For about a year now, we have been told at least once a month that the new nuclear deal with Iran is “very close to being concluded.” However, each time there is a misunderstanding between the parties at the negotiating table, which prevents the signing of a new agreement that would prevent Tehran from developing its own nuclear arsenal, which would lead to major changes in the Middle East. Although it is not officially part of the negotiations between the major powers and Iran, Israel is the nation most opposed to the treaty. Israeli leaders have recently developed a tough, sometimes even bellicose, rhetoric about the possibility of a new treaty with the regime in Tehran. But why is Israel so vociferously opposed to the deal, especially given that it will, at least ostensibly, serve its interests in the region?

Israel-Iran Relations: The Evolution of Regional Rivalry

To better understand how such a bitter rivalry between Israel and Iran arose, a brief review of the recent history of relations between the two countries is necessary. Although the countries maintained friendly relations and cooperation before the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the situation gradually changed with the regime in Tehran, at least one episode of cooperation through intermediaries after the events of 1979 due to changes in the internal and external landscape and in the regional political and security environment.

In an effort to establish cooperative relations with non-Arab groups in the Middle East after the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, David Ben-Gurion included Iran in what would become the “periphery doctrine,” a series of agreements with non-Islamic states. subjects and/or non-Arabs such as Turkey or the Kurdish population in the region. Faced with a pan-Arabist ideology that was gaining more and more followers in the Middle East thanks to the voices of leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser and the support of the Soviet Union, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, was pushed even closer to cooperation with Israel. Thus, before the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the two states developed close relations that materialized in many areas: supplying oil to Israel, allowing Iraqi Jews to transit through Iranian territory on their way to Israel, improving Tehran’s relations with Washington through good relations with the Jewish state, technological exchange, etc.

A few weeks after coming to power, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini destroyed all cooperation with Israel. The Islamic Republic believed that the previous regime, through its relations with the US and Israel, violated the principles of Islam and threatened the independence and values ​​of Iran. If the United States thus became the “Great Satan,” then Israel was its younger brother. Hostility and calls for mobilization to destroy Israel have long dominated Iranian discourse, but there have been moments of pragmatic cooperation without an overall improvement in relations. One such example is the famous “Iran-contra” scandal during the Reagan administration. At the height of the Iran-Iraq war, Tehran received weapons from the US through Israel in exchange for sums of money to be used to finance the Contras’ struggle in Nicaragua against the Marxist junta.

The nuclear program created by Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in ​​the 1950s was revived in the mid-1980s, and by the end Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) In 2015, progress in uranium enrichment and Iran’s creation, funding and development of a number of non-state organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad raised alarm in Israel. The deal, signed during the Obama administration by Iran and the P5+1 group (the United States, France, Britain, Russia, China and Germany), has faced a high degree of unpopularity in the region, especially from Israel, but also among Arab states such as Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. The aggressive campaign of former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu probably played a big role in Donald Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the JCPOA. However, all currently available data from international institutions indicate that the regime in Tehran has largely complied with the terms of the agreement and has succeeded in preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

Confronting Israel: Deal, Strategy, and Fear of Abandonment

Former Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was by far the most vocal opponent of the nuclear deal with the Tehran regime. He has never shied away from harsh criticism of both the Obama administration and the deal itself, which he often called a “historic mistake.” Israel’s current leaders, from former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett to current Prime Minister Yair Lapid, have largely adopted Netanyahu’s rhetoric. Little difference can be found during the tenure of Bennett, who has not been as public in his statements, preferring to express his concerns and rejection of the new deal in direct and private dialogue with leaders in Washington.

However, neither Netanyahu nor his successors have publicly presented a viable alternative for how to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. There are many options available, but there is no indication that any of them can lead to a complete end to Iran’s nuclear program. Recent covert actions by Israeli intelligence have included assassinations of scientists involved in the development of the nuclear program and sabotage of equipment, but apart from humiliating Tehran and delaying the development of nuclear weapons for a short time, they lack the ability to produce long-term. long lasting effect. Economic sanctions have failed to change the behavior of Iran, which has developed its so-called “resistance economy” by producing imported products domestically. They work effectively only in conjunction with a diplomatic strategy and are a tool for delaying the nuclear program, not ending it.

