The signing of a memorandum on energy cooperation in Tripoli is not an unexpected event. It represents the culmination of Ankara’s strategic decision to create a new front with Athens. With the confidence of a regional power, the neighboring country is strengthening its presence in Greece’s soft underbelly. There are three scenarios for the next phase of the Turkish plan in the region.

Scenario one. Turkish drilling rigs will start operating in the Gulf of Sirte (or beyond) but will not enter the proposed or delimited Greek EEZ. In other words, not a single Turkish drilling rig or research vessel will approach Crete. Thus, the tension will be maintained at an acceptable level and we will not come to a military crisis.

Scenario two. Ankara will try to challenge Greek sovereign rights south of Crete (for example, near Chania prefecture), but Turkish ships will avoid the delimited Greco-Egyptian EEZ. Here comes the big question about the national red line. Is it 6 nautical miles, 12 nautical miles, or perhaps within the supposed Greek EEZ?

Scenario three. Ankara decides to send the drilling rig to the Greek-Egyptian EEZ, escorted by warships, to enforce the provisions of its memorandums on the proposed Turkish-Libyan EEZ. This scenario can be implemented with a simultaneous diversion to the Aegean or Cyprus. With today’s data, the third scenario is the least likely. As long as Greek-Egyptian defense cooperation remains close, the Turkish side will avoid worsening relations with Cairo.

Athens has developed a containment strategy that mainly concerns Western Thrace, the eastern Aegean and Cyprus. So far, the Libyan Sea has been of little interest to the Greek side. This was facilitated by the devaluation of the geopolitical and geo-economic significance of Libya. We can no longer afford to ignore what is happening in a long-suffering country.

There must be a full explanation of the national red lines so that the enemy knows what is acceptable and what is not.

Circumstances require the formation of a Greek strategy to contain the Libyan Sea, taking into account the specifics of the region. Generally speaking, containment includes a strong psychological dimension associated with the fear of failure. In practice, the defender must convince the enemy that the costs of offensive action far outweigh the potential benefits.

The credibility of such a threat rests on two pillars. The first concerns the military means available to punish, if necessary, the attacking side. In this case, Greece has a strategic and tactical advantage due to its geographical proximity to the maritime area, which is disputed with Turkey. From a military point of view, the presence of the Turkish fleet south of Crete is a rather risky operation.

The second pillar concerns the political will to use military force when necessary. For this to happen, the political and military leadership must send signals of determination and self-confidence to the other side. But the main thing is that there is a complete clarification of the national red lines, so that the enemy knows what is possible and what is not. The scale of the threat does not allow for generalizations or ambiguities in Athens.

If the other side does not violate the national red lines, there is hope that tensions will decrease and Greek-Turkish relations will gradually normalize. Find a peaceful and civilized way to resolve our unique differences. Otherwise, Athens must respond in a clear and decisive way to protect our sovereign rights. The Turkish plan seems to include the usurpation of the alleged or demarcated Greek EEZ and, ultimately, our exclusion from the Eastern Mediterranean. No Greek government can allow this.

* Mr. Manos Karagiannis is Associate Professor at King’s College London and the University of Macedonia. His book Deterrence and Defense will soon be published by Papadopoulos Publications.