After twenty-seven years of journalism and academic research, we can objectively draw some lessons from the Imia crisis. Athens hastened to militarize the confrontation for the status of a rocky island, as they did not realize the real stake in time. The Turkish leadership sought to challenge Greek sovereignty in the eastern Aegean by creating “gray zones”. At the strategic level, the Greek side made three fatal mistakes that played a decisive role in the unfavorable outcome.

First, the then prime minister and foreign minister managed the crisis through the prism of rivalry with the inner-party opposition. Relations between the political and military leadership were not harmonious, as the critical moments emphasized. The Prime Minister and his staff, along with A/GEETHA, met in the Parliament Hall, not in the National Business Centre. EYP and her commander were dismissed in a dismissive manner without any significant reason.

Secondly, Athens fell into the trap of the logic of escalation, not calculating the balance of power in the international and regional system. In the era of the American pan-empire, Athens found itself hopelessly alone, without real allies. The pro-Serbian stance of previous governments has significantly undermined Greece’s position in the EU. and in NATO.

Thirdly, Athens’ negotiations with Washington and, accordingly, with Ankara started from the wrong starting point. After the first two days, the Greek government sent out messages that it did not want war with a neighboring country. But it has weakened the credibility of our deterrence based on the threat of a military response. In other words, the political leadership acted almost amateurishly and did not show due seriousness.

The complexity of the Turkish threat goes beyond the government’s electoral cycle. We need a different strategy based on long-term planning.

On a purely operational level, after the landing of Turkish commandos in the western part of Imia, the Simitis government encountered a surprise that changed the dynamics of the crisis. With the creation of a fait accompli, Athens ran out of options and it immediately became apparent from the other side. The fact that decision makers were informed about Turkey’s actions from outside sources demonstrates the situation in Athens. In addition, clan rivalry between the army and navy created unnecessary tension. Finally, there does not appear to have been a well-designed military plan to respond to such a small-scale provocation. The Greek deterrence was designed to deal with the possibility of an Attila-style operation in 1974.

It is reasonable to wonder whether the current political and military cadres of the country have learned from the mistakes of their predecessors. Indeed, operationally, the Armed Forces are at an exceptional level. The events in Imia have served as a wake-up call for the military, which has already developed several scenarios for the next crisis. The continued strengthening of the special forces is impressive and creates a bulwark in the Turkish persecution. The systematic promotion of interdisciplinarity guarantees the effectiveness of the Armed Forces, if required. Greece today has the means and plans to repel an attack if it acts quickly and decisively. However, our operational competence and readiness is not the only prerequisite for successfully overcoming a military crisis.

At the strategic, that is, political, level, there are still pathogens that could prove fatal to our containment strategy. The complexity of the Turkish threat goes beyond the government’s electoral cycle. We need a different strategy based on long-term planning and a “technocratic” approach to the problem. In any case, personal diplomacy has little chance of a positive result. Restoring the national security system is now imperative. Greek agencies must acquire extraversion, which will allow them to provide strategic information about the enemy. Only in this way would a possible yurushi become a disorderly retreat, regardless of the intentions of third countries.

Ultimately, the Imia crisis has a lot to teach us. We must learn from our mistakes and omissions, without ideological attachments. Most importantly, however, we must not easily forget those who sacrificed themselves that night. Faithful to the traditions of our people, Christodoulos Karathanasis, Panagiotis Vlahakos and Hector Ialopsos reminded us that “he is brave who does not fear an honorable death.”

Mr. Manos Karagiannis is Professor of International Relations at the University of Macedonia and Lecturer in International Security at King’s College London. His new book, Deterrence and Defense, is published by Papadopoulos Publications.