A large-scale military operation is difficult to carry out and the probability of its long-term effectiveness is low, which will lead to catastrophic consequences for the entire region. Israel’s ability to mount a major military operation against Iran’s nuclear program is uncertain, to say the least. This would involve flying over enemy territory, avoiding Iranian air defense systems, refueling in the air, destroying sites and returning to Israel. At least two steps are extremely difficult to accomplish at this point: Israel does not have the necessary equipment to refuel fighters in the air, and Washington has made it clear that it will not support such a move if Israeli leaders decide to launch a military operation against Iran; much of Tehran’s nuclear facilities are buried underground, and the US has so far refused to sell Israel bombs capable of destroying underground targets. Also, Iran already has the know-how to build a nuclear arsenal, and destroying uranium enrichment plants or equipment would only delay that process.

Thus, from the point of view of the threat to the security of Israel and the region, diplomacy remains the best option. While a new nuclear deal would not address all of Israel’s concerns or permanently halt Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, it would provide a long-term solution by creating more opportunities to contain Iran’s nuclear program. Time is now of the essence. Every day that Israel does everything in its power to delay or prevent the signing of a new deal is a day that Iran takes another step toward developing nuclear weapons. And yet, why do Israeli leaders oppose the treaty?

First, a nuclear Iran would inevitably cause major changes in the regional balance of power, forcing Israel to change its nuclear posture. Tehran’s development of nuclear warheads would significantly increase the level of danger in the region and probably trigger a wave of nuclear weapons among other states such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or Egypt. At the same time, from Israel’s point of view, the new deal will unfreeze billions of dollars in funds blocked by economic sanctions, which will later be used for purposes that Israeli leaders cannot control, such as the financing and development of numerous armed groups linked to Iran in countries such as Iraq, Syria or Lebanon. However, Israel’s fears have a deeper basis since the days of US President Barack Obama.

Since the inauguration, then-Prime Minister of Israel Benjamin Netanyahu had a bad opinion of the new administration and its policies in the Middle East. Barack Obama’s speech in Cairo, his first foreign visit as president to a region that did not include Israel, was seen by Israeli leaders as a US departure from previous principles of guaranteeing the security of the Jewish state. The rapprochement with Iran, the negotiation and signing of the 2015 nuclear deal, despite Israel’s insistence and protests, added fuel to the fire. The statements of American leaders and the apparent repositioning of foreign policy towards Asia, instability in neighboring countries, the difficult situation in the occupied territories and the wars in the Gaza Strip, as well as the growing influence of Iran in the region contributed to a large extent due to Israel’s fear of being abandoned by the United States.

Under these conditions, regarding the Iranian nuclear program, the only reliable guarantee for Benjamin Netanyahu was, and probably still is, the complete elimination of Iran’s nuclear potential. For the Obama administration, the optimal policy in this situation was diplomacy. These divisions also played out domestically, dividing Israel’s political environment into two camps: those who believe the probability of an Iranian nuclear strike is very high and those who believe it is low. For those in the first category, Israel should do everything in its power to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. For those in the second category, Israel must do everything it can to prevent Iran from going nuclear.

But the fear of being abandoned by the rapprochement between the US and Iran and the perceived external repositioning of the US towards Asia, away from the Middle East, requires Israeli leaders to reconsider their country’s position on Tehran’s nuclear program. Israel’s nuclear arsenal is probably one of the most closely guarded secrets in the region, and although its extent is little known, it is precisely the lack of transparency that has so far prevented a cascade of nuclear weapons by states in the region. The specialized literature defines three types of nuclear positioning, a concept defined as “operational rather than declarative doctrine”, each with its own characteristics described in the table below. Read the whole article and comment on Contributors.ro