Question mark in the name of the event on the theme of monitoring “”Stay in Europe”?” it was enough to anger staunch supporters of the We Remain Europe (no question mark) movement that emerged in 2015 to defend the country’s European course, which the referendum said had been compromised. The slightly ironic use of the question mark certainly implies the question of whether their monitoring, organization, reach and goals are somehow alienating us from the foundations of European liberal democracy. On the other hand, however, no one has the right to intercept the true meaning of Europeanism as it manifested itself then, especially if it thus serves (“objectively”, we would say in an older, Orthodox parlance) the goals of the enemies of the European perspective.

So who owns Europe? Does anyone have the right to claim to have expressed once and for all the true content that “Europe” has (should) have for our small country? The answer is obvious: of course not. The idea of ​​Europe and our relationship to it is too complex, historically disputed and subject to constant negotiation for anyone to claim exclusive rights to it.

But the question is deeper. In the last crisis decade, of the many crises, “Europe” has been one of the most basic, symbolic and real disputes. From the memorandums to the Prespa Agreement, which culminated in the 2015 referendum, there has been a constant division based on (pro-/anti-)-Europeanism defining political identity and polarization. But is it still relevant? If so, in the same way and with the same content?

Before answering, let’s keep in mind that Europeanism is necessarily plural, since “Europe” is a signifier with many signifiers. If one wanted to generalize the recent history of our relationship with the idea of ​​Europe, it would not be entirely inaccurate to describe it something like this (also based on some Eurobarometer readings).

In the first post-colonial period for Greece, as well as for the other two South European countries of the “third wave of democratization” according to Samuel Huntington (Spain, Portugal), “Europe” was the horizon for the consolidation of young democracy. After decades of “Kashetian democracy”, the junta and the Cypriot drama, we took it as a guarantee of democratic institutions.

The Euroscepticism of the 1970s did not last long. Already in the mid-1980s, the Greeks were increasingly positive about participation in the EEC, rapidly approaching the average European level. However, the consolidation of democracy has brought about changes in the hierarchy of the signified. During the years of economic growth and (not so real, as it turned out) rapprochement with prosperous Europe, our already strong pro-European sentiments have become utilitarian. Europe meant economy, not democracy.

Does anyone have the right to claim to have expressed once and for all the true content that “Europe” has (should) have for our small country?

In 2011, the Greeks for the first time responded negatively to the question of whether the state benefited from EU membership. However, at the same time, they believe that the EU can handle the crisis better. not national governments, and they answer “euro” to the question “What does the EU mean to you?”. In 2018, the EU for the Greeks meant, first of all, freedom and the euro, and not economic prosperity, and only then peace and democracy.

In the most difficult phase of our relations with “Europe”, a whole spectrum of different, often contradictory attitudes towards it has developed, from complete acceptance to the deepest skepticism, without final distancing from it – a sign of the ability of the European project to incorporate its criticism. The people who voted “no” in the referendum ended up accepting the need to stay in the eurozone, others may have voted “yes” and then joined nationalist rallies against the Prespa deal. The “camps” were less clean than the proponents of the camp worldview believe.

To use A.O.’s well-known exit-vote-loyalty scheme. Girshman, the Greeks raised their voice, however, without choosing a way out, but definitively demonstrating their commitment to European belonging. Even if this belonging no longer meant a community of prosperity, but nevertheless a community of freedom, rights and democracy.

If this is the case, if the “idea of ​​Europe” takes on different – and not monolithic – meanings at every moment, it is possible that the defense of the foundations of liberal democracy is returning today as its main signifier. (and demand). Especially since exposing an extensive network of surveillance or senseless attacks on independent authorities, which, as far as we know, is the main mechanism for controlling and balancing power in every developed democracy, is not even included in the compendium of European democratic laws.

In this sense, the question mark at the end of the beautiful phrase “We remain in Europe” not only does not arouse suspicion, but is also mandatory – not only today in general. As a constant reminder that our belonging to Europe is never a given once and for all.

Mr. Yannis Balapanidis is a political scientist and writer.