In the 2010 municipal elections, the Golden Dawn combination made its political debut by winning a seat on the Municipal Council of the Municipality of Athens.

Since 2012, a series of electoral successes of the neo-Nazi formation began in the central political arena, whose upward trajectory was stopped in the last parliamentary elections, and the front party of the criminal organization remained marginally outside the Greek Parliament.

Before 2012, Golden Dawn had a tiny percentage of the electorate. Despite its insignificance, it had a structured paramilitary core and engaged in violent activities directed against those it saw as its ideological enemies and underminers of its own version of the nation and nation-state.

The situation with the financial crisis served as a catalyst for the launch of Golden Dawn. The entry into the central political arena of the anti-system police party was accompanied by the instrumentalization of the anger of the electorate, seeking revenge on the system of a two-party system and governance.

The background of the economic crisis may be favorable, but it does not necessarily lead to the rise of extremists.

The fact that at the beginning of the crisis there were no anti-establishment parties in the party territory to the right of New Democracy (LAOS was “normalized” with its participation in the government of L. Papademos) was a favorable impetus for the release of the Golden Dawn. to the parliamentary arena. Perhaps, however, this would not have happened if the modus operandi of the organization had not secured its presence as a punitive party that not only claims but actually opposes the “system” and the “establishment”.

After losing the parliamentary elections in 2019 and being convicted by the court in 2022 for joining a criminal organization, its leader and leaders, Golden Dawn, does not show up on the electoral radar of voters. On the way to the 2023 parliamentary elections, there is a movement of the extreme right pole of the party system. On the one hand, the conspiratorial and nativist Hellenic Solution, as it were, preserves and somewhat strengthens its electoral percentages, on the other hand, the National Party – the Greeks of Ilias Kasidiaris, who was convicted at first instance for participating in a criminal organization and a leading member of the Golden Dawn, is also hardly noticeable in polls, if not as large as it would be necessary for his representation in Parliament. It may seem new (it was founded in 2020), but the Kasidiari party matrix has its roots in the election-discredited Golden Dawn. While he has added issues from the anti-vaccine environment to his agenda, other formations, from the Greek Solution to the Breath of Democracy, are also moving in the same murky waters of the anti-vaccine conglomerate, seeking support among conspiracy-minded voters. The National Party – the Hellenes of Il.Kasidiaris is very similar in its format to G.Papadopoulos’ EPEN: it was founded by a prisoner and, despite the alleged enrichment of its agenda, remains committed to the goal of releasing the founder and asserting / appropriating the political legacy of the Golden Dawn.

Ahead of the polls, there are no major signs pointing to the prospect of a return of right-wing extremists to the parliamentary scene: a discredited political brand and essentially retro-party agenda leaves no room for the rise of the homegrown right. extremist, as it was in 2012. However, with the end of the financial crisis, there was not only a reduction in political opportunities and the subsequent institutional management of crises (pandemic, energy, Turkey). The mood of the electorate is different in the current conditions, which, despite a series of crises they experienced, released enough reserves of anger and increased positive emotions (optimism, hope). Not without an admixture of negative sentiment, the emotional fabric of the electorate now looks calmer and less susceptible to manipulation by extreme populists. Also interesting is the agenda of stakes recognized by the electorate as important: stakes that cause “complaints” (immigration, unemployment) and play the role of right-wing populists and extremists to the highest degree seem to have lost their priority in the rating of voters at this stage.

What are the electoral prospects for formations seeking support among conspiratorial voters?

Such a reading of the situation does not mean that the reservoirs from which the far-right pole could draw electoral support have disappeared, nor that this situation could not change before the elections. The so-called Qatargate is already an opportunity for right-wing populists as it renews the rhetoric about the corruption of the political elite and the decline of the representative institutions that shape their discourse.

The existing liquidity conditions, combined with hidden reserves and dormant electoral sentiment, make movements unpredictable, and voting for the far right an alternative that cannot be erased, especially among voters with an authoritarian background of beliefs, a penchant for populism, and a former electoral affinity for the Golden Dawn.

* Ms. Vasiliki Georgiadu is Professor of Political Science at Panteion University.