Prague, evening of January 29. Darkness falls over the “Golden City” and over Prague Castle, which Kafka obsessively described in his works – born nearby – in the form of a timeless castle. Just as Milos Zeman could not be seen in the Castle yesterday, so today the new President Peter Pavl could not be seen in the center of political power for centuries. However, something has changed: in the following years, those who voted for him will be able to see President Pavel in office, as the fourth president of the Czech Republic, which, after a period of coexistence with Slovakia, finally turned into a federation of which even now it is not known why in the early 1990s he was considered ballast

Czech politics has always been in a precarious balance: it has never been based on strong parties and strong leaders, instead allowing the emergence of funny creatures such as post-communist communists, political pirates or Czech nationalists of Japanese origin. In the early 1990s, Vaclav Havel wanted a presidency with little power but with a symbolic charge, an institution tailored to the personality of one who referred to the “power of the powerless” in his writings. The next president, Vaclav Klaus, acted more energetically, but within the limits of the constitutional mandate. Typical Central European skepticism, exemplified by the Czech nation in various periods of history, was embodied by Klaus in the form of distrust of the virtues of the European project. Vaclav Klaus continued Mrs Thatcher’s vision – or at least that’s how he wanted to be seen. Then there was a strange experiment, from the outside looking in, but entirely compatible with the Czech spirit: Miloš Zeman, a president who raised nostalgia for the communist period to unforeseen heights. How is it possible that in the Czech Republic, and only in the Czech Republic, a party like the KSCM could achieve remarkable results by 2021 in a country that has introduced the strictest provisions related to lustration? The explanation lies in the paradoxical behavior of the Czech electorate, skepticism combined with nostalgia for the past, which, on the contrary, seemed better than the decadent landscape of the present. However, Zeman, a former member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia since 1968, did much better in the elections than the Czech Communists because he was based on the Socialist Party rather than the KCSM. Outwardly a European social democrat, deep down he is a politician with staunch communist convictions. Lustration was ultimately defeated in the Czech Republic, as it turned out that it was not the first echelon of ex-communists who wanted to stay in politics, but ordinary members who, after 1989, were considered to have completely disappeared during the profound events. transformed Central Europe.

In a country where the deep legacy of the old regime has not been fully elucidated, and traditional Central European skepticism has always dominated, the rise of populism has become a natural consequence. In 2012, billionaire Andres Babis founded the populist party ANO 2011 – Party of Dissatisfied Citizens. The centrist populist party, which is part of the liberal group “Restore Europe” at the European level, is another paradox of Czech politics. A leader-based party, like Forza Italia, was conceived only as an electoral vehicle for Silvio Berlusconi. In 2017, Babis managed to form an alliance with the Socialists and Communists, leading a minority government that lacked a majority in parliament. In 2021, a center-right coalition led by Prime Minister Petr Fiala will come to power. A coalition formed by the Eurosceptic party (ODS), a party called “Mayors and Independents” that supports local and regional political interests, the Christian Democratic Party (KDU-CSL), the liberal and progressive Czech Pirate Party and TOP 09, a liberal-conservative party. A very diverse government in fact, bringing together “digital parties” such as the Pirates, regional parties, conservative, liberal and Christian Democratic parties. Opposition to Babis and the government he led led to all these parties coming together to form not one, but two electoral alliances (extreme diversity prevented the emergence of a single center-right alliance), which together won the election.

After 2021, Fiala’s government faced not only the opposition gathered around Babis, but also the opposition of President Zeman. These two represent everything that could be more opposite: nostalgic ex-communist vs. former pragmatic communist; a political person with an exclusively political past vs. a businessman who sees politics only as a means to gain more power. However, the period after the formation of the Fiala government forced Babis and Zeman to find themselves in the same political project with a populist-identical shade. They both have something in common: distrust of liberal democracy.

The parties currently supporting Fiala’s government have been discussing the candidacy of Petro Pavlo, who was released from military and diplomatic duties in 2018, since 2019. The leaders of the center-right parties realized that in order to balance ANO 2011, it was not enough to compete with Babis alone. There was also a need for a political figure who would be the direct opposite of Zeman. On the other hand, the coalition understood that the too early introduction of Pavel into the electoral struggle would definitely compromise his chances. That is why Pavlo is carefully building his profile as an independent candidate in the period 2019-2022, officially announcing that he wants to run for office only in June 2022, after the change of power. Pavlo presented himself as a candidate not from a party or an association of parties, but from a citizen’s initiative. By making this option, he chose the most difficult path. His military training and dedication to supporting his fellow men must have had a lot to do with this personal choice.

