The financier of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, is probably trying to convince Russian President Vladimir Putin to go on the defensive against a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive. His rhetoric, which has been misinterpreted as a call for an end to the war, is actually aimed at freezing the conflict, a pause that would allow Moscow to rebuild its severely weakened forces, the US-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) said in its latest assessment of the war in Ukraine.

It is quite possible that Prigozhin’s attempt is complicit with those who lead the regular army, Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, who, although declared enemies, would make peace with Chief Wagner, trying to use him to persuade Putin to accept This strategy is discussed in experts of the Institute for the Study of War in their assessment, News.ro reports.

However, the Kremlin leader is stubborn and seems unwilling to abandon his ultimate goals of “denazification” and “demilitarization” of Ukraine, insisting on the offensive.

It is possible that Putin is reluctant to agree to a cease-fire because of the influence of pro-war figures in the Kremlin, who remain mysterious for now, or because of concerns about the consequences for the stability of his regime.

In any case, a Ukrainian counteroffensive could decide the outcome of the struggle for influence in the Kremlin, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) concludes in its latest analysis.

Why Prigozhin wants a frozen conflict

Yevgeny Prigozhin said that Ukraine will try to “tear” Russian troops to pieces and stressed that Russia should resist such attacks. In his recent rhetoric, financier Wagner has been increasingly panicky and emphasized the uncertain future of Russian offensive operations in Donbas, according to ISW, a Washington think tank that provides a daily open analysis of the state of the war in Ukraine.

Prigozhin’s calls to strengthen Russian defense in the occupied territories and frequent discussions about the prospects of a Ukrainian counteroffensive are notable in that they indicate that he is trying to intensify the discussion in Russia’s domestic information space, ISV notes.

However, Russia continues to conduct offensive operations in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

Prigozhin also advocates that Russia concentrate on maintaining its current front lines rather than trying to make more territorial gains so that Russian forces can regain combat capability for further offensive operations.

Prigozhin is not in favor of Russia ending the war and coming to terms with Ukraine and the West, as some Russian and Western sources have reported. On the contrary, he condemns a faction within the Kremlin that hopes to end the war through negotiations, ISW notes. In effect, Prigozhin is arguing that Russia should face the full force of the impending Ukrainian counteroffensive and try to maintain the current front lines without ending the war or entering into peace talks, ISW explains.

He argues that a pause after the climax of the Ukrainian offensive will allow Russia to rebuild its fighting power and build nationalist support in Russian society to resume the fight, even in the event of defeat.

Prigozhin is also trying to reframe and undermine some of Putin’s key maximalist goals in Ukraine, namely the “denazification” and “demilitarization” of Ukraine, presumably to minimize the informational impact that might arise from going on the defensive and giving up trying to gain more ground. now.

The ultra-nationalist formation Rusici came to support Prigozhin

The far-right Russian paramilitary group Rusici (Assault and Sabotage Intelligence Group), which promotes the recruitment of ultra-nationalist and irregular Russian forces, echoed Prigozhin’s rejection of the goals of “denazification” and “demilitarization.”

Rusichi noted that Russia is fighting in Ukraine more to seize Donbas, for vital space and combat experience, than to really fight Ukrainian “fascism” and “Nazism”, as Moscow wants.

By reframing Putin’s goals, Prigozhin and some factions within Russia’s ultranationalist community may have sought to prepare Russia’s domestic information space for the prospect of frozen front lines potentially close to the February 23, 2022 starting lines.

Shoigu and Gerasimov talk like Putin, but they want something else

Russia’s high command is also likely trying to persuade Putin to switch to defensive operations, but it may not be able to convey that message directly to Putin.

Some ultra-nationalist figures claim that the Russian Ministry of Defense sought to bring in 400,000 contract troops to ensure that Russia had enough military personnel to protect existing front lines and effectively freeze the current front lines in Ukraine. Russia’s military command is also said to have deployed recruits to support Russian lines in Crimea and may be readying other resources to ensure Russia can hold some positions when the expected Ukrainian counteroffensive culminates.

