Against the background of a radical reset of the regional geopolitical context, joining the European Union (EU) is a necessity, not just a historical opportunity for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in their efforts to consolidate their own states. Moreover, the adoption of the European vector would enable a future separation from the Russian sphere of influence, provided that the initiated reforms create order and prosperity, as well as stop depopulation.

Equally important is the fate of the “frozen conflicts” and whether the Russian military threat can be used by future European elites to block the progress of the three countries to a possible accession stage.

The current European leadership admits that a situation similar to the admission of a divided Cyprus to EU membership may repeat itself. The head of EU diplomacy, Josep Borrell, referred to the Cypriot precedent in the context of the Transnistrian conflict in Moldova. The same argument applies to Georgia, but also to Ukraine, which launched a military counteroffensive in June to liberate all its territories from Russian occupation, including Crimea. However, the specifics of the Cyprus model require a more detailed analysis to determine the expediency of using it as a precedent for the countries of the “Associated Three”.

The European agenda of the “Associated Trio” – technical progress and political ambitions

Although the implementation of the EU’s June 2022 accession requirements is progressing, none of the three countries have fully met them. They had almost a year at their disposal, but the nature of reforms requires systemic changes that require time, sufficient financial resources, efficient administrative apparatus, competent human capital, political stability and adequate security (absence of war). Traditional problems for these countries relate to justice, the fight against political corruption, the reform of local state administration, etc. According to the EU’s interim assessment, Moldova fully met three conditions out of 9 (33%), followed by Ukraine with two requirements out of a total of 7 (28%). In Georgia, three conditions out of 12 are fully fulfilled or 25%.

These three countries have similar strategies to achieve the goal of European integration, namely the fulfillment of the technical aspects of EU requirements. The political side depends on the subjectivity of Brussels in relation to the actions and speeches of the governors in Kyiv, Chisinau and Tbilisi. The EU has clear preferences for Ukraine and Moldova. A dilemma situation persists with regard to Georgia. The EU must decide between the pro-European sympathies of the population and the geostrategic role of the country, on the one hand, and the oligarchic political system combined with the aggressive Euroscepticism of the government, on the other.

Ukraine intends to begin accession talks as early as 2024, and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is using his political clout to advance Ukraine’s cause among European leaders. The opening of negotiations is also presented as a way to raise the morale of the Ukrainian army trained to fight against Russian aggression (President.gov.ua, June 2023). Moldova’s political rulers are trying to send political signals to national institutions and European offices about their determination to meet EU requirements. In this sense, against the background of criticism that it will have a political influence on reforms in the field of justice, President Maia Sandu proposed to the High Council of Magistracy and the members of the Commission of Preliminary Verification that the accession to the EU depends on the fight against corruption in the judiciary. Georgia is in a delicate situation. Both the EU and the majority of civil society have legitimate objections to the quality of political reforms, the repressive nature of the regime, and the influence of informal oligarchic players (Bidzina Ivanishvili). However, the Georgian government believes that 11 of the 12 EU conditions (Agenda.ge, June 2023) have already been fulfilled, which contradicts the objectivity of assessments made by European institutions. Even if compliance with pre-accession conditions is the only requirement for candidate status (Interpressnews, June 2023), non-adherence to the sanctions against Russia may be an additional, but undeclared, political hurdle.

“Cyprus precedent” – conditionality of Greece and the size of the uncontrolled zone

According to Borrell, as a precedent, the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 took place against the background of strained relations between Greece and Turkey and constant deadlocks in the process of reunification of the island. As a member state of the EU since 1981, Greece views Turkey’s pre-accession dialogue and EU accession negotiations, launched in 1999 and 2005 respectively, as ways of influencing both the Cyprus solution and the resolution of Turkish-Greek disputes, including including territorial ones. The right of veto in the field of enlargement, which the EU member states possessed, gave an advantage to the Greek factor in the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU. Greece later extended the same leverage to its relations with the EU and its enlargement policy towards Central and Eastern Europe (the former socialist and former Soviet space) to promote Cyprus’s 1990 candidacy. In particular, Greece conditioned the eastward expansion of the EU through the accession of nine states with the inclusion of Cyprus in the same wave (EuObserver, 2002). This step was achieved even though the island remained unincorporated and with a disputed Turkish military presence in the northern region.

