The devastating earthquake in Turkey creates new data. The neighboring country is entering a period of introversion and intense political and economic upheaval. Until Erdogan reveals his election date documents, the opposition will beat him, albeit prematurely, in an attempt to nip the natural disaster reference in the bud to delay the election. On the other hand, according to safe estimates, it will take at least $150 billion to return to normal life, especially in the long term, because at 15% of GDP, a multiplier x 1.5-2 is calculated, because. destruction concerns infrastructure and networks, and ultimately the economic and social fabric. Well, the Turkish leadership is in search of donor-lenders, because even resorting to international mechanisms (for example, the IMF), which they are reluctant to do anyway, is not enough to meet their needs.

In this climate, and with relatively fresh memories of 1999, when earthquake diplomacy took us to Helsinki and then to a tentative agreement in late 2003, there are proposals to use the momentum and restart the thread immediately. Of course, it would be nice to first agree on exactly where we are staying. Exploration that was revived after 2021 and discontinued in 2022 but still held for viewing? In consultations between military commissions, since the downgrading of the role of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and the abolition of the post of post-secretary general deprived us of an interlocutor at this level? In the positive agenda in the field of economy and trade, which was successfully carried out by the Deputy Foreign Ministers in charge of economic diplomacy, but was suspended last May under the responsibility of Turkey? Would it finally make sense for the leaders to get back to business, given the personal nature of Turkish foreign policy?

Be that as it may, at this particular moment in the bilateral sphere, the Greek side is in no hurry. After all, the Turkish colleague took care to poison the climate in the period following the speech of the Prime Minister of Greece before Congress, continuous attacks, threatening statements, and now systematically questions the sovereignty of the Greek islands, linking this to their demilitarization. They were preceded by the signing of an EEZ demarcation agreement with the government of Tripoli, the adoption of the “Blue Homeland” theory as official policy, and the conduct of seismic surveys in the demarcation zone south of Kastelorizos.

So now it is Ankara who must show in practice what the warming of relations means. In short, he must present credentials confirming any change that needs to be made. The atmosphere remained electrified for almost six months, violations of our airspace set one record after another, dangerous flights over the Greek islands multiplied. Are statements of sympathy or a willingness to re-apply with emotional expansion in connection with the earthquake enough if they are not accompanied by concrete actions or better containment?

Now Ankara must show in practice what the warming of relations means. He must submit credentials confirming any change to be made.

However, Athens is eager to see how Western-Turkish relations will develop, precisely because the Greek-Turkish course will also depend on them. We must act actively in order to jointly form a new environment that will regulate relations between the West and Turkey. Diagnose the needs of the latter, which have certainly changed dramatically after the devastating earthquake, and link them to the rules. Turning to the West now seems like a one-way street for a leader who is politically interested in opposing him but must admit that the resurrection of the Turkish economy (which before the earthquakes struggled with high inflation, propping up the pound sterling exchange rate). and low interest rates) to rudimentary normality is going through a restoration of trust with the West.

Greece can take advantage of the EU’s institutional umbrella. in support of Turkey, consider restoring flagship policies such as the Customs Union in order to create a new negotiating base to the extent that Ankara’s priorities are redefined. As far as the US is concerned, the imposition of long-term aid conditions for Turkey’s recovery should include Greece’s position. In any case, after the elections in Greece and Turkey, we expected an initiative focused on the energy of the Eastern Mediterranean to free up their natural resources, contributing to the security of the EU’s energy supply. (Greece also plays a role and cause here). But at the same time, it would be useful for Athens to lay down a roadmap on the carpet that would detail steps first towards de-escalation, then towards its consolidation (and cooperation on low-level policy issues), towards the gradual strengthening of a climate of relative trust before decisive a step towards starting a substantive dialogue, a specific framework based on international law, and a binding timetable for settlement and/or recourse to The Hague. The harsh new reality for Turkey makes its adaptation mandatory, with Greece awaiting tangible evidence as a condition for a restart.

Mr. Konstantinos Filis is Director of the Institute of International Affairs, Professor at the American College of Greece, and International Affairs Analyst for ANT1.