In Athens, concern prevails over the possibility of consolidating the negative data created for Greece by the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, as the situation in Libya once again got out of control. Ankara remains particularly active in Libya, and despite the clear stance it has taken on fresh clashes between the forces of Tripoli-appointed Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeiba and Fati Basagi, who has been running for his seat since last February by decision in the Bengal parliament he is trying to play the role of a bridge builder.

According to information coming to Athens, although the Turks support Dbeiba, they already have close contacts with Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and are also trying to establish channels of communication and understanding with Basaga.

Greece’s fears are heightened by the fact that the situation is now radically different from that of 2020, when the Egyptians viewed the Turkish presence in Libya as openly hostile. Now in the special services and at the diplomatic level in Cairo there is not only an understanding of the importance of Ankara’s role in Libya, but also coordination efforts to overcome the current crisis.

Of course, the bra de fer in Libya is much wider, as Italy (Dbeiba) and France (Basaga) are in different camps in the competition. Parliament Speaker Aguila Saleh remains negative about Turkish influence, but the possibility of overcoming the crisis and finally forming a new government or launching processes that Ankara will have a significant impact remains open. Sources with knowledge of very serious and chaotic events tell K that the Turks are promising logistical and financial assistance, as well as greater exploitation opportunities on the bottom of the Eastern Mediterranean, as long as the Libyans continue to support the Turk-Libyan Memorandum.

Adding to Athens’ concern is the fact that the Egyptians no longer view the Turkish presence in Libya as openly hostile.

Given the involvement of Egypt in this new round of events in Libya, the situation in this large North African country is at least in a new phase. It is recalled that Greece and Egypt signed an agreement on the partial demarcation of their exclusive economic zones (EEZ), which is also the main argument of Athens in favor of the irregular nature of the Turkish-Libyan memorandum, since it partially overlaps these zones, cutting off Turkey from Libya.

The intense diplomatic mobilization in Libya, even in the eastern part, to which Turkey previously had limited access, combined with the ever-improving understanding with Egypt, testifies to a very conscious choice that Ankara has made to use all available tools for its declared strategic goal. with the aim of expanding influence in the maritime sphere. Obviously, Athens is on diplomatic alert to avoid unpleasant surprises.

This attempt to encircle Greece through the triple doubt of its rights in the Aegean, Libyan and Eastern Mediterranean is another argument in favor of all those who understand that the Turkish rhetorical escalation of the past few weeks is not another electoral tool. in the hands of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, but it has a much more substantial character. Ankara wants to speed up procedures for reviewing the status quo in the region and believes that this could be part of a broader balance sheet reform framework.

In Athens, the concern is heightened by the fact that even officials do not escape the field of aggressive statements, a tactic unusual for a sector with many years of experience and tradition, such as the Turkish diplomatic corps. The intensity of Ankara’s attempts to impose an agenda that will somehow lead to a decrease in Greek influence not only in the Eastern Mediterranean, but also in the Aegean, is undoubtedly connected with what is perceived in Turkey as an opportunity, and the crisis in Ukraine is draining the diplomatic capitals of the largest states Europe as well as the USA.