One of the most unexpected events of the war in Ukraine is the use of Iranian Shahed-136 drones by the Russian armed forces immediately after the beginning of the repression caused by the incident that blocked the functioning of the bridge in the Kerch Strait.

The use of these drones is considered a sign of weakness, evidence that the Russian Federation no longer has its own military equipment that can be successfully used in the war in Ukraine. If we sum up the military equipment used after the start of the successful offensive of Ukrainian troops in the Kharkiv direction, we can see that Iranian drones are an important part of it. The massive attack that followed 3 days after the incident in the Kerch Strait and targeted the entire territory of Ukraine demonstrated that even when the Russian armed forces want to be extremely visible, the result is very far from what Moscow wants. After General Surovikin assumed effective command, the use of Iranian drones became a central element of Russian military strategy.

According to the data, the Iranian drones are an implementation of the Russian-Iranian military agreement, apparently concluded in August. Le Monde. According to the information published in Washington PostAccording to the new agreement, signed on the occasion of the visit of the Iranian delegation to Moscow on October 8, the supply of Fateh and Zolfaghar missiles is foreseen. The supply of drones was carried out on the basis of the first agreement, the existence of which is not recognized by either Moscow or Tehran. On October 18, Kremlin press secretary Dimitriy Peskov was asked about Russian-Iranian military cooperation, but he flatly denied it. Data on the ground clearly contradicts this, but Russian propaganda has accustomed us to such a total denial of reality. Later, information appeared that there are Iranian instructors who help the Russian army use drones, especially in the territory of Crimea, the front-line territory. It is not surprising that the Russian Federation turned to Iranian instructors during the war in Syria.

One of the first reactions of Ukraine was Foreign Minister Kuleba’s proposal to President Zelensky to sever diplomatic relations with Iran. Ukraine also initiated steps alongside Israel to acquire a missile defense system Iron dome, using the argument that Iran is a common threat to both Ukraine and Israel. Israel’s position remained unchanged, expressed in the voice of Defense Minister Benny Gantz: Israel provides humanitarian and economic support to Ukraine, but does not send weapons. However, the Minister of Diaspora Affairs in Israel, Nahman Shai, argued the same as Ukrainian officials: Iran is a common enemy of Ukraine and Israel, and Israel cannot remain aloof from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The answer came on October 23 through an Israeli attack on Iranian drone production facilities located in Syria. Haaretz noted that Iranian drones are produced and stored near the Dimas military airport near Damascus, used by Iran and the Hezbollah movement during the war in Syria. Even after this airstrike, Iran denies providing Shahed-136 drones to the Russian armed forces, and the Russian Federation refrains from commenting on Israel’s direct involvement in supporting Ukraine.

right New York TimesIsrael already provides the Ukrainian authorities with important information about Iranian drones, and an Israeli company provides satellite images of the launch sites of these drones, located in the territory controlled by the Russian Federation. Israel still refuses to deliver Iron dome Ukraine. The reason is that the Russian Federation controls the air over Syria and may, as a retaliatory measure, no longer allow Israel to use Syrian airspace to strike Iranian targets. However, the fact that Israel managed to destroy Iranian production facilities located in Syria on October 23 shows the vulnerability of Russian air defense. The result will be greater flexibility in terms of delivery Iron dome Ukraine? It remains to be seen.

The transfer of Iranian drones took place in August, but back in July, Jake Sullivan, the US national security adviser, mentioned the possibility of this transfer, which again shows – how many times? – the vulnerability of the information system of the Russian Federation, Iran or both states.

Since the beginning of September, the United States has imposed sanctions against the Iranian airline Safiran Airport Services, accused of providing the delivery of drones, as well as the Iranian companies Paravar Pars, DAMA and Baharestan Kish, which produce them. The EU, in turn, imposed sanctions on October 20 against several organizations and individuals involved in the production of Iranian drones, without providing too many details about the object and scope of the sanctions. France, the United Kingdom and the United States believe that Iran’s supply of these drones violates the 2015 UN Security Council Resolution 2231, under which Iran agreed to curtail its nuclear program in exchange for the waiver of some of the sanctions it had been under.

Deputy State Department spokesman Vedant Patel said on October 17 that the Russian Federation has lost more than 6,000 pieces of military equipment since the start of the war in Ukraine, putting enormous pressure on the defense industry. This resulted in a request for support from countries. such as Iran, adding that a significant number of drones transferred by Iran suffer from technical defects. This fact was also confirmed by the Ukrainian army, which received Iranian drones intercepted by air defense systems.

What is the reason that the Russian armed forces prefer to use Iranian drones? One explanation is their limited size and the fact that they are very difficult to detect by air defense systems. However, the Ukrainian army constantly reports on the destruction of Iranian drones – most recently, on the night of October 23-24, 16 Iranian drones were shot down at the front in southern Ukraine. At the moment, there is no reliable data on the number of drones that have already been delivered to the Russian Federation, the number of used ones or those that will be delivered. Recently, the Ukrainians announced that they shot down 60% of Iranian drones launched by the Russian Federation. If these figures were true, there would be no reason for optimism – it means that 40% of Iranian drones have not been intercepted and hit their targets, even if Ukraine’s air defenses have been significantly strengthened in the past few weeks with the help of Western partners.

Iranian drones are very effective because radars detect them at the last moment and Stinger surface-to-air missiles cannot intercept them. The only effective means of combating them is – no matter how ridiculous it may seem – the use of automatic weapons. We were all surprised by footage of Ukrainian police trying to shoot down Iranian drones – in fact, it seems to be the only way to effectively fight them.

These drones are guided by GPS systems and have a flight range of 2,500 kilometers, but they cannot carry an explosive payload of more than 50 kilograms and cannot engage mobile targets. They are designed to hit civilian targets, so the Russian armed forces prefer to use them. Iranian drones are perfectly adapted to the new Russian strategy of hitting civilian targets and the energy infrastructure of Ukraine. They cannot be effectively used against military targets and certainly not against Ukrainian troops on the move.

The international community’s efforts to counter Iran’s supply of drones to the Russian Federation are hampered by the emergence of social unrest in Iran. Paradoxically, as Richard Haas, president, noted Council on International RelationsIran is more interested than its Western partners in engaging with them in discussions related to the delivery of drones, as this would provide some legitimacy in power at an extremely difficult domestic moment. Hence the existing dilemma in Washington and Brussels: diplomatic efforts can force Iran to stop supplying drones to the Russian Federation, but the price will be the long-term legitimization of the regime in Tehran, which is increasingly controversial and fragile due to protests. The path chosen by the West was and is the use of international law in an attempt to determine the application of Resolution 2231 – but this path also requires the support of the Russian Federation, which would be contrary to the current interests of this state. entire article and comments on Contributors .com