For now. Two decades have passed. Twenty years since Alexis Tsipras he began to take his first steps on the central political scene. Of course, he received his baptism of fire even earlier. The 1990 occupation brought him to the fore for the first time and paved the way for his election as president of the Youth Coalition in 1999, with the support of then-party chairman Nikos Constantinopoulos.

However, his presence has become more intense since 2002, when, as leader of the Youth Group (which also featured later First Left stars, Nikos Karanikas, Nasos Iliopoulos and Gabriel Sakellaridis), he was in Florence for the 1st European Social Forum. He came to the attention of public opinion in 2006 when, under the slogan “We are in the game”, he won 10.51% of the vote as head of the “Open City” of the municipality of Athens. Since then – and especially in the last 10 years, when he came second in the 2012 election – he has not left the game, despite the periodic predictions of his opponents, who believe that the ambiguity and ambiguity in the politics that he specializes in, they can be fatal flaws in Greek politics (experience shows that they are probably qualities).

How much has Alexis Tsipras changed since the 2015 politician? This is the central question ahead of the 2023 elections. His opponents answer that he has not changed at all. He will always combine ignorance and delusion with opportunism and carelessness in choosing partners. He will always combine pravism with an obsession with civil war, social sensibility with an attraction to Soviet solidity (as his recent article on Gorbachev in Rassvet showed), aggression against “Madame Merkel” with building a wonderful relationship with the former chancellor. Close associates, however, say he has been disappointed by management and European advice and that he is constantly learning and changing. That he is leaning more and more towards the center – even if “he will forever remain left-wing, looking to the center, and not a centrist, looking to the left.” It is recalled that he, a populist, ruled with an unprecedented disregard for populism (implemented a tough memorandum and signed an agreement on North Macedonia).

The debate about “who is the real Tsipras” goes on forever. Those who see him as dangerous emphasize that one should not forget that he is the only politician who has threatened Greece’s participation in the EU. The response of his fellow travelers is that the decompression of anti-Europeanism, which he audaciously achieved in Europe, revived the commitment of the Greeks to the European perspective. On the other hand, those who stubbornly reject him resent his love for Panos Kammenos’s state partner, Pavlos Polakis, and “polarization”, tax policies that crushed the middle class, authoritarianism that was expressed in methods (television licenses and Novartis) and cynicism in managing the image of the disaster in the Oka. And they say that all this explains why for 6 years he has consistently ranked second in the polls and consistently lost in elections to Kyriakos Mitsotakis.

Scissors with NW

SYRIZA officials attribute the party’s poor performance to the fact that opinion polls always underestimate its outreach, which happened even before previous elections.

What do they say to SYRIZA about all this? Are they satisfied with the “flat” performance of the party and the “somersault” of their president? The answer is “no” – but on the other hand, they do not see all black. And here’s why: top executives remind us that opinion polls always underestimate a party’s reach, and that this was proven back in 2019, when polls showed until the last minute that it would win 26%, but got 31.5%.

They add that the graph of the difference between the two sides, according to six-month MRB measurements, is declining at such a rate (from 18% in May 2020 to 7% in May 2022) that if it continues, the difference could by 2023 reach limits of statistical error. As for the excellent relationship with Pavlos Polakis, they answer that the extreme style of Polakis cannot even be put on a par with the central decision of the ND. to integrate the leading figures of the far right into an “invisible coalition”, clearly expressed in the government.

So do the interlocutors of Alexei Tsipras believe that he will soon return to the government? Not really. The former prime minister is reported to have admitted that his party has a “handling problem”. He understands that the majority of voters, many of whom are “Syrians”, do not believe that most of the leaders of SYRIZA have enough appetite, methods and knowledge to roll up their sleeves and effectively run the country. That is why Tsipras’ speech in Thessaloniki had to be technocratic, realistic and practical, in order to give the impression that there is a program and solutions with a cost calculation. They hope to continue this line in the coming months and succeed in overcoming the general mistrust. What positively surprised the Kumundouri clergy was the decision of Kyriakos Mitsotakis to draw TIF’s attention to the “danger” of forming a SYRIZA cooperation government from the first simple proportional elections. “Mitsotakis is rallying his base, but at the same time he is acknowledging that the game can be open,” they say.

And here is the opportunism of Tsipras, which has not changed a bit, let’s say “anti-Syriza”. This is expressed in the instrumentalization of a simple analogy in order to cause political confusion, instability and “blurring”. In SYRIZA, some rub their hands and remember Mao’s words: “Great upheaval, wonderful situation.”

Disagreements subsided

Not everyone in SYRIZA is a fan of partnerships, but the differences have finally subsided. Pavlos Polakis (who aims to be self-reliant) and the coordinator of the Political Planning Committee, Nikos Bistis, who insists on cooperation, now seem to agree that the party can bet on the formation of a government that “will be” on the ballot box of simple proportionality – with PASOK, Measure 25 and KKE clearance Alexis Tsipras, who first mentioned this scenario two years ago, as well as leaders such as Nikos Pappas, Dimitris Tzanakopoulos, Nikos Filis, Olga Gerovasilis and Giannis Ragusis, discuss it, each with their own nuances. Can they “get away with it” with them? To an absolute extent, they don’t even believe it themselves. They admit it’s a science fiction scenario (especially since it contains “tolerance for the KKE”), but in reality they they are trying to spread this scenario, not necessarily to convince of its implementation, but to return it to public debate, the impression is that SYRIZA and Tsipras, one way or another, can “return to the game.” Later Twenty years after Florence (and despite the politics that emerged from the “Florence Institute”…) Tsipras and his troupe remain on the stage. On the edge, but not outside.