According to some estimates, the Greek Cypriot community saw in the process of accession to the EU additional value for the reintegration of the island. Thus, the Turkish minority would receive guarantees of security and freedom, including in the field of free movement of people, as a result of Cyprus’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC-EU). Already at the stage of preparation for accession, the export of the Greek part of the island from the EEC amounted to 50%, and the Turkish part – 64%. This commercial dependence on the common European market was another argument in favor of the accession of the island as a whole to the European Economic Area (EU).

In EU documents from 1998, the integration of the northern part of Cyprus, controlled by the Turkish-Cypriot community, with the military support of Turkey (a NATO state since 1952) is considered permissible if it is carried out as part of Cyprus. accession to the EU. The EU’s openness to such a scenario was based on the territorial and demographic dimension of the region controlled by the Turkish side, and the potential of the region in the field of tourism and agriculture was qualified as an advantage. The only serious objections raised by Brussels at the time concerned the need to bring the region’s infrastructure standards in line with those of the rest of the island, which is governed by Greek Cypriots.

However, even 19 years after Cyprus joined the EU, the island remains divided. The main reasons relate to the EU’s limited attractiveness for reunification and the stagnation of Turkey’s accession negotiations, including due to the non-application by the Turkish side of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement with the EU regarding Cyprus. Both the Greek veto and the EU’s intention to promote the reunification of Cyprus served as important factors in the accession of Cyprus. However, so that the lack of territorial integrity in the candidate country does not pose a problem for the EU, other aspects are also important. Rather, an example of Cyprus kind of, since not only the population of the separatist region (the territory controlled by the Turkish minority) is insignificant, but also the external actor opposing the reunification is the EU candidate country and NATO member Turkey (with 40,000 troops stationed on Northern Cyprus in 2022). From this point of view, Cyprus could represent a kind of “semi-precedent” for the European integration of states with frozen conflicts and, accordingly, armed conflicts (external military aggression) from Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus – Moldova, Georgia and, accordingly, Ukraine. It is obvious that European integration is an incentive for the territorial reintegration of these countries. However, unlike Cyprus, the territorial problems faced by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia originate from Russia’s aggressive stance, which inflames and/or reproduces “frozen conflicts” in the former Soviet space, which are later used as a source of geopolitical influence in the region.

Cyprus is a “semi-precedent” for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia

Based on the security realities in countries with regions occupied or de facto controlled by Russia, the Cyprus model is so far only a “semi-precedent” for the possible agenda of the accession of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia to the EU.

Primo, the balance of power in separatist or temporarily occupied regions by Russian forces is constantly changing and will be marked by the results of the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Among the three cases, Moldova has the most influence on moving the Transnistrian conflict towards a peaceful solution. Thus, it increases the economic dependence of the separatist regime on Moldova and the EU. At the same time, the Transnistrian criminal and political elites are willing to make concessions in order to survive politically and economically. The situation in Ukraine is currently uncertain due to the continuation of the war, and in the separatist regions of Georgia – Abkhazia and South Ossetia – Russian political and military control is maintained and/or strengthened.

Second, Cyprus benefited from Greece’s veto, which forced the EU to accept the still-divided island during the 2004 enlargement wave. In the case of the “associated trio”, only Moldova has some historical and identity affinity with another EU member state. (Romania), similar to the existing one between Greece and Cyprus. Theoretically, Romania has the right of veto, which can be used to facilitate Moldova’s accession to the EU. But Romania’s internal European policy is still in the process of formation and will be partially limited by the fact that it is not yet part of the Schengen area and the Eurozone. Poland and the Baltic states – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – could lobby in favor of Ukraine. Georgia is in a more isolated situation. But if qualified majority voting materializes in the field of EU foreign policy and eventually extends to enlargement policy, then the veto will disappear as a tool used by member states to promote or block candidate countries.

Third and the last aspect is related to the population and territory of separatist regions or actually occupied by Russia (See the table below). Based on the EU’s argument for a manageable size of the region not controlled by official Cyprus, formulated back in 1998, Moldova and Georgia should be eligible for EU membership, having respectively 12% and 20% of the occupied territories. Similar parameters are observed in relation to the population of the separatist regions. In the case of Ukraine, the liquidation of the Russian territorial occupation is currently underway. At the same time, apart from the EU’s ability to digest candidates with separatist regions, the geopolitical actor that produces or fuels separatism also matters. In contrast to the negative image of Turkey, a candidate country for joining the EU and a member of NATO, in the case of Cyprus, Russia is perceived as a direct military threat by both the EU and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. – Read the entire article and comment on contributors.ro