The “Difficult Nation” is once again facing its traditional demons, as evidenced by the deteriorating infrastructure marked by the terrible tragedy at Tempe.

A little earlier, wiretapping, as well as minor and not very financial scandals, faced SW with its demons: lack of a strict ideology, limited respect for institutions, old partisanship.

If the brilliance of all ND narrative has faded, oh SYRIZA, after losing 2019, probably never shone. However, the object of these strings is not SYRIZA. This is UV. The force that, under the leadership of Kyriakos Mitsotakis, sought to take a new role in the political system, dominated for a long time and, although it retains (at least so the opinion polls immediately before the train tragedy showed) a noticeable lead, it has lost much of the attractiveness of the protracted first stage of its government term.

Elites and the rehabilitation of the right

SYRIZA’s dizzying rise to power and the key moment of the referendum created a deep and polarizing tide of distrust for the equally polarizing SYRIZA. This movement was in the minority.

The yes vote in the 2015 referendum represents the first measurable—albeit defensive—crystallization of anti-SYRIZA negativity.

However, it was not until the second SYRIZA government (after September 2015) that the initial anti-SYRIZA sentiment expanded and turned into a “current”, i.e. a mass phenomenon with largely stereotyped characteristics. The numbers here are impressive.

Current range vs. SYRIZA, as shown by the study we did with Angel Seriatoapproached 70%, systematically exceeded 60% of the electorate, and its core was slightly wider than 40% – very close to the “yes” percentage in July 2015 (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/367165368_To_anti-SYRIZA_reuma_).

In this context of the majority’s rejection of SYRIZA, his New Democracy K. Mitsotakis – as PASOK suffered a strategic defeat and new players such as Potami failed to establish themselves – it is gradually becoming the main expression of a somewhat new and complex coalition of voters.

The electoral movement towards ND was not impressive, as a large number of voters in historical PASOK, and a little later DIMAR, turned towards SYRIZA. But it was crucial because it gave the ND a broader socio-cultural base of support than the traditional right.

A particular, but highly strategic, aspect of this breadth of support is the increasing influence of the ND in the field of intellectuals and experts of all stripes and, more generally, among those who interfere in the public sphere (academicians, writers, journalists, analysts, etc.). In the past, PASOK and, to some extent, the revitalizing left have had a significant presence in this area.

Thus, the ND, a party both conservative and liberal, with an ultra-conservative core inside, but with strong old-party tendencies, a party that also excelled in Greek statistics, found itself in the following interesting position: because of the strength of SYRIZA, and as the only viable “opponent of awe” in relation to it, gradually becomes the main pole of representation of a wider – not narrowly and classically right – part of the intellectual and managerial elite.

This part is strongly focused on the European perspective of the country, it is modernizing, reforming and liberal – or thinks it is. Some parts of it are soft, others are hard, neo-liberal.

The rejection of the Official Opposition Party, as well as personally Alexis Tsipras (negative personalization) in this multi-layered “elitist” environment is political, stylistic, cultural and, for its most well-to-do part, sharply class (because it combines the arrogance of the economic position with all the previous ones).

It is particularly interesting that the sum of these people, from the most moderate to the most fanatical, from the most sophisticated to the most “raw” and mediocre, considers – participating in the logic of the “field” a la Bourdieu – to represent a kind of “high variety” in comparison with “low diversity” represented by the SYRIZA system and, in particular, the intellectual environment adjacent to it. This belief in “superiority” towards Syrian outsiders—combined with shared interests—creates a “we” identity that reinforces the depth of direct or indirect connection to the Northern North.

Thus, an internal restructuring of forces took place in our country, mainly at the elite level, but obviously to a lesser extent at the level of the electorate (at this second level, it was expressed in the so-called dominance of Mitsotakis to the center). We will call this reassignment or regrouping within the elites “secondary regrouping”, regrouping within the realm of the “old forces”.

This realignment was in addition to the central realignment that saw SYRIZA become a central player within the broad left-center-left. The obvious consequence was the exemption from support and voting for ND.

SYRIZA, unilaterally focusing on the most militant, polarizing and toxic part of the newcomers to the conservative faction, the so-called “extreme centrists”, did not see the big picture. Restructuring at the elite level gave the ideologically dense and largely old conservative party faction a new look and political-cultural breadth that it lacked after 1981.

This gave it a kind of ideological primacy for the first time, which was greatly reinforced by the anti-SYRIZA media focus. The formation of this complex “coalition” of support for the ND is a factor that strengthened its political and electoral resilience. This becomes apparent today, when it became very difficult for her.

Voters and image cracks

However, at the level of the electorate, this balance turned out to be limited and could not reverse the long-term domination of the wrong political forces within the framework of the post-colonial party system. From 1981 until the July 2019 elections, in no single parliamentary contest did the combined electoral percentage of parties on the right side of the political spectrum, in this percentage I include all the wrong votes, from PASOK to those from the smallest organization of the far left, not less than 50% (estimated: 52.05% in 2019). The phenomenon of such illegitimate dominance is rare in Europe.

Of course, after the ND came to power, the initial image of a serious government was formed, fulfilling its promises along with some serious, according to the public, successes (management of the first wave of the pandemic, events on Evros). a politically unique image of dominance: 17 percentage points difference with the second party in January 2020, 18 percentage points in January 2021 (Politico poll). This is no longer the case, despite the fact that ND in the field of foreign policy and the digitization of the state (digitization is consistent with the narrative that the government is “modernizing”) is widely accepted.

Today, there are far more negative opinions about the work of the government than positive ones, and the overall assessment of the government is unambiguously negative. Anti-ND sentiment has intensified, as has the negative attitude towards the prime minister “reflexively” – even if the dominant belief remains that if SYRIZA were in government, things “would be worse”. Moreover, since there is nothing liberal and modernizing about wiretapping and running it, the rallying of liberals and modernists around New Democracy has lost some of its former legitimacy. In a sense, voting to the right is again incriminated, but only partially. Old bad habits have their price.

In conclusion, the anti-SYRIZA movement has weakened and SYRIZA is currently recording the highest percentage of polls since 2019. But SYRIZA did not find the words that would inspire the confidence of the majority. No clues that would compensate or at least neutralize the new role – still “old” – ND. Thus, if the “magic” for ND is lost, the “magic” for SYRIZA is not created.

The country is about to enter an extremely protracted election campaign that will likely feature two contests. Turnout in the recent European elections was high in the last phase of the campaign – and higher than originally thought.

The Tempe tragedy is outrageous. And it harms the narrative of modernization and the “self-reliant Greece” of the Northern North. Liquidity will increase.

Gerasimos Moschonas is Professor of Comparative Politics at Panteion University.