current, unfortunately modern “earthquake policy”.

• Hear from each contender in the race the position on their long-term priorities, challenges and programmatic policies on critical issues, so that public debate on them will hardly replace public debate. The responsibility of the media in this process is greater than ever.

• Create a commitment to universal acceptance in the face of challenges for the future of our society. Defining a program for universal recognition of political competitors is not just a matter of “political culture”. This is the main condition for preventing constant failures and disappointments. It is about maintaining a persistent policy that is in line with long-standing problems that have no easy solution and do not withstand constant changes in direction with each change of minister. There is a common denominator that the parties agree on: to demand more financial support from the EU. However, they rarely agree on the required use. This is clearly not enough. The development of positions and general recognition should move towards long-term goals.

Elections are a symbolic moment of democracy. The future of the country, employment and unemployment, income and poverty, security, trust and much more depend on their outcome. The country at critical moments often rallied forces and showed a unique ability to respond. However, not always. We believe that the big question is how to overcome our systemic weaknesses in order to deal with the pressing problems big and small. The answer is not only financial, and therefore becomes difficult.

2023 is an election year. In an erasable landscape, it is to be expected that the emerging state structure will see the big picture, understand the need to overcome the country’s troubled cycle over the past fifteen years, and set it on a trajectory that will correct the indifference to the great challenges of the future that is already present.

Mr. Thassos Giannitsis and Mr. Stavros Tomadakis are honorary professors at the University of Athens.