The main reasons for the decrease in the number of refugees from Ukraine staying in Romania and the increase in mobility are related to a number of interrelated aspects. First, the legal framework of Romania has undergone frequent changes, which can make it difficult, for example, not only to employ foreigners (including refugees), but also to “keep” them in the workplace after employment. Apart from these frequent changes, the legal framework for the integration of foreigners (including refugees) in Romania remained incomplete and often unclear. There are, for example, significant gaps in the rights of foreigners (such as civil and political), but also low awareness by public institutions of their responsibilities towards these persons

Over a year ago, I wrote an article about the exemplary mobilization of civil society, the general population and state institutions in front of the large number of people displaced by the war in Ukraine, and how it sparked a wave of international recognition for Romania.

More and more people are wondering what the current situation is almost two years after Romania became one of the main transit and destination countries: has the number of people transiting through Romania increased? And what about those who receive permission for temporary protection or settle here? What is a socio-demographic profile? How have the legislative changes of the last two years affected the prospects of refugees in Ukraine? How does the local population see the flow of refugees from Ukraine? This article aims to answer these questions using the latest data and available research.

Over the past two years, almost 5.5 million border crossings from Ukraine to Romania have been registered (over 1.5 million of them through the Republic of Moldova). In the reverse direction, from Romania to Ukraine, 3.4 million crossings were registered during the same period of time. The image below shows the evolution of these costs/outputs over the past two years and shows some interesting details. First, there is some “seasonality” in these transit flows – except for the first few weeks after the invasion in late February 2022, the highest inflow/outflow occurs during the summer holidays (July-August) and winter (November-December). ). Second, despite expectations of stabilization over time, there is actually a trend of a slight increase in transit through Romania, especially in the last 6-7 months after the modification of the “50/20” program to support refugees from Ukraine.

The distribution of the proportion of women/men/children among the total number of people transiting through Romania remained roughly the same over the 2 years, where about ¼ were men and 1/5 were minors. Likewise, the north of the country remained the main points of entry/exit from Romania – Siret (1.9 million), Sighet (700 thousand) or Hamleu (330 thousand).

Instead, there have been important changes to the type of checkpoint you enter Romania through, as shown in the image below. If at the beginning of the invasion the most transit points were the border crossing points between the Republic of Moldova and Romania, then over time the points between Ukraine and Romania became the most used points, followed by sea/air or with other countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia).

In addition, if in the first days after the beginning of the invasion, the main border points through which Ukrainian citizens left Romania were points on the border with Hungary, then over time the points between Romania-Ukraine and Romania-Bulgaria became the most transit points, as the image below shows that indicates the reorientation of the flow of displaced persons from Ukraine.

These changes indicate an important transition from “one-way” transit from Ukraine to other Western European countries in the first months of 2022 to a type of transit with several exits and entries from Ukraine. As I mentioned above, in the last year there has been an intensification of this type of “pendulum” mobility, but the last 6-7 months after the modification of the “50/20” support program for refugees from Ukraine are especially noticeable. this meaning

Another important change that has occurred in recent months concerns the number of displaced persons from Ukraine living in Romania, as shown in the image below. As of the beginning of February 2024, 78,700 citizens of Ukraine were registered in Romania, which is the lowest figure since March 2022. The largest number was reached exactly one year ago, in February 2023, – 113 thousand people. In other words, over the past year, almost 35,000 people (about 1/3) “abandoned” their residence in Romania and preferred to return to Ukraine or migrate to other countries, as evidenced by other studies.

The decrease in the number of Ukrainians registered in Romania seems to be closely related to the above observation on commuting mobility – more and more people seem to be spending short periods of time in Ukraine and Romania instead of long-term residence in Romania.

This phenomenon seems to be confirmed by the number and distribution of temporary protection permits issued in Romania, which reached 152 thousand from March 2022 to January 2024, but whose number/month decreased starting from April 2023 after several months (June 2022 – April). 2023) it was relatively stable as shown in the figure below. Again, the drop becomes steeper, especially in the last 6-7 months after the transition to the 50/20 refugee support program in Ukraine.

In addition, this is also indicated by the counties/localities where the most permits for temporary protection were issued in the last two years, which (with the exception of Bucharest) are in the immediate vicinity of Ukraine (Constanța, Maramures, Galati, Suceava). and it grew over time.

The main reasons for the decrease in the number of refugees from Ukraine staying in Romania and the increase in mobility are related to a number of interrelated aspects. First, the legal framework of Romania has undergone frequent changes, which can make it difficult, for example, not only to employ foreigners (including refugees), but also to “keep” them in the workplace after employment. Apart from these frequent changes, the legal framework for the integration of foreigners (including refugees) in Romania remained incomplete and often unclear. There are, for example, significant gaps in the rights of foreigners (such as civil and political), but also low awareness on the part of public institutions of their responsibilities towards these persons. Last but not least, although the legislation and public policies adopted in Romania to accommodate the flow of Ukrainian refugees largely respect the directions set by the EU framework, most of these changes were not made with the direct involvement of refugees through public consultations.

Closely related to the debate on the legal framework, although “on paper” refugees have access to the full spectrum of social services in Romania, the reality shows us that they also face the same barriers as many Romanian citizens in their relations with by the state, but did not have their adaptive (coping) mechanisms at hand. For example, there were significant delays (sometimes as long as almost 1 year) in the payment of expenses under the 50/20 program, as well as in payments under the new refugee assistance program in Ukraine, which led to even greater vulnerability of refugees. beneficiaries of these programs. Another example comes from the field of pre-university education, where, although there is a right to participate in the state education system, due to language and institutional barriers, only a small part of children in Ukraine are actually enrolled in it, and a significant proportion (approx. 1 in 4) are not attend any form of formal education, neither in Romania nor in other countries.

We also see a decrease in the willingness of the local population to support refugees from Ukraine, and in the international context, Romanian citizens declare themselves somewhat more moderate, as shown in the image below. There also seem to be important regional differences between different cities/districts in Romania regarding the perception of the impact of the refugee flow at the local level. Last but not least, the data show that about half of those who received displaced persons from Ukraine (i.e., the group that interacted with them constantly) believe that the arrival of refugees has led to higher rents/housing prices, and prices in general. –

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