The news of Iran’s agreement to normalize relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) made a splash in many Arab capitals. Even greater was the surprise of Washington, while for Israel it would have been a small shock. While Israel has remained completely silent on its public reaction, Washington has paid tribute by welcoming the process of restoring diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran after a seven-year hiatus.

What the U.S. did not exactly welcome was the identity of the mediator who made possible the successful conclusion of bilateral negotiations that began in Baghdad in 2021. China has systematically expanded its economic and commercial presence on both sides of the Arab-Persian Gulf over the past two decades. Over the past decade, China has not only deepened its military cooperation with Iran, but also expanded its regional security presence by acquiring two military bases in Arabia (Gwadar) and on the Red Sea (Djibouti).

At the same time, it has become a major oil buyer for both Iran and the BSA, integrating both countries into a strategy of land (OBOR) and sea (Maritime Silk Road) energy, telecommunications and transport networks and infrastructure that will shorten distances. and the cost of transporting Chinese exports of goods to Europe, Africa and the Middle East on the one hand, and Chinese imports of raw materials from Europe and the Middle East on the other. The ports of Haifa and Piraeus are important links in this economic chain.

However, a feature of the new Chinese Silk Roads is that they are developed mainly through land and rail routes from Iran to Turkey and from Russia to Europe, in order to protect in the event of a US-China conflict from US maritime dominance to all maritime zones that pass through the umbilical cord. Euro-Chinese economic interdependence from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. The normalization of Iranian-Saudi relations will contribute to the implementation of this fundamental priority of Chinese trade geopolitics, while significantly reducing the political risk of exporting hydrocarbons from the Persian Gulf.

China knows it still lacks the infrastructure and means to challenge US regional military dominance alone or in alliance with Russia and Iran. This, however, never meant that they would not use their increased economic influence to break the monopoly of diplomatic influence that the US enjoyed over members of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Organization). This abandonment of the monopoly was clearly beneficial for Iran, but it should be emphasized that it is also – but not equally – beneficial for the BSA, which follows a post-2003 and apparently post-2015 strategy of geostrategic autonomy and distancing from USA.

This strategy has its roots in the events of 9/11 and the ill-fated US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan that ended in fiasco and expanded Iran’s ability to expand its influence in the region. However, the autonomy of the BSA accelerated catalytically during the 2011-2015 period, when the indiscretion of the Obama administration not only openly flirted with the possibility of the Muslim Brotherhood parties in Libya, Syria and especially Egypt coming to power, the JCPOA agreement in 2015 on Iran’s nuclear program.

Over the past twenty years, China has systematically expanded its economic and commercial presence on both sides of the Arabian-Persian Gulf.

The JCPOA was a geopolitical anathema that pitted the BSA, the UAE, and Israel against American Democrats. It formed the basis of the anti-Iranian rallying of these three states, which led to Trump’s Republican presidency in 2020 in accordance with the Abraham Accord, that is, the recognition of the state of Israel by a number of important Arab states, with prominent UAE and Bahrain. . The acceptance of the agreement by Bahrain, which would not have been possible without the consent of the BSA, signaled Riyadh’s positive attitude towards Tel Aviv and Washington, that it would also agree – at an appropriate price – to the normalization of relations with Israel, despite the current Palestinian “waiting” .

While the Biden administration would like nothing more than to revive the Obama JCPOA, which Trump destroyed in 2016, Iran’s entry into the ranks of Russia and against Ukraine ruled out that possibility. Logically, this would support the BSA’s desire to join the US and Israel in the direction of joining the Abrahamic covenant alliance. That the BSA decided to re-normalize relations with Tehran at a time when Iran announced that it had enriched its uranium to 84% (enrichment of 90% leads to a nuclear weapon) highlights the gap in trust between the Biden administration and Riyadh.

Eventually, the split became apparent in 2022 due to the pro-Russian neutrality that the BSA maintained on the Ukrainian issue at the diplomatic level, as well as the strengthening of the BSA-Russia oil alliance at the OPEC+ level. In this context, the agreement with Iran, which is essentially a non-aggression pact and not settling any disputes, is another strong statement of the BNA’s geopolitical autonomy from the US. The agreement significantly complicates the possibility of US-Israeli preemptive strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities and deprives the Iranian opposition of a powerful supporting factor. This will, of course, apply to the extent that Tehran also refrains from instrumentalizing the Saudi Shiite minority, which makes up 40% of the BSA’s main oil-producing province’s population.

This agreement does not necessarily mean that the path to the inclusion of the BSA in the Abrahamic Accords is finally closed. This means that the price (sale of F-35s, US security guarantees, nuclear power plants) for this could become too high for any US government. At the energy level, the renormalization agreement marks a decision by Saudi Arabia to close a very important source of friction within OPEC, which could, under certain conditions, contribute, with the assistance of Iran, to the full inclusion of Russia in the cartel of oil exporting countries. .

Dr. Theodoros Tsakiris is Associate Professor of Geopolitics and Energy Policy at the University of Nicosia.