The European integration of the states that have recently joined the “enlargement package” of the European Union (EU), including Georgia and Moldova, is a long process of generational and socio-political transformation that may encounter obstacles. Often this process can overlap with moments of anti-reforms or attacks on supporters of the pro-European agenda, leading to social upheaval in the form of protests. In the context of the prospect of joining the EU, the de-Europeanization of political processes by initiating illiberal actions can generate protest sentiments, as the recent experience of Georgia shows. At the same time, as in the case of Moldova, pro-European governments may be overwhelmed by the current crises fueled by Russia’s war against Ukraine. Such governments are vulnerable to the socio-economic consequences of crises, which the opposition exploits through protests, which can also complicate Russia’s geopolitical interests.

Denis AshPhoto: Personal archive

Any anti-European political movement automatically turns into a pro-Russian approach, which is heavily taxed by active elements of society represented by civil society (NGOs, students, etc.). This type of socio-political behavior was observed in Georgia in the context of recent protests against the “anti-foreign agents” law. These protests were dominated by the belief that the government had “imported” the format and spirit of the law from Russia to counter civil society and institutions that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad, mostly from the US and the EU. At the same time, anti-government protests can take place in candidate countries for EU membership, such as Moldova, where power is monopolized by political forces interested in European integration. An extremely favorable geopolitical climate for the EU, such as Moldova’s, is not, however, an antidote to protests that instrumentalize poverty and corruption.

Both in the case of protests in Georgia and in Moldova, the EU and the West are in a vulnerable position. As the case of Georgia shows, after suffering a political defeat due to pro-European protests, rulers may relapse, still seeking to marginalize pro-European voices in the domestic political and public space. Despite the fact that the local political agenda is based on European integration from a technical and legislative point of view, it is not necessarily saved from the risk of being renationalized or partially de-Europeanized to reduce the influence of the EU. In addition, in the case of protests organized on the basis of socio-economic discontent, which are observed in Moldova, the image of the EU may suffer due to a negative association with the government to which the EU gives external legitimacy. Therefore, the EU has no other choice but to be vigilant and punish the breach of obligations by the governments of the countries included in the enlargement agenda by implementing the conditionality mechanism in practice.

Protests in Moldova are a socio-economic, criminal and geopolitical melange

The nature of protests in Moldova is complex. They are held regularly, becoming a kind of calling card of the Shor party. Three main elements form the basis of the anti-government protests, the strategic goal of which is to delegitimize the ruling party (Action and Solidarity Party) and President Maia Sandu before the 2023-2025 election cycles.

received the dominant component of the protests is the high level of poverty in the country, exacerbated by the energy crisis of 2021-2023. Against the background of average annual inflation of more than 30% during 2022, the impoverishment of the population intensified. According to the 2022 Multidimensional Poverty Index, the absolute poverty rate in Moldova was about 25% of the population, with about 1/3 of those affected coming from rural areas. It is to this category that the organizers of the protests – members of the Shor party – appeal.

The second element which characterizes protests related to the use of money from unknown, that is, illegal, sources. These financial resources were supposed to be used to recruit protestors from socially vulnerable sections of the population. So far, the authorities have confiscated about 4.5 million Moldovan lei (up to 300,000 euros) from representatives of the Sor party. The protesters do not care about the origin of the money or the criminal profile of the organizers. As long as receiving money from Shor’s party is not criminalized, it will be impossible to stop the recruitment of low-income citizens for anti-government protests. This should in no way nullify the right to association and free expression on the one hand, or lead to ignoring the problem of absolute poverty being used for political purposes on the other.

The third element it is aimed at the ties of the protest organizers with Russia. The Shor Party was sanctioned by the US in October 2022 for facilitating Russia’s malicious influence on Moldova’s democratic institutions. A similar request of the Moldovan authorities was addressed to the EU. The government in Chisinau insists that the Sora protests are being held with the aim of a violent seizure of power by pro-Russian forces. But in order for such a scenario to become plausible as an object and degree of achievement, the number of protests must be at least 30-50 thousand people, and the involvement of Russian military forces stationed in the Transnistrian region must be operational. Such a situation would repeat the scenario under which Russia occupied Crimea in 2014. Currently, anti-government protests in Moldova are an opportunity to strengthen the positions of the pro-Russian and Eurosceptic opposition.

Protests in Georgia are a political mobilization of the pro-European population

Unlike repeated protest actions in Moldova, organized with the mass participation of socially vulnerable Eurosceptics, anti-government demonstrations in Georgia were short-lived and attracted dynamic pro-European sectors of society (NGOs, students, etc.). Georgian protests were focused against the draft law “on foreign agents” (March 8-10, 2022) and stopped immediately after its repeal. Neither the detention of Mykhailo Saakashvili (six years in prison) nor the problematic implementation of EU conditions can provoke massive anti-government protests, even if they are initiated by the opposition.

The Georgian public shows a high sensitivity to politics, which can lead to a rupture of the European agenda. The intensity and connotation of the protests would be different if the ruling party (“Georgian Dream”) had friendly relations with the EU. Aggressive rhetoric against decision-makers and EU institutions, intensified after the 2020 parliamentary elections, increases suspicions that the Georgian government is ready to de-Europeanize certain political processes in the country. The government in Tbilisi cannot abandon the European agenda because of the political and international image costs, but will try to re-nationalize it. But if the image of the EU is too discredited, favorable conditions will inevitably arise for the activation of Russian soft power in one form or another.

Although the absolute poverty rate in Georgia was around 17% in 2021, populist political parties in that country do not turn to socio-economic themes to organize protests. At the same time, the government tried to fully capitalize on the consequences of Russian aggression against Ukraine: the influx of Russian citizens (about 1 million), an increase in their remittances (4 times to 2.1 billion dollars), as well as increased exports to Russia, which is looking for ways under the pressure of sanctions import diversification. As a result, Georgia’s economy grew by about 10% in 2022. Therefore, although there is a significant socially vulnerable layer in the country, it cannot be involved in protests with the same ease as in Moldova.

Even if the pro-European opposition is fragmented (at least 11 formations), with a total public support of about 30%, the government can still expect protests from Georgian youth (Generation Z), who react to attempts to import authoritarian practices (from Russia, Azerbaijan, etc.). The ruling party is trying to prevent the risk of repeating such social explosions in the future by discrediting the organizations that mobilized the youth for protests. The propaganda of the ruling party projects these NGOs as a public phenomenon opposed to the church, which is the most respected institution in the state. In parallel with the stigmatization of the protesting youth, Georgia’s ruling party equates the opposition’s protest moves with an attempt to change power through a “color revolution” or a coup d’état (Agenda.ge, March 2023). Unlike the situation in Georgia, protests organized by the opposition in Moldova, using vulnerable population groups, are considered a tool of subversion in the hands of Russia. Read the whole article and comment on Contributors.ro