Egypt, sending a signal of strength and focusing mainly on Turkey, carried out a lateral demarcation to the west of the 2020 Greek-Egyptian agreement. The demarcation is precise and very cautious, while allowing Libya and Greece to come to terms with Egypt. on the remainder, where the three EEZs converge. However, this does not cease to be a one-sided action. But this is a continuation of a comprehensive response to the illegal and extremist memorandum between Ankara and Tripoli. Therefore, the Greek side is fully justified in choosing a segmental demarcation with Cairo, since it has laid a solid foundation for a broader understanding of regional processes and rapprochement with the largest Arab state in the world. By methodically building our relations and joining forces with Egypt, we are de facto undermining Turkey’s hegemonic tendencies and reacting – if not always in concert, then at least in the spirit of mutual understanding and mutual information – to Turkey’s maximalist steps. This largely explains the complete – perhaps not so inexplicable – opposition of Athens to the government of Tripoli, that is, not only because of its identification with Ankara, but also because of our rapprochement with Cairo.

Egypt sees Erdogan’s Turkey as a regional competitor with hegemonic aspirations, whose (until recently?) organic ties to the Muslim Brotherhood cast doubt on the very existence of the Sisi regime. And trust in your Turkish counterpart cannot be restored with a handshake or investments from Qatar. Even if the renunciation of the Muslim Brotherhood convinced the Egyptian leadership of Turkey’s intentions, this alone is no longer enough. For Cairo, Libya is key. Its further destabilization, in which Ankara is clearly investing in order to maintain Tripoli’s dependence on it, thereby maintaining its strong foundations, Egypt does not tolerate. As well as actions that attempt to form a fait accompli that will strengthen Turkish influence in the wider region.

After the unilateral demarcation of Egypt, Tripoli is asked to make a choice between tacit acceptance, a mild reaction, or appeal to The Hague.

After Egypt’s unilateral demarcation, Tripoli is being asked to choose between tacit acceptance, a mild response, or turning to The Hague, although Cairo does not recognize such jurisdiction. Anything more dynamic on her part seems doubtful, given the caliber of Egypt. Accordingly, Turkey, despite the condemnation of the Greek-Egyptian agreement (most recently with a letter to the UN along with the Tripoli transitional government), chooses a confrontation only with Greece and is unlikely to risk a (new) break with Egypt. However, both for reasons of prestige and in essence, he cannot “digest” the de facto deconstruction of the Turkish-Libyan pact, and even the martyr method of salamization.

As a result of Egypt’s move, which anticipates future EEZ negotiations with Libya and places limits on other countries involved, the Greek side should expect retaliatory measures that can only concern itself. Tripoli could submit to the UN the coordinates of the unmarked part to the west and northwest of Turkish Libya, or TRAO could conduct surveys (seismic or drilling) close to those conducted by ExxonMobil or in the northernmost parts of the proposed Libyan continental shelf. Turkey has been working on the scenario of declaring an EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean for a long time and now it can find the required alibi. Erdogan is in the pre-election period, under pressure from a misguided policy in the Mediterranean that is leading him to a drastic rollback without impressive results, he sees the danger that Netanyahu’s recovery will hold the momentum of the Turkish-Israeli relations, so he is looking for a way to get revenge. If in fact he comes across the initiative of Cairo as an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, and the opposition criticizes him for the “devastation” of Al-Sisi, then he may turn against Greece, as he weighs the data differently in relation to Egypt. It is also more convenient due to the hostile climate it has created towards Athens, and any loss of connection with Cairo would significantly weaken Ankara’s position in the region.

* Mr. Konstantinos Filis is Director of the Institute of International Affairs and Associate Professor at the American College of Greece. Under his leadership, the book “The Future of History” (Papadopoulos Publications) is published.