Prepared for a slow and dangerous campaign semester in Greek-TurkishWhere rhetorical escalation and the possibility of a crisis on the ground will coexist with efforts to keep channels open or even some discussions with Ankara lies Athens. After the recent revival of the “German” channel (Kalin, Bura, Pletner), nothing significant seems to have been achieved. This initiative was the result of intense protests from the Greek side in recent months, as well as the need for Germans to recognize the status quo of Greek-Turkish relations. The question is what can be the typology of contacts in the next period of time, in addition to the need to draw a “red line” between Athens and Ankara.

Preliminary contacts, Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), Fragoyiannis-Onal’s forgotten “positive agenda”, the “red line” of the two national defense ministers Nikos Panagiotopoulos-Hulusi Akar are all on the table. However, there are structural changes in dealing with the situation. Until 2016, and even more so until 2019 (especially after the agreement between Ankara and the administration of Tripoli), after a reasonable period of easing tension, any warming up of discussions was recorded.

Ankara’s new tactics, especially after last April and the fateful decision of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan wage a daily rhetorical campaign against Greece, the environment has actually changed. In Athens, it is well understood that – especially after the events around Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu – the different dynamics that political events inside Turkey can take on could make Mr. Erdogan’s behavior even more alienating. Athens also remains suspicious of the need to use this notorious deconfliction mechanism in the context of NATO, which was hastily created in the fall of 2020, with the main goal of not giving the appearance of the Alliance’s inaction in the event of the withdrawal of two of its members clash cautiously. None of the experienced officials and other actors who have dealt with this issue from time to time understand how a mechanism can help that actually … already officially exists, since the military representatives of Greece and Turkey in NATO can still talk if need. .

This volatile situation also dictated what was rather premature for the usual Maximos Palace leak, that GETHA head Konstantinos Floros would remain in office for the fourth and final year. The senior officer was at his post during both 2020 crises and his experience was considered important. In addition, Maximos also wanted to respond in advance to accusations of weakening relations due to publications about surveillance by the EMP. In the spirit of consolidating operating experience, January crises will also be held to house the new HES and GEN leaders. Although ballooning remains the main scenario for a possible crisis, there is also a readiness in Athens to artificially escalate tensions based on the refugee issue, especially after Erdogan’s incendiary statements on Friday, once again accusing Greece of “cruel treatment of refugees.” All eyes are, of course, on Crete, especially after the “stupor” in Ankara and Tripoli, as a result of Sisi’s presidential decree on the unilateral demarcation of the maritime border to the west.

The announcement by the Ministry of Energy of the discovery of a potentially significant field (2-3 trillion cubic meters) in the southern part of section 6 of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Republic of Cyprus is news that will go unnoticed in Ankara. The field, discovered by the Italian-French consortium ENI/TOTAL, is located in the southern part of Block 6, which is not claimed by Turkey. It is recalled, however, that Turkey claims the northern part of Block 6 as part of its continental shelf, and until recently there have been reports that the Turkish Oil Company (TRAO) may attempt exploration there. The timing of the discovery announcement is important. In Cyprus, an inexorable election campaign is going on, which goes almost unnoticed by Athens. However, the February 5, 2023, presidential election to nominate the man who will replace Nikos Anastasiades ten years from now is at the center of a struggle that does not escape important national issues.

Athens is fully prepared for Turkey’s attempts to use countries or factors that it influences. Clashes with the administration in Tripoli are the most obvious route, but the Egyptian stance has added a significant degree of difficulty to interim Prime Minister Abdulhamid al-Dbaiba. One case where Ankara is trying to expand its influence to create friction is Albania. The fact that, on the day of Mr. Dendia’s visit to Tirana, Mr. Rama chose to recall that Albania is a “strategic partner” of Turkey, which has just signed for the supply of three Bayraktars, also shows how difficult it is for Athens to achieve co-promissory note to refer the EEZ delimitation dispute to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.