Last year ZF published the opinion of the undersigned regarding the classified project auction and I expressed some opinions that unfortunately came true. This seventh version of the feasibility study (a world record for project preparation), which Romania has proposed since the 80s, is a typical “case” of how to do nothing

I will try to explain why the “auction” resumed this week is expected to be another failure, as a result (or objectively!?) the final “burial” of the project, on plausible grounds, easily “swallowed” by the general public, for example, that either no one presented again, or that the proposals did not fully meet the requirements of the technical task, or that no funding or investors were found, any other reasons , which can be invented “on legal grounds”.

And look how they legally “bury” a very important project for Romania, although everyone is still talking about it NEED (and not feasibility!) of this project, but the Ministry of Energy is fighting to bury it “competitively”, despite the pompous statements of Minister Burduzhi that “this is a priority project for him”… there will be, but there are more and others around.

The reasons are two big and broad:

1. System which was created in Romania: an immoral politico-economic concubine (or vice versa)
2. Competence managerial and professional who participated in Romania (also economically and politically)

Let’s take a deeper look at just these 2 reasons:

1. System

Guided by the curiosity to read the “new version of the Terms of Reference”, effectively announced by Minister Burduja, as if the “comments of participants from the previous edition” – season 1 – of the auction, to which more than one appeared, were included, we notice that nothing has changed in the concept of SAPE and in C/S (either the minister does not know and was lied to, or he knows and the possible bidders are lying to him, which is very serious, or somewhere there is a small, very small change, invisible so that “someone likes” it, but we have at least 1 bidder, to whom we should award the contract).

In Romania, public procurement is regulated by the relevant Law on Public Procurement (which has become a “fetish” in the field of the public sector, an ideal tool, good only for “maneuvering” the public procurement process depending on different interests, a problem to which I will return below). Who has the curiosity and patience to read the Technical Passport posted on SEAP (Electronic system of public procurement – that is public procurement for the general public!). You will find that this document is about 60% about laws and legal procedures that bidders must follow, about 30% about how bidders must be good and expert, and nothing more about what we want, how we want , so that it is Tarnitsa.

In a word, some papers prepared by some lawyers and other bureaucrats, which have nothing to do with Romania’s unique energy project, particularly technological and which few people have an idea of ​​”what they are eating”. For the sake of relevance, I invite readers, even if they have no experience in this matter, to take a look at this:

Handbook on the evaluation of hydroaccumulating hydroelectric power plants

Cost-benefit analysis and decision evaluation framework

March 2021

ANL-21/10

https://www.energy.gov/hydrowires

(US Department of Energy)

More information about HydroWIRES is available at https://energy.gov/hydrowires.

have some idea of ​​what a CHEAP power plant means.

Let’s first see how it happens in large corporations that operate in the international market, competitively:

• And they have a department Procurement (procurement), which is authorized to arrange/purchase what is necessary and, above all, is legally responsible for the entire process
• And they operate on the basis of very clearly established “laws” (more specifically the Domestic Procurement Regulation), including established evaluation procedures transparent to any potential suppliers, qualification criteria for admission as a qualified supplier, available budgets for certain positions, etc. All that, they are often published on the websites of the respective Corporations!
• In all these large corporations, in a situation where there is a “failure” of being unable to purchase any essential equipment, any essential service for the proper functioning of the corporation, on the grounds that “nobody showed up” this fact is unacceptable, and in the vast majority of cases the management of the procurement department changes almost instantly.

What we see now is happening in the big “corporation” SAPEMinistry of Energy, “responsible” for the acquisition of TEO services for Tarnița-Lăpustesti?:

1. What we read in the Terms of Reference of the last tender (and which will be repeated soon), under the signatures of the “working group” consisting of 13 “experts”, advisers, lawyers, investment optimizers and the chief executive, first of all, who, absolutely all of them have nothing to do with the job called “international procurement” leaving no clear result as to who would know much about the “feasibility of CHEAP”. Above all these signatures 3 (three) Temporary directors !?, (who this time signed the specifications, apparently assuming their content. This is really a big progress compared to the previous “edition” of the tender.) The big question is who and how many C/S signatories have the knowledge and qualifications to communicate with the bidders who must have similar experience in Tarnița – at least 4 other similar ones projects).
2. In addition to the lack of clarity about process responsibilities, there is another: lack of clarity about funding sources (or at least the intentions of project funding and/or beneficiary participation to better understand and assess risks on the part of the beneficiary). International practice clearly provides for this condition: no reliable international auction can be conducted without indicating the sources of funding. (of the project, not S/F!)
3. Not knowing “whose project really is” and who is the commercial and legal counterparty, we are still surprised that “no one proposed anything in the PDSER electronic system”, suggesting, for God’s sake, that the electronic system decided objectively and impartially … and the organized parties had nothing to do with it, that’s all, “enforce the law”!?
4. Let’s see who organizes the auction, write down Exercise books and it is assumed that they will appreciate them too (if in the end they will have something). From what we have seen above, these are “invisible”, and the first thing that comes to mind are those from Hidroelectrica, the undisputed “experts” in hydropower, who own “half the lake” in Tarnica. Why this might be a problem, one might think without much imagination?:

No one has studied the past failures of this project. According to the request of Mr. Shimpeu, a member of Radu Bohdan in the Parliament of Romania, registered in the Chamber of Deputies under no. 4380A/2014 regarding the possibility of implementing the Tarnița-Lăpuștești project, the Ministry of Energy responded through the authorized minister – Secretary of State Mihai Adrian Albulescu (according to No. 101906/RN/30.06.2014) that the project is very necessary and was to be financed and managed by Hidroelectrica together with a team of Deloitte consultants, but (I quote the Ministry of Energy’s response below):-

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