The geopolitical situation on the European continent is at a critical crossroads until the end of 2023. Forecasts related to the dynamics of geostrategic interactions depend on the continuity of the solidarity of the European Union (EU) with Ukraine, in particular with regard to the conventional and hybrid forces of Russia’s aggression. The intensity of the EU’s commitments in the coming months will depend on the response to four key challenges: (1) Russia’s military tactics against Ukraine in the winter; (2) the speed with which the EU’s southern neighborhood can be stabilized; (3) the stability of society in European countries in the face of the risks of political radicalization, as well as (4) pre-election forecasts in the USA.

According to the Russian logic of war, the use of winter and the waging of an energy war to exhaust the Ukrainian infrastructure are again at the fore. There are already signs that Russian airstrikes are hitting Ukraine’s energy sector more aggressively than port facilities in Odesa region (Reuters, November 2023). Resolving the crisis in the Middle East, while effectively protecting Palestinian civilians in Gaza and the West Bank during Israeli military intervention, is attracting EU attention and resources. Brussels is clearly interested in turning this crisis into an opportunity to formalize Palestinian statehood (Politico, November 2023). At the same time, violent outbursts against immigration in Dublin, right-wing anti-government protests in Spain against the amnesty of Catalan separatist leaders, or the victory of Eurosceptics in the elections in the Netherlands reveal some structural weaknesses of the EU. Months before European Parliament elections in the summer of 2024, Brussels must come up with a solution to prevent the rise of Eurosceptics, with a focus on migration. Last but not least, the proactive nature of the EU in foreign policy will be influenced by the pre-election context in the USA, where the balance of power between Democrats and Republicans raises certain questions about the sustainability of the current harmony in transatlantic relations.

The unpredictability of the external environment forces the topic of pro-Ukrainian solidarity to rise to the top of discussions in Brussels and European capitals. The EU’s solidarity with Kyiv can be measured both from the side of financing and from the side of European integration. Although not to the same extent, both files are important. These dimensions can have a positive effect on each other or, on the contrary, they can infect each other if the EU does not consider them in a comprehensive and complementary manner.

Geopolitical fatigue in the EU and the Ukrainian dossier

As of February 2022, European solidarity with Ukraine in defense against Russian aggression was foreseen in the EU’s external strategies. This is based on almost complete solidarity within the 27 EU states, with the exception of Hungary. The uniformity of support for Ukraine in the EU generally reflects the support of the population at the European level. Although in the spring of 2023 there were some signs of waning public sympathy for Brussels’ response to Russia’s aggression, most Europeans sided with Ukraine. Thus, European public support for the EU’s strategies towards Ukraine ranges from 60% to 85% depending on the area of ​​intervention (Eurobarometer, July 2023). The greatest support is evidenced by EU humanitarian aid to Ukrainian refugees (88% in July versus 91% in February 2023), and the smallest – in the field of military equipment supplies (64% in July versus 65% in February 2023). In any case, the changes in attitude are insignificant, and the majority of the European public perceives the EU aid offered to the Ukrainian side positively.

However, a certain geopolitical fatigue is taking shape regarding the Ukrainian case, which combines nationalist-protectionist reactions in sensitive areas (in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary), such as access to grain products. Recently, opposition to the increase in the number of permits for Ukrainian carriers operating in the EU, whose number has increased from 165,000 in February 2022 to about 1 million today, has intensified. It is also possible to catch pessimistic signals regarding the availability of financial resources in the EU and the crystallization of the budget deficit in some European capitals. At the European level, it is about Hungary’s opposition to the creation of a new financing mechanism for Ukraine until the end of 2027 in the amount of 50 billion euros. A viable alternative solution may be direct borrowing from EU national governments, although this may cause some budgetary pressure. The aid promised to Ukraine in 2024 by some European states – Germany and the Netherlands – concerns military aid in the total amount of about 3.6 billion euros. However, there is uncertainty regarding the ability of individual national governments to allocate financial resources for Ukraine’s needs that were previously provided through European funding instruments. The first case in this sense concerns Germany’s budget deficit, which amounts to 60 billion euros. This budget change could lead to a major overhaul of spending in 2024 on the green transition, the critical chip industry, and social subsidies for energy (Politico, November 2023).

