Turkey has had the strangest and most controversial election in decades. Without a centralized reporting system, and with the institutions that were supposed to guarantee the integrity of the electoral process crumbling, chaos reigned from the start and continued until late into the election night. Two opposing camps entered into a battle for impressions, and the polarization of society was reflected in the behavior of its ranks. None of the opponents gets the required 50% + 1, and the country goes to the second round. The very high voter turnout testifies to the continued faith of the Turks in the power of the ballot box. The government camp wins relatively confidently in the parliamentary elections. In general, Turkey followed in the footsteps of Brazil, where polarization and competition played a central role in the elections.

There are interesting consequences, even with caveats, that lead to questionable and largely uncertain results. First, President Erdogan remains dominant in Anatolia and the socioeconomic strata that made him dominant. Second, the opposition alliance of six leaders leads in the most populous cities, but suffers in the countryside, and the lack of an alternative government is costing them dearly. Third, Bahceli’s nationalist party is gaining unexpectedly high percentages, as is ultranationalist candidate Sinan Ogan in the presidential election. Turkish nationalism, a trademark of political leadership and a tool of exploitation, especially in electoral processes, has once again triumphed over its neighbour. Finally, the electoral influence of the parties created by Erdogan’s former ministers and now part of the opposition alliance has been reduced to zero.

And what now; In the second round of the presidential election, Erdogan is the favorite, even if Kılıçdaroglu is slightly ahead after the first round, for two reasons. Firstly, the victory of the ruling coalition in the parliamentary elections gives Erdogan a useful (albeit rather imaginary) argument of uncontrollability and instability if he is defeated within 15 days, since in this case there would be a forced collusion of the powerful President Kılıçdaroğlu with the parliamentary majority controlled by the party Erdogan. Secondly, it is difficult to imagine that the majority of Ogan’s voters will go over to the side of the Alevi Kilichdaroglu, who clearly won the support of the progressive Kurds and whose candidacy was met with great reservations by the nationalists.

The citizens of Turkey went to the polls en masse and will have to do it again in two Sundays. Now we are talking about maintaining political stability and an acceptable election result for both sides.

* Dimitris Tsarouhas is a professor of political science at the Virginia Institute of Technology in the United States and a fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) Turkey Program.