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Chief of the Russian Army General Staff, Army General Valery Gerasimov, are likely sensitive to the threat of a Ukrainian counter-offensive, but are likely to continue sending troops under contract to bolster meaningless offensive operations at Putin’s insistence.

Kremlin sources have previously indicated that Putin values ​​loyalty over competence, a sentiment that likely prevents Shoigu and Gerasimov from focusing on creating the optimal conditions for effective defense rather than wasting elite Russian units in grueling battles of attrition for small gains.

ISW previously noted that Shoigu and Gerasimov previously may not have been able to convince Putin to issue a decree on mobilization in May 2022 – despite the fact that such a move was needed by Russia to restore the forces needed to conduct offensive operations in Ukraine.

Prigozhin, media wizard

It is possible that the leaders of the Russian army partly established a strained relationship with Prigozhin so that the oligarch could persuade Putin to stop the offensive through the Russian information space.

ISW noted a sharp improvement in Prigozhin’s relations with the Russian Defense Ministry and the Kremlin since early April. The Russian Ministry of Defense, for example, began to directly acknowledge the merits of Wagner’s forces in its daily reports and provided Wagner with ammunition and mobilized troops as reinforcements in early April 2023.

Prigozhin and Kremlin-linked military bloggers also stepped up claims that the son of Kremlin spokesman Dmytro Peskov, Mykola Peskov, served with Wagner in Ukraine — presumably a communications operation aimed at publicly mending relations and, perhaps to increase Prigozhin’s loyalty to the Kremlin.

Previously, Prigozhin managed to influence Putin’s decision-making process by organizing the appointment of commanders loyal to him and the dismissal of incompetent soldiers, so that he penetrated Putin’s inner circle with his criticism of the conduct of the war, ISW notes. .

A Russian political expert noted that in the past, various Kremlin officials have first publicly expressed their plans and projects before persuading Putin to make changes, and Prigozhin is likely to follow the same pattern of influence.

It is possible that the heads of the Russian military command and individual Kremlin officials who favor Putin’s freezing of the war could turn to Prigozhin again to influence Putin once again, ISW writes.

Putin remains stubborn. Be wrong?

Putin’s continued insistence on Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine suggests that the group that wants to freeze the war along the current front line has not fully convinced the Kremlin leader. Indeed, Russian forces are continuing offensive attrition operations to capture Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and Maryinka in Donetsk Oblast, as well as limited offensive operations in Luhansk and western Donetsk Oblast, despite growing Russian fears of an imminent Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Russia’s winter offensive failed to achieve the Kremlin’s ambitious goal of capturing the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions by March 31, but Russian forces do not appear to have abandoned their continued operational focus on tactical gains, however small and costly. these gains.

During the winter offensive campaign, Russian forces suffered significant losses in personnel and equipment, which currently limits their ability to conduct offensive actions on several fronts and will likely limit the ability of Russian forces to respond to possible Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.

The Russian armed forces did not respond to these constraints by prioritizing the axis or implementing an operational pause along any line that would have allowed the Russian armed forces to resupply and recover for a decisive defensive effort. Russian forces continue to deploy contract troops and remnants of effective units to support offensive operations in eastern Ukraine, instead of maintaining this critical reservoir of combat power to respond to a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Bakhmut, Avdiyivka, and Maryinka do not provide significant operational advantages to Russian forces, and any minor tactical advantages along either direction are unlikely to improve Russian forces’ ability to defend against a Ukrainian counteroffensive.

It is possible that Putin is reluctant to agree to a cease-fire because of the influence of influential pro-war figures, who are still mysterious, or because of concerns about the consequences for his regime’s stability. The insistence on tactical advantages suggests that the pro-war camp, which favors continuing the offensive at all costs, is likely still influencing Putin’s decision-making about the war.

A possible shift to preparations for defensive operations ahead of a potential Ukrainian counteroffensive would likely mean that Putin has definitively rejected the views of the pro-war camp in favor of those of a more pragmatic group.

Thus, the possible success of a future Ukrainian counteroffensive could determine the outcome of this struggle for influence over Putin’s decisions, ISW concludes.

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