“Many judge so even in our times, hoping that the boiling feelings with which we are seized may be directed by a war in the neighborhood, that, without spilling elsewhere, the offensive feelings which have taken possession of the body of our society may not maintain their fever, which leads us finally to our death.”[1]

Michel de Montaigne

Where did it all start? We will remind: Moscow cannot imagine the survival of the Russian Empire without providing living space, according to classical theories of geopolitics (see the theories of Gelford Mackinder). Therefore, in order to ensure the security of the Russian Federation – the Kremlin believes – it is necessary for the former states that were part of the defunct USSR to be under strict economic, political and military control.

In other words, states such as Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Moldova, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan or Azerbaijan (and even the Baltic countries, Finland and Eastern Europe, auxiliary) can only have a very limited freedom of choice, which must go through a preliminary consent of Moscow and cannot cross the red lines established by the Kremlin.

Until the end of 2013, Ukraine provided certain guarantees to remain in the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation, despite popular pressure expressed through the so-called “Orange Revolutions”.

VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH, POLITICAL ACTOR, SYMBOL OF ENSLAVEMENT

Viktor Yanukovych was the governor of the Donetsk region and ran in the presidential elections of Ukraine in November 2004 with an openly pro-Russian platform. On November 24, 2004, after the second round of voting, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine officially declared Viktor Yanukovych the winner of the election, having won 49.61% of the vote against 46.61% of the pro-Western counter-candidate Viktor Yushchenko (who did not recognize the election result, accusing it of massive falsifications).

The High Court in Kyiv suspended the results of the presidential election pending the consideration of appeals filed in connection with Viktor Yanukovych’s victory. Meanwhile, in Kyiv, protesters (the first “Orange Revolution”) increased public pressure to resume voting, which happened. And after this third round of the 2004 elections, the pro-Western candidate Viktor Yushchenko was declared the winner.

Since the fall and winter of 2004, Viktor Yushchenko, former chairman of the National Bank and former prime minister, known for his policy in favor of Ukraine’s orientation towards the space of Euro-Atlantic democracies, began to show visible signs of suffering attributed to dioxin poisoning[2]. He completed his term in 2010, but did not run again, leaving the way open for Yanukovych.

In 2010, in the final phase of the presidential elections, two (more or less assumed) pro-Russian candidates, namely Viktor Yanukovych and Yulia Tymoshenko, faced off, and the former won. The victory of Yanukovych, who was sworn in on February 25, 2010, again strained the atmosphere in the country.

The 2010 vote offered (as can be seen in the image) the prospect of a divided Ukraine, where the southeast (which geographically largely overlaps the historical 18th-century governorship called “Novorossiya”) overwhelmingly voted (especially Donbas) for the presumed pro-Russian candidate.

But Viktor Yanukovych was certainly the one whom Moscow needed in Kyiv. Yanukovych refused to sign the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union (“Eastern Partnership”), agreed to extend the agreement on the lease of military bases in Crimea to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and called for the intervention of the Russian military to “protect” the pro-Russian population of Crimea.

Yanukovych’s mandate again brought street protests to Kyiv (the second “Orange Revolution”), which were brutally met by law enforcement agencies, partly at the direct request of the Kremlin, Vladimir Putin himself. On February 22, 2014, Viktor Yanukovych was removed from power, and he was temporarily replaced by the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada, Oleksandr Turtsynov.

On the same day, Viktor Yanukovych left Kyiv ostensibly to participate in the congress of pro-Russian movements, which was to be held in Kharkiv. He never made it to Kharkiv and preferred (apparently, not agreeing with Vladimir Putin’s demands) to hide in the Russian Federation (Rostov-on-Don). However, he broadcast a pre-recorded speech through the media, in which he accused that he was removed from power illegally and that he did not resign, and that “neo-fascists” seized power in Kyiv.

As you know, the next day, the Russian army invaded Crimea and took it by force by means of a simple operation (the soldiers did not have insignia and did not march under the flag of the federation); then supported pro-Russian separatism in Donbas, but failed to occupy Mariupol, Odesa or Kherson in order to recreate (symbolically and not only) the old governorship of “Novorossiya”.

MINSK AGREEMENTS OR ENSLAVEMENT AGAINST PEACE

Minsk 2[3]:

1. An immediate and broad ceasefire;

2. Removal of large-caliber weapons of both camps;

3. OSCE monitoring and verification;

4. Initiation of dialogue regarding the creation of self-government in Donetsk and Luhansk regions;

5. Forgiveness and amnesty of persons participating in the armed conflict;

6. Exchange of hostages and prisoners;

7. Provision of humanitarian aid;

8. Restoration of socio-economic relations, including payment of pensions;

9. Restoration of border control of the Ukrainian state;

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed groups, military equipment and mercenaries;

11. Constitutional reform in Ukraine, including decentralization and separate mentions of Donetsk and Luhansk;

12. (Free) elections in Donetsk and Luhansk;

13. Activation of the activities of the Trilateral Contact Group with the participation of representatives of Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE.

The parties to the “Minsk Agreements” were the Trilateral (Contact Group formed by Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the OSCE) and the “Normandy Format” (mediators France and Germany). Unfortunately, each of the parties is involved in negotiations and implementation Minsk agreements he understood differently about the completion of the process outlined by the relevant documents (in this case, Minsk 2).

Moscow wanted to preserve Crimea, which had already been unilaterally annexed to the Russian Federation, to completely remove it from the discussion, to ensure the preservation of its control over the Black Sea, the mouths of the Danube and the straits, as well as to receive confirmation from Ukraine for Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa regions to obtain autonomy from Kyiv with the possibility of choosing in the future either federation with the rest of Ukraine or joining the Russian Federation.

France and Germany did not agree with this (let’s call it extreme) Russian point of view, which was never agreed with Kyiv, but they would have nothing against a decision according to which the Russian Federation would keep Crimea, Donbas to achieve autonomy (with by yourself). -state administration), but within Ukraine, and further this status quo will allow Europe to continue vital economic relations with the Russian Federation, as they were established until February 2014.

Ukraine did not accept the negotiating offers of France and Germany precisely because it believed that if it once conceded, Moscow would not stop until it achieved what it really wanted, that is, the creation of “Novorossiya” and the capture of 45% of its territory, in which home to over 60% of the state’s economic base (not to mention land loss).

In general, those who accuse Petro Poroshenko and, in particular, Volodymyr Zelensky, of opposing implementation Minsk agreementsseeking at all costs a war with the Russian Federation, stubbornly ignores (of course, for various reasons) the fact that Moscow was (and still is, although after 250 days of war it had to seriously readjust its goals) all the time the confidence that it could take from Ukraine whatever it wants, either through diplomatic pressure and economic blackmail, or through open war.

Even if it were to secure Novorossiya—the general definition of the southeastern territory, from Odesa to Kharkiv—what it wants without resorting to open war, Moscow would still not relinquish political control over the rest of Ukraine through a puppet government, simply because it does not refused neither the Baltics nor Eastern Europe.

However, with the beginning of the war, taking into account the heroic resistance of the vast majority of Ukrainians and the support of Ukraine by the West, Moscow’s plans will have to be seriously adjusted, adapted to the reality on the ground and the capabilities of the Federation (military, economic, political and diplomatic) in order to support the achievement of the goals that by February 24, 2022 year, he believed that he would easily reach it in just 18 days.

Read the whole article and comment on Contributros.ro