Ion Ceban is a new controversial figure from Chisinau, which some political leaders from Bucharest are banking on. Rising star. It joins a long list of seemingly incomprehensible decisions taken by Bucharest (or some of its leaders) in the strategic relationship between Romania and the Republic of Moldova. Strengthening of Ion Ceban’s relations with Romanian political leaders continued in 2022.

Ceban, the pro-Russian mayor of Chisinau who poses as a centrist politician, even with pro-European views, had actual business trips to Romania in 2022, trying to attract funding and support from Romanian parties and administrations. If funding is still limited (according to Ceban, worth 2.5 million euros), many city halls or district councils were reluctant or allocated reduced budgets, the same cannot be said for the results of his PR campaign. That Ion Ceban knows how to use very well at home, in the Republic of Moldova.

Ceban is probably the leader of Moldova with whom mayors, heads of county councils, ministers or heads of parties in Romania meet most often. 2022 meant dozens of meetings with Romanian political leaders, mainly from the Social Democratic Party, as well as important members of the National Liberal Party and the Save Romania Union. In CRPE, we were able to identify at least 30 meetings with political leaders of Romania, including 12 with PSD representatives, 8 with PNL, 5 from the EDR, 5 with representatives of other political parties or unrelated parties (but all are close to the PSD). Ceban participates in cultural events and concerts in Romania, gives speeches, and Chisinau even co-finances notable events in Romania.

In an interview with the G4media portal, Maia Sandu asked the Romanian mayors, who are implementing joint projects with Ion Ceban, to better document themselves about the situation in the Republic of Moldova. A diplomatic message, but one that likely harbors many smoldering resentments. And this testifies, if it were so, to the duplicitous behavior of many political leaders of Romania in relations with Chisinau.

We also reiterate who Seban is. An influential person in the Republic of Moldova for at least a decade, elected mayor of Chisinau in 2019 after re-election with a song, former deputy and secretary for ideology a member of the pro-Russian Socialist Party, Ceban has adopted a dual policy in recent years, maintaining closeness to the pro-Russian camp while courting Romanian and European politicians. He declared himself apolitical after taking office as mayor, but took a “leave of absence” from Chisinau City Hall to support Igor Dodon, president of the Socialist Party, during the 2020 presidential campaign.

Cheban condemned Russia’s war in Ukraine only in October 2022, when he called Russia an “aggressor state”. And that’s only half a mouthful. He waited for months for the war to develop and the Kremlin’s financial support to decrease in order to “form” his opinion. And it is likely that the new speech also has the approval of the Kremlin, because the type of tough politician with strong pro-Russian and anti-European messages, in the style of Igor Dodon, has crashed in the polls. Homophobic, he tried to ban the LGBT march in Chisinau, promoting a speech that incites hatred.

The intensive campaign to promote Ceban in Romania is also connected with the absence of any coherent strategy of Bucharest in relation to Chisinau. For years, Romania has banked on controversial politicians in Chisinau, especially those who gravitated around the fugitive oligarch Plahotniuc. Today, Maia Sandu is not happy with the openness that Plahotniuc had in Bucharest. Of course, the Republic of Moldova is supported, which is quite natural, but at the same time, some Romanian political leaders are also looking for other “dialogue partners”, preferably more flexible ones.

And Ceban is a master politician who knows how to exploit Romania’s inconsistency to score points at home. The flight of the oligarch Plahotniuc from the Republic of Moldova and the de facto dissolution of the Democratic Party of Moldova, the favorite of Bucharest, left a “vacuum” in Moldovan politics, in the so-called zone of the center, which Ceban is trying to fill with moderate language. There also remained a gap in the preferences of some political leaders from Bucharest.

Ceban is looking for as much support as possible in Romania or other European countries to prepare for local elections in 2023, as well as, most likely, parliamentary and presidential elections. He internally uses any received funding, image or event from Romania to convince an undecided electorate, unconvinced or disaffected by Maia Sandu’s Party of Action and Solidarity, that he is not really a pro-Russian politician, but a moderate, who may not oppose either camp, but will support the pro-European line of the Republic of Moldova.

With the newly created party, National Alternative Movement.in the spotlight. Coincidence or not, the Romanian PSD is the common denominator of both the Democratic Party of Moldova, now called the European Social Democratic Party, and Ceban’s party. PSD leaders recently posed in Chisinau with representatives of both parties.

An ambitious politician, Ceban realized that partnership with Romanian administrations and political leaders was a winning card. Especially for a political career that wants to go beyond the Chisinau City Hall. What Romania can gain from this association (which has long since overcome the barriers of simple funding, which in some cases are easier to explain) and why political leaders in Romania are helping to whitewash the image of the politician who created and is making the Russian Games in Chisinau is a question that deserves repeating many times.

However, 2022 also meant unprecedented support from the Bucharest government for the Republic of Moldova, especially in the energy sector, against the background of the war unleashed by Russia and the blackmail of Gazprom. We have at least two positions in Romania on this matter: the first is that Romania has done everything possible to help Chisinau. The second one we share is that Romania did not live up to expectations and promises even when Chisinau was left without electricity and natural gas, suffering including blackouts due to the Russian bombing of Ukraine.

Insufficient support of the RepublicMoldova demonstrates all the vulnerability of Bucharest and its inability to become a provider of security and prosperity for Chisinau. With the Strategic Partnership signed since 2010, major infrastructure projects have been significantly delayed or not even started, Bucharest projects many of its internal weaknesses into its relationship with Chisinau. With a rudimentary political class, Bucharest seems unable to adopt the selfless behavior that would truly support the European course and reform measures in the Republic of Moldova. Read the whole article and comment on Contributors.ro