In order to reduce or even eliminate obstacles related to the financing of Ukraine, EU leaders are preparing a new legal framework that will allow the use of profits from Russian financial resources frozen in the EU, amounting to almost 200 billion euros (Bloomberg, November 2023). The new mechanism will result from the legal consequences of the sanctions applied against Russia. Both the completion of legislation that legalizes the confiscation of income from Russian money blocked in the EU and the 12th package of sanctions may materialize by the end of 2023 or even in the first months of 2024. The creativity demonstrated by the EU in identifying alternative financial resources is lacking in the field of European integration, where political unanimity is needed to advance the pre-accession dialogue with Ukraine.

Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia – EU expansion to the east as a “package” or separately?

At the beginning of November, the European Commission assessed the readiness of Ukraine and Moldova as sufficient to start accession negotiations, although it indicated that not all conditions have been fully met. At the same time, the Commission established a number of requirements (9 in total) that Georgia must fulfill in order to obtain the status of a candidate country. Although the EU’s focus is now on the eastern dimension of the enlargement policy, Brussels is aware that the Western Balkans must remain on the agenda. That is why, probably also at the insistence of Austria, which is actively promoting accession negotiations for the Balkans (FT, November 2023), the EU decided to give a positive signal for the possible start of accession negotiations for Bosnia and Herzegovina (EU, November 2023).

Ultimately, the EU must reconcile old priorities with new enlargement emergencies. For this reason, expansion policy is inevitably split into two “dimensions”, even if it is under the same expansion pack roof. However, in addition to multiple speeds in the field of reforms, there are structural problems of the interstate and interethnic order in the Balkans, which differ from those directly caused by the Russian factor in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. EU policy on these two enlargement regions is divided by Turkey, the tenth candidate country. European actors are forced to increase symmetry in their policy towards Turkey as a result of its growing geopolitical weight (Euronews, November 2023).

The formation of two separate blocs in the field of EU enlargement is determined, respectively, by two sets of local realities and prerequisites. On the one hand, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are part of the Associated Trio, the most advanced and Europeanized group of Eastern Partnership countries. Although they have implemented association agreements with the EU, they have so far been overtaken by the countries of the Western Balkans – Montenegro, Serbia, Albania, North Macedonia and Kosovo – in several chapters. The EU’s ambitions and aid for the Western Balkans channeled resources ahead of accession, enabling them to better align with European standards. On the other hand, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have problems with territorial integrity due to separatism and occupation promoted by Russia (BneIntellinews, July 2023). This aspect strengthens the argument about the proximity of the three Eastern Partnership countries, including from the point of view of structural limitations and risks.

Distinctive features in the course of European integration of these regions raise the question of whether the future wave of expansion will consist of a “package” approach within one region. At least until 2030, the EU will be tempted to consider these regions separately. In the past, enlargements have taken place both as a “package” (Romania and Bulgaria in January 2007) and separately – Croatia in July 2013. Although both models still apply, the final decision will rest with the EU and the candidate countries. Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership.

Numerous interdependencies between Ukraine and Moldova (security, energy, transport, etc.), as well as Romania’s support of the Moldovan file in the process of preparing for accession, may incline Kyiv to look pragmatically at a possible “package” approach with Moldova. FirstThe Ukrainian side notes that there is broad European support for the current political government in Chisinau. Since Moldova can open the door to Brussels and European capitals, engagement with Moldova is compatible with Ukraine’s strategic interests. The second aspect The importance that contributes to the scenario of the Moldovan-Ukrainian combination in the field of EU accession depends on the fact that the Moldovan authorities used the Ukrainian issue to preserve their public legitimacy in Moldova and create a favorable image at the international level. The Moldovan side’s solidarity with Ukraine (refugees, transport flows, etc.) has become an investment in the confidence of the Moldovan government in the EU. Therefore, the European course of Moldova is significantly influenced by the alliance and rapprochement with Kyiv. The third and last factor it is an overly optimistic belief that Moldova can reform quickly to meet the accession criteria. Therefore, the leadership of Ukraine could count on the fact that the attachment to the leading country in terms of European integration can have indirect positive consequences for Ukrainian negotiations with Brussels. All these arguments make the Chisinau government more interested in going “in a package” with Ukraine than on its own. Even Kyiv does not signal that it would like to be separated from Moldova in the process of expansion for logical pragmatic and strategic reasons. – Read the entire article and comment on Contributors.ro