The pandemic was the first opportunity Paul used to outline his political profile. Wherever populist parties were in power that did not take decisive measures in the field of health care, the pandemic caused disaster. The same thing happened in the Czech Republic, where Babis ignored the doctors’ advice. The consequences are visible, in all waves of the pandemic, the Czech Republic is the champion in the incidence of Covid – 19. In April 2020, Pavlo starts a civil initiative to fight the pandemic, travels the country, collects funds for volunteers working in hospitals, talks about how to fight against pandemic and begins to win the trust of citizens. One day, Pavlo hands Prime Minister Babish a plan to combat the pandemic, drawn up by analogy with NATO’s emergency plans. Babis, however, was concerned only with his personal project.

The beginning of the war in Ukraine became the second moment when Pavlo got the opportunity to demonstrate his competence. The Czech Republic was and is at the forefront of efforts to support Ukraine. Explanations for this attitude are much more complex to generalize in this context. However, two reasons cannot be avoided in any interpretation. The Czechoslovak leadership always showed sympathy for the Ukrainians, who were left without a state after 1918, unlike the Czechs and Slovaks, who had such a chance. It is no accident that after Transcarpathia became part of the Ukrainian SSR, Ukrainian leaders found their refuge in Prague – until the long arm of Soviet-style communism was established in Czechoslovakia. The second reason is that the Czechs (and Slovaks, but to a lesser extent) were deeply disillusioned after the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968: the Soviet government was identified with Russian domination, which the Czechs opposed as fiercely as they rejected the German domination. Images of Russian aggression against Ukraine awakened a collective anti-Russian unconscious in the Czech Republic. A popular feeling that caused solidarity with Ukrainian refugees more than in other European countries, and which put Fiala’s government in front of a fait accompli: helping Ukraine meant agreeing with the orientation of the majority of citizens.

The war in Ukraine was, in a way, Peter Paul’s chance, which he could not miss. His firm pro-Ukrainian position won the respect of citizens from the very beginning. His long military career and especially his NATO experience were of great importance because his explanations from the outset had an air of competence that other thought leaders could not have. Pavlo announced his candidacy only in June 2022, after three months during which he competently explained why Ukraine needed help. Pavlo criticized the countries of Europe, which have an ambiguous attitude towards Ukraine. He explained at length why the West made a mistake by underestimating Putin’s claims after 2014. He calmly showed what disastrous consequences the victory of the Russian Federation would have not only for Ukraine, but also for the entire system of international relations. The government coalition realized for the second time that Pavel does not need political support, but he can offer, if he is elected president, the best authority and legitimacy of Fiala’s government. Thus, the election campaign was exclusively Paul’s brand. The campaign centered on competent, apolitical people, united only by the confidence of the candidate’s victory, people who from the very beginning declared that they did not want to be a “shadow government”.

The election campaign took place under the banner of war in Ukraine. Babis tried to rely on the anti-war direction of the minority and lost. He said that if Poland or the Baltic states were attacked, as Ukraine was, the Czech Republic should not rush to their aid, in line with NATO commitments, only to come back and say only that politicians should fight for peace and avoid war. Babis later addressed his opponent directly, stating that he was a “diplomat, not a soldier” and that he did not want “the Czechs to be drawn into the war.” Babish’s campaign was extremely tumultuous, accusing Pavel of being an agent of the communist secret police, just as Putin was an agent of the KGB. The main point is that Babis was proven to be a former agent of the StB, even after the Constitutional Court confirmed in 2017 the conviction of an employee of the Czechoslovak communist secret police. During the election campaign, Czech voters received an anonymous text message urging them to report to the nearest military unit to receive weapons needed for mobilization for war with Ukraine. On the contrary, Pavlo presented himself as a diplomat and an experienced military man, without attacking his opponent. Pavel skilfully speculated on Babis’ position against involving the Czech Republic in a possible military conflict in defense of Poland, declaring in Polish that he would visit Poland after his election.

Pavel’s victory in the second round was decisive Continue reading the article on Contributors.ro