The energy crisis in Moldova continues, but it seems that the Moldovan government is getting easier to overcome the difficulties. The return to the contract with the Transnistrian region (Centrala Termoelectrică de la Cuciurgan – MGRES) for the supply of electricity allows some financial relief for the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) government, consumers and the business environment. This also reduces the likelihood of negative scenarios related to a possible aggravation of the humanitarian crisis involving the citizens of the Transnistrian region. At the same time, by directing the entire volume of Russian gas to Transnistria, he can revive the activity of its economy. In addition to natural gas, another concession from Chisinau is the extension of environmental permits for the polluting Transnistrian metallurgical industry (Uzina Metalurgica Moldoveneasca) until the end of 2022. Thus, the old status quo is restored, which was convenient for the separatist administration and the oligarchic Sherif group to provide some minimum conditions to avoid an anti-regime uprising and/or exodus from the region. And last but not least: with the restoration of access to electricity produced in Transnistria, the pressure on Romania to increase aid to Moldova decreases. Romania managed to integrate energy preferences into its policy towards Moldova, thus responding to the high level of “unionist” sympathies among Moldovan citizens.

The usefulness of the Transnistrian energy factor for Moldova is unquestionable if Transnistria pays for the consumed gas. This argument, however, is partial until Moldova has access to gas purchased at the price of Russian gas, which is fully transported to Transnistria (5.7 million cubic meters per day) for more affordable electricity production. The price of electricity sold by the separatist regime is 17 euros per MWh lower than the preferential price offered by Romania in October-November (73 euros/MWh and 90 euros/MWh, respectively). Under these conditions, the Chisinau authorities will try to at least partially reduce the electricity tariff or, as an alternative, leave it frozen during the winter. The population is already wary of the constant increase in electricity tariffs, the fourth in November. Recent surveys show that high prices are the most important problem facing the public (IRI, November 2022 – 57%).

Despite the fact that the contract with MGRES was signed during opaque negotiations, it shows that Moldova has to choose from a series of dilemmas and has chosen the “lesser evil” (Intellinews, December 2022). The approval of this contract by the US Embassy and the EU through the Energy Community underlines the fact that even external partners understand that Moldova depends on the Transnistrian region, at least during this winter. The goal on which the government of Moldova has focused is to ensure political and socio-economic stability in the short term – until the spring of 2023 – when the energy crisis will have the most acute consequences.

“Pragmatic” concessions, even in favor of the Transnistrian region

In the end, the Moldovan government appears to have caved in to Russian pressure, leaving the Transnistrian region as the main beneficiary of the deal to restore electricity supplies. In short, Transnistria receives Russian gas at a convenient price (twice lower than on the European spot market), produces electricity for its own economy and for export to the territory under the control of the constitutional authorities, receiving money for it. In this way, Russia solves the problem of socio-economic and political survival of the separatist regime, which back in October bet on a similar operation with Chisinau.

Despite the fact that the Transnistrian region stands to gain the most, the government in Chisinau gains time and a political base to resolve the energy crisis with minimal image costs. The authorities of Moldova managed to prevent further increase in inflation in December and later in the first quarter of 2023. This means that less resources are allocated to compensation schemes, which already amount to 5 billion lei (245 million euros). As such, it could reduce political pressure on the government, which already faces high levels of public disapproval. About 30% of the population consider a change of government as the main solution to overcome the socio-economic crisis (BOP, December 2022). The level of negative opinion in society is high, even though most media sources considered independent are quite favorable to the authorities. The low popularity of PAS increases the credibility of its political opponents, who are mobilizing their efforts for anti-government protests and preparations for local elections in 2023. At the same time, PAS’s attempt to replace local legitimacy with the recognition of external partners is risky. strategy.

Even if countering Russian propaganda is more effective than ever in the past, 45.6% believe that the PAS government is responsible for the energy crisis, and around 67% believe that President Sandu should go to Moscow to demand lower prices for Russian gas (IPP ). , December 2022). Although more than 1/4 of the population sees a change of government as a way out of the impasse, PAS and its informal leader, President Maia Sandu, know that rejecting Natalia Havrilica’s government does not solve anything. However, apart from the usual management deficiencies, the main problems are structural and relate to economic dependence on Russian gas and electricity capacities in the Transnistrian region. Currently, natural gas and electricity, respectively, imported from the EU and Romania, respectively, are several times more expensive than what Moldova can get from Russia and Transnistria. The objective reality is unpleasant for the government in Chisinau and contrasts with its geopolitical priorities of disengagement from Russia. Moldova’s vulnerability to Russian energy levers is exacerbated by continued Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, which repeatedly shuts down electricity in the Odesa region (Meduza, December 2022). For these unfortunate reasons, at the risk of erosion of popularity, the government will try to reach pragmatic agreements with Transnistria as long as it feels in danger, even if the terms of the agreements are more favorable to Russian-Transnistrian interests.

“Unionist” feelings – between utilitarianism and the pressure of the energy crisis

In search of reliable sources of electricity, the Chisinau government turned first of all to Romania, which is a key player in Moldova’s energy security. From October to November, electricity from Romania is sold to Moldova at subsidized and market prices. President Maia Sandu’s request to Romania to save electricity in order to be able to supply more electricity to Moldova was one of the last moves, albeit not entirely successful, to attract the attention of the Romanian public and politicians. Radical leaders of the unionist movement, such as George Simion, leader of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR – 27 deputies in the Chamber of Deputies and 12 in the Senate of Romania), suggested that Romania stop helping Moldova. . The provided opinion was not approved because it was representative in the political environment of Romania. Although fraught with other drawbacks, the resumption of electricity imports from Transnistria takes some of the pressure off the shoulders of Romania, which continues to help Moldova, but also prevents attacks like those George Simion has voiced.

Even if Moldova can cope with the energy crisis with the help of Romania (the EU and Ukraine), the electricity supplied by Transnistria defies Chisinau’s inflated expectations. As a result, the “unionist” mood in society is protected by the expectations of hyperoptimists, as well as the attacks of skeptics, who probably see in the energy impasse in Moldova an opportunity to speed up the project of reunification with Romania.

Problems in Moldova’s energy sector and the usefulness of Romanian support may be one of the explanations for the fact that sympathy for the union remains between 30% and 33% (IData, November 2022). These sociological trends may persist, even if the country’s status as a candidate for EU membership may weaken them. Romania’s official position is completely detached from the calculations of unionists on both banks of the Prut, who believe that Moldova’s failure to resolve the energy crisis will be a sign that reunification is inevitable. However, Romania’s membership in NATO makes the attractiveness of unionism run into resistance from supporters of neutrality. While 54.5% oppose NATO compared to 22.4% who agree to join the military bloc, 41.1% say neutrality will not protect the country from external aggression (BOP, December 2022). The most powerful tools for strengthening a positive image in Moldova, which are at Romania’s disposal, are the sphere of energy. In view of the restoration of the supply of electricity from Transnistria, Romania can adjust its energy assistance in such a way that it becomes feasible, proportionate and does not cause a negative reaction of the Romanian public, including the unionist one, towards Moldova. entire article and comments on Contributors.ro