European sanctions undergo a process of constant maturation and renewal, adapting to current geopolitical sensitivities. In the context of Russian military aggression against Ukraine, European actors are pedaling efforts to pass the 11th package of sanctions. The main goal of the European Union (EU) is to ease the pressure on Russia by adjusting the restrictions adopted in the first 10 waves of sanctions. This could include penalties for organizations that facilitate sanctions evasion. Thus, about 90 international companies, including from China, etc., may be subject to secondary sanctions for involvement in (re)export of dual-use goods. Russia resorts to “parallel imports” with the help of companies from third countries that are not subject to Western sanctions, including to restore the capabilities of the military industry (RBK, May 2023). At the same time, a sanction is foreseen for evading restrictions on the transportation of Russian oil. Thus, vessels that disable traffic tracking systems on shipping routes will be penalized by the EU (Politico, May 2023). Finally, we want to fight against smuggling, the final destination of which is the European market. It also prevents accidents at sea, which Russia’s use of aging vessels could cause oil spills and environmental disasters, especially in the Baltic Sea region (WashingtonPost, May 2023).

While Hungary and Greece condition support for the 11th package of sanctions on the exclusion from the Ukrainian sanctions list (Politico, May 2023) of certain companies in the banking and transport sectors, respectively, the EU is preparing to formalize anti-corruption sanctions. The new sanctions regime, which is still being finalized, targets corruption beyond European borders and could improve the management of geopolitical emergencies in geographical proximity. Thus, a new lever of influence appears on the horizon within the framework of the common foreign and security policy of the EU in relation to both partners and geopolitical rivals. Anti-corruption sanctions may become mandatory to prevent the negative development of corruption in neighboring countries. At the same time, this sanctions regime may complicate initiatives to instrumentalize corruption from the region, which the EU seeks to Europeanize, by hostile regional states such as Russia.

The usefulness of anti-corruption sanctions for EU relations with its neighbors

The advantage of the anti-corruption sanctions that Brussels is going to introduce is their horizontal nature, which will allow corruption to be punished worldwide, regardless of country or region (Transparency.eu, May 2023). With the introduction of anti-corruption sanctions, the EU overcomes the shortcoming of the previous regime, which was strictly focused on the violation of human rights, the “European Magnitsky Act”. Once in force, fighting external corruption through individual sanctions – travel bans and asset freezes – could become strategic for the EU’s management of enlargement. Financial transactions with sanctioned parties will also be prohibited (AFP, May 2023). In addition, the same tool can serve to prevent regional security risks associated with the use by Russian special services of criminal groups in the region to destabilize neighboring states.

In the field of regional European integration, anti-corruption sanctions can have a beneficial effect in promoting the EU enlargement program by immobilizing local agents of corruption. The same diplomacy of anti-corruption sanctions can serve as a warning system for the EU against criminal-oligarchic attempts to boycott democratic reforms in candidate countries. At the same time, pro-European forces from the states included in the European enlargement package (10 states from the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and Turkey) can use sanctions as a tool of external intervention against mass corruption phenomena. In other words, the ambitions of this sanctions regime signal an increase in the degree of interventionism of the EU, primarily in relation to its neighbors.

At the same time, anti-corruption sanctions will draw new “red lines” in relations with geopolitical rivals. Thus, the EU will be able to prevent and devalue informal ties between corrupt officials in the east and Russia. In the current geopolitical context, Moscow relies on the actions of oligarchic networks or coordinates regional corruption in an attempt to separate the region from Ukraine and the EU. Therefore, anti-corruption sanctions can become a geopolitical means of protecting the EU’s geostrategic interests. For this sanctions policy to work, it will need objective reporting from its diplomatic missions, integrated anti-corruption agencies in neighboring countries, reliable networks of investigative journalism, and pro-reform political forces that are not interested in politicizing the country’s anti-corruption sanctions.

New sanctions on the eve of the summit of the European political community

Russia’s actions against Ukraine have a negative impact on the security of neighboring states. Having been largely affected by regional socio-economic upheavals and their exploitation by local political forces linked to Russia, Moldova has requested an extension of Western sanctions. Following US sanctions against Ilan Shor and Volodymyr Plahotniuc in October 2022, Moldovan governors called on Romania to help put measures on the EU agenda to sanction oligarchs and intermediaries suspected of ties to Moscow at the European level. As in the case of the US, European leaders justify the sanctions by saying that Russia is using corrupt forces to destabilize public order in Moldova against the pro-European government.

In March-April 2023, the ideas of sanctions, dedicated to the situation in Moldova, were disseminated at the level of European institutions. The final decision of the Council of the EU is expected before the summit of the European Political Community, which will be held in Moldova on June 1. Currently, the sanctions list includes five Moldovan politicians or persons associated with them – Ilan Shor, Marian Tauber, Volodymyr Plahotniuk, Gheorghe Kavkaliuk and Igor Chaika (RadioMoldova, May 2023). However, once the sanctions regime is in place, other people and organizations risk being put at risk if the government in Chisinau proves that they are contributing to instability. Among the criteria that will guide the EU in the application of sanctions are participation in actions that interfere with political processes, including elections, as well as accusations of an attempt to change the constitutional order with or without the use of violence. In addition, oligarchs who have influence over state institutions or participate in illegal financial transfers will be subject to sanctions. Although Romania played an important role in promoting this sanctions regime, Brussels notes that the measures will be implemented as a result of Moldova’s (government) request. Read the full article and comment on Contributors.ro