The bright Russian ideologue Oleksandr Dugin is a frequent hero of journalistic investigations into the deep causes of Moscow’s recent foreign policy. Long-bearded, sonorous and extroverted, Dugin is a telegenic orator who fits the stereotype of the archetypal Russian philosopher. He can be many things to his listeners – a modern Dostoevsky, a right-wing Trotsky, an Orthodox monk, a second Rasputin or an alternative Tolstoy.

Dugin is a well-read polyglot who can speak several languages. He is well versed in social theory, esoteric literature, and normative philosophy. His political views range from Samuel Huntington’s theory of civilization to Aleister Crowley’s Satanism, from far-left trade unionism to far-right traditionalism, from ultra-reactionary principles to radical ideas.

Dugin was called a conservative, Marxist, imperialist, fundamentalist, geopolitician, etc. Most of these labels are appropriate in one way or another, but are themselves inaccurate. To describe his own ideology, Dugin introduced new constructs such as “neo-Eurasianism” or “fourth political theory” to impress readers in Russia and abroad.

Dugin is also an engaging speaker and conversation partner. At conferences, talk shows and interviews, he appears clear, eloquent and communicative. Frankly admits his extremist nihilistic position. Dugin openly calls for a global illiberal revolution, predicts the end of the international order and easily explains the reasons for his disgust with the West.

In the 1990s, Dugin openly presented himself as a fascist. He repeatedly praised representatives of German National Socialism and its allies. However, Dugin has recently refrained from publicly expressing his sympathy for historical European fascism. Instead, he now presents himself as an “anti-fascist”.

The output of Dugin’s texts and his various think tanks over the past 35 years has been enormous. Dugin and Co. they have published dozens of books in various languages, written hundreds of articles, and broadcast thousands of written, audio, or video recordings through various Russian and non-Russian media, public forums, and social networks. An extraordinary volume, numerous translations and a dizzying number of Dugin’s statements – not superficiality, dubious quality and fanciful statements – made him famous.

Today, Dugin is recognized throughout the world as the main representative of modern Russian political thought. His public ubiquity, belligerent statements and rhetorical skills have led many observers to regard him as one or even the mastermind behind the resurgence of Russian imperialism and Moscow’s anti-Western turn. Over the past 15 years, Dugin has been called, among other things, “Putin’s inspiration” and “the most dangerous philosopher in the world.”

But Dugin’s role in the Kremlin’s new aggressiveness in general and the Russian-Ukrainian war in particular is more complicated. Contrary to what is often presented, Dugin is neither an intellectually innovative philosopher nor an ideologue with direct access to the Kremlin. He likes to present himself as both, and his Russian and non-Russian supporters praise him as a deep thinker connected to the Russian leadership. Ironically, some of his critics also take these statements at face value.

However, Dugin’s philosophical statements and political ideas are only Russian translations or reformulations of older, non-Russian anti-rationalist and anti-individualist philosophical discourses. Anyone familiar with Classical Geopolitics, Integral Traditionalism, International Occultism, the German Conservative Revolution, French Postmodernism, the European New Right, and some other alternative schools of thought will constantly experience deja vu when he reads Dugin.

Readers unfamiliar with the elevated views of Dugin’s pre-, inter-, and post-war inspirations may perceive him as an original Russian philosopher. But what he proclaims as his “Neo-Eurasian” or “Fourth” theory is merely a copycat from some controversial and/or fringe theorists and philosophers from the odious West. Dugin’s cauldron of nihilistic fantasies, fascist dreams and totalitarian schemes contains little new for researchers of non-Russian ultra-nationalism, anti-democracy and illiberalism.

An equally common mistake concerns Dugin’s direct influence on the political decision-making process in Russia. It is true that some people close to Putin, such as his longtime KGB colleagues Viktor Cherkesov and Volodymyr Yakunin, have shown a confirmed interest in Dugin’s writings.

The well-known deputy of Putin, the secretary of the Security Council, Mykola Patrushev, once referred in an interview to the geopolitical ideas of Sir Halford Mackinder. Perhaps Patrushev learned about the British geographer from Dugin, who popularized the controversial explorer of the world in Russia in the 1990s. At the beginning of the 20th century, Mackinder declared that whoever controls the so-called “heartland”, that is, the territory of today’s Russian Federation, will rule the world .

In the past, some of Dugin’s extreme statements anticipated the rhetoric of today’s Kremlin propagandists. In 2014, in an infamous video presentation, Dugin called on the Russians to “kill, kill, kill” Ukrainians. In 2015, he declared: “War is our homeland, our element, our natural and primordial environment, in which we must learn to exist effectively and victoriously.” Dugin’s other older statements once seemed outrageous, but ring true in today’s Russia.

However, the growing correspondence between Dugin’s speech and the Kremlin’s rhetoric, especially starting in 2022, should not be exaggerated. The growing rapprochement is evident, but not enough to claim a direct causal link between Dugin’s ideas and Putin’s policies. Over the past decades, Dugin has proven that he predicted the evolution of post-Soviet Russia better than many academic researchers. However, he was more of a prophet and popularizer than an inspirer or direct leader of these currents.

Since the 1990s, Dugin and his followers are acknowledged to have contributed to the growing poisoning of Russian public and intellectual discourse with Manichean, conspiracist, and eschatological ideas. Their stories are about the centuries-old enmity of the West against Russia, about the inevitable final battle between traditional land powers and liberal maritime powers, about the infiltration of foreign powers into Russian society, etc. contributed to the radicalization of Putin’s regime and policies. Dugin and his followers were supported in this by dozens of other reactionary, fascist, racist and ultra-nationalist Russian writers and commentators.

Together they achieved something akin to the so-called conservative German revolution in the Weimar Republic of the interwar period. Instead of directly influencing parties, politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats, they have created an atmosphere in which violent repression at home and armed aggression abroad seem natural. Few Russian politicians repeat Dugin’s ideas verbatim, and even fewer have read his books. Given Dugin’s previous commitment to fascism, few Russian officials admit that he made an impression on them. – read the entire article and comment on contributors.ro