There is no need to analyze, especially at the present moment, very serious national reasons requiring special attention to what concerns the foreign mission of the MFA. With the current focus solely on wiretapping, a historic opportunity to revive the ever-needed operational leverage of our foreign and defense policy is in danger of being missed. I have repeatedly mentioned the need to pay attention to the opposite course taken by EYP in relation to its Turkish counterpart, MIT. The latter is evolving (in combination with many state and semi-state services of the Erdogan system) into a huge, multifaceted and aggressive neighbor mechanism. For our own national intelligence system, the extensive development of our relations with the “allied” states of the Southern Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf in recent years should have served as a ringing wake-up call. These countries certainly have nothing to do with Western systems of democratic governance and public accountability, but they operate, negotiate, and operate using the secret services as the central pillar of their external actions. Despite all this, our country chose to ignore these critical channels (indicative of the choice of a new commander in 2019), with fatal consequences: last year, Ankara neutralized all the advantages (we thought) that we received.

For obvious reasons, I will not publicly analyze the serious shortcomings of the country’s security system and focus on creative proposals:

1. Separation of EYP to create two services, as happens in most European countries. Specifically:

a) One (Internal Security Service) will have counterintelligence and combating terrorism and organized crime/neutralization as its primary responsibilities, reporting to the Minister for Citizens’ Protection.

b) The second (Foreign Intelligence Service) will have as its main task the collection, analysis and dissemination of foreign information (mainly on nationally critical countries) using human resources and technical means. This particular agency may report to the Minister of National Defense or the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These two services should be staffed by staff currently employed by the Ministry of the Interior (depending on their qualifications) or by appropriate staff serving in other public services, and provision should be made for transferring any released or ineligible staff to the wider public domain. or other services.

2. Alternatively, the EMP could be kept as it is after a complete reorganization: fewer departments and departments for greater flexibility and better control of activities, the abolition of some no longer needed regional divisions, the reduction of administrative staff, the organization of appropriate training, the transfer of personnel to other services or from them, etc. A fundamental reorganization can be considered the division of the EMP into two main areas of its activity, i.e. collection of foreign information (espionage) and work with the actions of foreign services in our country (counterintelligence) with two operational deputies. commanders responsible for its two specific and main missions. For administrative, financial and operational duties of one EYP, a third deputy commander may be assigned.

3. In the case of choosing a proposal for a single and completely reorganized service, its final subordination to the Prime Minister must be decided at the same time, since only in this way will its general duties, while its national role, be covered and justified.

Whichever of the above proposals is qualified, it is considered necessary to return the Directorate for the collection of information by electronic media to the new unified ELA (or to the spy sector if it is separated) from the National Security Agency (where it was, unfortunately, moved about two years ago). Finally, with regard to control over one or both services, one must decide whether the state wants real/substantial control or formal control. If formal control is chosen, it is sufficient to assign the appropriate authority and responsibility to the Committee on Institutions and Transparency, whose members, however, will never be able to control the operational activities of one or both services through deliberately formal and meaningless hearings of the governor or governors, since they do not have the necessary special knowledge. However, in the event that the state decides to control the intelligence services as a whole and to a large extent, the responsibility for control may remain with the Committee on Institutions and Transparency, but with the following additions:

a) The committee should always seek specialized staff with similar knowledge and experience, a qualification that some non-working EYP executives are likely to have.

b) In addition to the commander/commanders, the Committee will be brought and considered, in the opinion of the members of the Committee, deputy commanders and any other leader or employee, as soon as the “obstruction” is sufficiently selective and used for other and obvious purposes to refer to the notorious “secrecy” and Legislatively establish stricter penalties for the possibility of leaking confidential information or the names of EYP officials.

Its external mission is of national importance and its institutional protection is required immediately.

In any case, for the information mechanism to be effective, the following must be ensured:

• Recruitment must be based on EYP’s actual needs, and those hired must meet special conditions.

• Cancel or limit police assignments to a low level and only to meet security needs (personnel and facilities), excluding their deployment or use in operational areas (I avoid publicly documenting how and by whom EYP was seriously exposed in operational relation). or/and with leaks in the party and the media).

• Root out unionism as a constant source of internal conflict and operational difficulties, as well as dangerous leaks.

• Leaders’ choice of leaders must be convincingly documented and presented to the senior minister or prime minister for approval.

• A three-year (with transfer) term of office in the regional offices should be a critical criterion and a key advantage in the selection of leadership positions.

• Increase the corresponding budget not so much in terms of wages, but in connection with the need to modernize special equipment and develop business mainly abroad.

Finally, do not rule out the possibility of appointing a commander or deputy commander from the political headquarters of the EMP (acting or retired).

As the possibility of a dangerous confrontation with Turkish aggression is clearer than ever, the National Intelligence Service has a crucial role to play. Regardless of partisan objections to its ubiquitous interior, its exterior mission is nationally critical, and its institutional protection is urgently needed.

* Mr. Yannis Valinakis is a professor and former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.