Despite yesterday’s smiles, his (good) chemistry is still sought after Erdogan on Biden. Obviously, this is not the only and not the main reason for the difficulties faced by Washington and Ankara.

The latter’s inclination towards the East, the establishment of a strategic understanding with Russia, the contradictions in foreign policy, although in some circumstances giving it prestige and a sense of independence, but reinforcing the image of an inconsistent partner that cannot always be counted on, are taken into account with the American factor, without ignoring, of course , the importance of Turkey in a number of issues.

While Erdogan’s frequent politicization confirms his unreliable – by Western standards – character, with the delay in joining Sweden and Finland, he ends up using all the cards at his disposal to pressure or even exchange for something else. In Ukrainian, annoyance at Ankara’s neutrality, but also understanding of its position, as well as encouragement of its initiatives to address issues such as the food crisis.

The holding of a meeting between the heads of the CIA and the FSB testifies to the mutual trust in the Turkish side and covers up the regulatory role that Erdogan seeks, but if the information about the Russian attack on Polish soil is confirmed, even if by chance, NATO will need solidarity.

However, the Turkish president fails to expand Biden’s tolerance for actions that would upset existing balances in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. While he worries about America’s turn toward Greece, he understands that anti-American rhetoric in his homeland favors him, but otherwise conflict with Washington is not a sober choice.

Tomorrow, for example, the Turkish media may present the brief contact between the two presidents as a White House concession to Soylu’s refusal to accept US condolences. However, Erdogan seems to have an opportunity in Indonesia to see Russia’s tight isolation, and Germany’s shift toward a (more) principled stance towards Turkey instead of Merkel-era mercantile appeasement cannot but worry him. To such an extent that for some time now he has been trying to find a common language with France.

At the moment, the Turkish leadership is conducting large-scale full-fledged negotiations with the United States, of which the Greek-Turkish ones are also a part. And he is trying to correct the mistakes of the past (significantly: the confrontation with Israel and Egypt, the acquisition of the S-400) in order to gain good testimony from the outside, soften the Americans, especially Congress, and thus gain more room for maneuver.

However, despite his successes in Ukraine and elsewhere, Erdogan has been trapped in the aftermath of the loss of the F-35 by having to upgrade and buy back the F-16, and his disregard for the law and the interests of allied forces on fronts like Libya narrows his options. Even if no conditions are set for the F-16, delivery times may be tied to Turkish elections. And Biden should not rush against what Erdogan took in yesterday’s four-four. Of immediate interest to Greece is the question of whether Ankara will try to activate the hydrocarbon exploitation agreement with Libya before the elections. It is here that the availability and effectiveness of the American leadership will be judged in relation to the Turkish president, who, like Macron and Soltz, was asked to refrain from escalating actions with Greece.

* Mr. Konstantinos Filis, Director of the Institute of International Affairs and Associate Professor at the American College of Greece. Under his leadership, the book “The Future of History” (Papadopoulos Publications) is published.